Miller v. Kleppen

• Citation: 395 Mont. 286,438 P.3d 806,2019 MT 83
• Decision Date: 09 April 2019
• Docket Number: DA 18-0575
• Parties: Shannon MILLER, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Tim KLEPPEN and Raelene Kleppen, Defendants and Appellants.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Montana

395 Mont. 286

438 P.3d 806

2019 MT 83

Shannon MILLER, Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.Tim KLEPPEN and Raelene Kleppen, Defendants and Appellants.

DA 18-0575

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted on Briefs: February 27, 2019

Decided: April 9, 2019

For Appellants: Wayne Jennings, Jennings Law Office, P.C., Bozeman, Montana

For Appellee: Ryan K. Jackson, Jackson Law, P.C., Bozeman, Montana

Justice Jim Rice delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 Appellants Tim Kleppen and Raelene Kleppen (Kleppens) appeal the order entered by the Eighteenth Judicial District Court, Gallatin County, after trial, granting specific performance of a contract to Shannon Miller (Miller). We affirm, addressing the following issues:

1. Did the District Court err by concluding Miller’s breach of contract claim was not barred by the statute of limitation?

2. Did the District Court err by determining Miller was entitled to specific performance of the contract?

3. Did the District Court err by dismissing Kleppens’ trespass claim?

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 This case concerns a boundary realignment agreement between two neighboring property owners in Gallatin County. Miller is the owner of Tract 241 of the Rainbow Subdivision of Bozeman Hot Springs, which she purchased and has lived on since 1989. Miller bought and owned the tract jointly with her husband, William, until his death in 2008. Kleppens are the owners of Tract 242 of the Subdivision, which they purchased pursuant to a contract for deed and obtained record title to in 2000.

¶3 In July 1999, Kleppens initiated an action against Millers in Gallatin County Justice Court, alleging Millers had erected improvements to their tract that extended onto Kleppens’ tract. In November 1999, after participating in mediation through the Justice Court, the parties entered into a settlement, first memorialized by a hand-written agreement and diagram, wherein they agreed to a boundary realignment of their common boundary line between Tracts 241 and 242 by exchanging equal amounts of property. The diagram depicted the intended boundary realignment and notes about the property. As the District Court found, the handwritten agreement contemplated a formal Stipulation, which was typed and then signed by the parties on December 1, 1999. The Stipulation provided the following description of the revised property line intended by the parties, referring to the handwritten diagram:

From Point A, as set forth on the agreed upon diagram, the new property line will head southernly to a distance eight feet to the direct south of the furthest southernly point of Miller mobile home, hence west to a point directly north of Point B, hence directly north to Point B. The area encompassed by the new property line as it traverses Kleppen’s Lot will be computed. The new property line will then traverse Miller’s lot by beginning at Point A, heading northernly for a distance, hence easternly a distance until it intersects the easternly boundary line of Miller’s Lot. The amount the new property line will traverse Miller’s Lot will be determined by adjusting the lines so that the same amount of acreage taken from the Kleppen Lot will be taken from the Miller Lot.

¶4 To accomplish the boundary realignment, the Stipulation provided that the parties would: (1) obtain a mutually acceptable surveyor to complete a property line readjustment to be filed with the Gallatin County Clerk and Recorder, with costs to be split equally between the parties; (2) construct a fence along the new boundary realignment on or before June 15, 2000, with costs to be split equally between the parties and "Miller" performing the labor at no cost to Kleppens; (3) remove Millers’ basketball hoop from Kleppens’ property, to be completed by Millers; and (4) address bushes currently on the property line. The Stipulation provided that "[w]hen the fence construction is complete the attorneys for both parties will file a motion with this Court for an Order of Dismissal with prejudice."

¶5 Following execution of the Stipulation, Millers removed the basketball hoop as required by the Stipulation. Over the years thereafter, Kleppens watered, mowed, and fertilized the property they were to gain under the Stipulation, and Millers mowed, sprayed weeds, and trimmed the trees on the portion they were to gain under the Stipulation. However, neither party retained a surveyor to complete the boundary realignment or purchased materials to complete the construction of the fence, and therefore, the boundary realignment was never recorded in Gallatin County, and the fence was not built.

¶6 The District Court found that, "[f]rom December 1, 1999 through May 7, 2016, neither party expressed or acted in a manner contrary to the ownership and boundary realignment terms of the Stipulation," and that "[n]either party acted in a manner that suggest[ed] they did not intend to complete the terms of the Stipulation."

¶7 On May 8, 2016, Kleppen approached Shannon Miller and asked her to remove her power pole, gas meter, pump house, and two trees from "his property"—property that was to be transferred to Miller under the Stipulation. Kleppens placed stakes and a string-line in the ground to mark the original boundary line, and cut down two trees in the area that was to be transferred to Miller. The District Court found these actions were "the first notification to Miller that the Kleppens no longer intended to abide by the terms of the Stipulation."

¶8 In June 2016, Miller filed this action in the Gallatin County District Court, seeking specific performance of the Stipulation. Kleppens counterclaimed in trespass, and sought removal of Miller’s property improvements. The District Court conducted a bench trial and held in favor of Miller, reasoning that Kleppens did not challenge the validity of the Stipulation, and did not assert any defenses that would support rescinding the Stipulation; that both parties partially performed their agreement; that the statute of limitations for breach of contract did not begin to run until Miller first learned of Kleppens’ intention to not comply with the Stipulation, on May 8, 2016, and that Miller could not have learned of the breach prior to that time. The District Court ruled Miller was entitled to specific performance and dismissed Kleppens’ trespass claim. The District Court ordered the parties to complete a survey of the property within 90 days of the order, and to construct a fence within 90 days of completion of the survey.

¶9 Kleppens appeal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶10 "In an action tried without a jury, we review the district court’s findings of fact under the clearly erroneous standard. A district court’s findings of fact are clearly erroneous if they are not supported by substantial credible evidence, if the court misapprehended the effect of the evidence, or if a review of the record leaves this Court with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. We review a district court’s conclusions of law de novo, determining whether the court’s interpretation and application of the law is correct." Blazer v. Wall , 2008 MT 145, ¶ 22, 343 Mont. 173, 183 P.3d 84 (citations omitted). Statute of limitations present a question of law; accordingly, "[w]e review for correctness the district court’s application of the statute of limitations." Wing v. State , 2007 MT 72, ¶ 9, 336 Mont. 423, 155 P.3d 1224 ; accord Gulf Ins. Co. v. Clark , 2001 MT 45, ¶ 13, 304 Mont. 264, 20 P.3d 780.

DISCUSSION

¶11 1. Did the District Court err by concluding Miller’s breach of contract claim was not barred by the statute of limitation?

¶12 Kleppens argue the District Court erred by ruling Miller’s breach of contract claim was not barred under § 27-2-202(1), MCA, which provides that an action for breach of a written contract must be brought within 8 years. Kleppens pose that Miller knew by June 15, 2000—the date provided in the Stipulation for completion of the fence upon the realigned boundary line—that the contract had not been completed, and, therefore, that a breach of contract had occurred. Thus, they contend a cause of action for breach then accrued.

¶13 The Stipulation was a written contract between the parties, and actions based thereon are governed by § 27-2-202, MCA. A period of limitation, such as the eight-year period here, begins to run "when the cause of action accrues."

Larson v. Undem , 246 Mont. 336, 340, 805 P.2d 1318, 1321 (1990) ; McWilliams v. Clem , 228 Mont. 297, 308, 743 P.2d 577, 584 (1987) ; accord Ming Da Situ v. Smole , 2013 MT 33, ¶ 22, 369 Mont. 1, 303 P.3d 747 ; Viers v. Webb , 76 Mont. 38, 42, 245 P. 257, 258 (1926) ; § 27-2-102(2), MCA. "Generally, ‘a claim or cause of action accrues when all elements of the claim or cause exist or have occurred, the right to maintain an action on the claim or cause is complete, and a court or other agency is authorized to accept jurisdiction of the action.’ " Ming Da Situ , ¶ 22 (quoting § 27-2-102(1)(a), MCA ). Additionally, "it has long been recognized that the statute of limitations runs from the time of the breach and not from the time of injury[.]" Kitchen Krafters v. Eastside Bank , 242 Mont. 155, 163, 789 P.2d 567, 571 (1990), overruled on other grounds by

Busta v. Columbus Hosp. , 276 Mont. 342, 370, 916 P.2d 122, 139 (1996).

¶14 Kleppens’ accrual argument is founded upon their position that the District Court’s findings of fact regarding the parties’ actions and intentions are clearly erroneous. They argue "no evidence" was presented that the parties embraced the new property allocations made by the Stipulation, "other than by supposedly mowing, watering, fertilizing and weeding," and that the "only act" carried out by the parties in furtherance of the Stipulation was removal of the basketball hoop by the Millers, which they characterize as "of little consequence." Therefore, they contend that "[f]or 16 ½ years the Kleppens believed that the Millers had no intention of moving forward with the stipulation...