Miller v. Kijakazi
| Decision Date | 09 September 2022 |
| Docket Number | 4:21 CV 56 ACL |
| Parties | BREANNE MILLER, Plaintiff, v. KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner of Social Security Administration, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
Plaintiff Breanne Miller brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 405(g), seeking judicial review of the Social Security Administration Commissioner's denial of her application for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Social Security Act and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under Title XVI of the Act.
An Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) found that despite Miller's severe impairments, she was not disabled as she had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform work existing in significant numbers in the national economy.
This matter is pending before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge, with consent of the parties, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). A summary of the entire record is presented in the parties' briefs and is repeated here only to the extent necessary.
For the following reasons, the decision of the Commissioner will be affirmed.
Miller filed her applications for benefits on April 3, 2019. (Tr. 202-17.) She claimed she became unable to work on August 11, 2017, due to back and neck injuries, bilateral leg numbness, tingling legs, tingling arms, “throbbing/sharp pain,” tailbone surgery, and a cyst. (Tr. 203, 245.) Miller was 32 years of age at her alleged onset of disability date. Her applications were denied initially. (Tr. 124-29.) Miller's claims were denied by an ALJ on July 2, 2020. (Tr. 12-21.) On November 25, 2020, the Appeals Council denied Miller's claim for review. (Tr. 1-4.) Thus, the decision of the ALJ stands as the final decision of the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.981, 416.1481.
In this action, Miller first argues that the ALJ's decision “lacks a proper pain evaluation.” (Doc. 31 at 3.) She next argues that “the opinion evidence is not properly evaluated.” Id. at 6.
The ALJ first found that Miller met the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through December 31, 2022. (Tr. 14.) He stated that Miller has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since her alleged onset date. (Tr. 15.) In addition, the ALJ concluded that Miller had the following severe impairment: degenerative disc disease. Id. The ALJ found thatMiller did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments. Id.
As to Miller's RFC, the ALJ stated:
After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(a) and 416.967(a) except: Redefined as retaining the ability to lift and carry up to the exertional limits; however, she is able to stand or walk for no more than 60 minutes during a normal eight-hour workday; is able to sit for up to eight hours during a normal eighthour workday, with normal breaks. She is unable to climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds, but she can occasionally climb ramps or stairs, stoop, kneel, crouch and crawl. She is unable to reach overhead. She is to avoid extreme vibration, all operational control of moving machinery, working at unprotected heights, and the use of hazardous machinery. She requires a sit/stand option every 60 minutes throughout the eight-hour workday for a brief period of time.
(Tr. 15.)
The ALJ found that Miller was unable to perform her past relevant work as a pipe fitter helper, but she was capable of performing other work existing in significant numbers in the national economy. (Tr. 19-20.) The ALJ therefore concluded that Miller was not under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from August 11, 2017, through the date of the decision. (Tr. 21.)
The ALJ's final decision reads as follows:
III.A. Standard of Review
The decision of the Commissioner must be affirmed if it is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Estes v. Barnhart, 275 F.3d 722, 724 (8th Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance of the evidence, but enough that a reasonable person would find it adequate to support the conclusion. Johnson v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1145, 1147 (8th Cir. 2001). This “substantial evidence test,” however, is “more than a mere search of the record for evidence supporting the Commissioner's findings.” Coleman v. Astrue, 498 F.3d 767, 770 (8th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Substantial evidence on the record as a whole . . . requires a more scrutinizing analysis.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
To determine whether the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole, the Court must review the entire administrative record and consider:
Stewart v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 957 F.2d 581, 585-86 (8th Cir. 1992) (internal citations omitted). The Court must also consider any evidence which fairly detracts from the Commissioner's decision. Coleman, 498 F.3d at 770; Warburton v. Apfel, 188 F.3d 1047, 1050 (8th Cir. 1999). However, even though two inconsistent conclusions may be drawn from the evidence, the Commissioner's findings may still be supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. Pearsall v. Massanari, 274 F.3d 1211, 1217 (8th Cir. 2001) (citing Young v. Apfel, 221 F.3d 1065, 1068 (8th Cir. 2000)). “[I]f there is substantial evidence on the record as a whole, we must affirm the administrative decision, even if the record could also have supported an opposite decision.” Weikert v. Sullivan, 977 F.2d 1249, 1252 (8th Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Jones ex rel. Morris v. Barnhart, 315 F.3d 974, 977 (8th Cir. 2003). Put another way, a court should “disturb the ALJ's decision only if it falls outside the available zone of choice.” Papesh v. Colvin, 786 F.3d 1126, 1131 (8th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted).
III.B. Determination of Disability
A disability is defined as the inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or that has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A); 20 C.F.R. § 416.905. A claimant has a disability when the claimant is “not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education and work experience engage in any kind of substantial gainful work which exists .. in significant numbers in the region where such individual lives or in several regions of the country.” 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B).
To determine whether a claimant has a disability within the meaning of the Social Security Act, the Commissioner follows a five-step sequential evaluation process outlined in the regulations. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920; see Kirby v. Astrue, 500 F.3d 705, 707 (8th Cir. 2007). First, the Commissioner will consider a claimant's work activity. If the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity, then the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(i).
Second, if the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful activity, the Commissioner looks to see “whether the claimant has a severe impairment that significantly limits the claimant's physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities.” Dixon v. Barnhart, 343 F.3d 602, 605 (8th Cir. 2003). “An impairment is not severe if it amounts only to a slight abnormality that would not significantly limit the claimant's physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.” Kirby, 500 F.3d at 707; see 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(c), 416.921(a).
The ability to do basic work activities is defined as “the abilities and aptitudes necessary to do most jobs.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.921(b). These abilities and aptitudes include (1) physical functions such as walking, standing, sitting, lifting, pushing, pulling, reaching, or handling; (2) capacities for seeing, hearing, and speaking; (3) understanding, reaching out, and remembering simple instructions; (4) use of judgment; (5) responding appropriately to supervision, coworkers, and usual work situations; and (6) dealing with changes in a routine work setting. Id. § 416.921(b)(1)-(6); see Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 141 (1987). “The sequential evaluation process may be terminated at step two only when the claimant's impairment or combination of impairments would have no more than a minimal impact on his ability to work.” Page v. Astrue, 484 F.3d 1040, 1043 (8th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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