Miller v. Lewis University

• Decision Date: 11 April 2021
• Docket Number: Case No. 20 C 5473
• Parties: Brianna MILLER, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. LEWIS UNIVERSITY, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

533 F.Supp.3d 678

Brianna MILLER, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff,

v.LEWIS UNIVERSITY, Defendant.

Case No. 20 C 5473

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division.

Filed April 11, 2021

Corrected April 12, 2021

Jason P. Sultzer, The Sultzer Law Group, Poughkeepsie, NY, Edward W. Ciolko, Gary F. Lynch, Carlson Lynch, LLP, Pittsburgh, PA, Kathleen Patricia Lally, Katrina Carroll, Carlson Lynch, LLP, Chicago, IL, Michael Alexander Tompkins, Pro Hac Vice, Leeds Brown Law, P.C., Carle Place, NY, for Plaintiff.

Ashley N. Higginson, Pro Hac Vice, Miller Canfield, PLC, Lansing, MI, Robert Thomas Zielinski, Miller, Canfield. Paddock and Stone PLC, Chicago, IL, for Defendant.

CORRECTED MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

MATTHEW F. KENNELLY, District Judge:

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), Lewis University has moved to dismiss Brianna Miller's first amended complaint. Miller—on behalf of herself and others—has sued Lewis alleging breach of contract (Count 1) and unjust enrichment (Count 2). She claims the University entered into a contract with her to provide, among other things, in-person classes and on-campus services. In Miller's view, she fulfilled her obligations under the contract by paying tuition. She claims Lewis breached the contract when, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, it transitioned to remote instruction.

Though the Court is sympathetic to all who have been aggrieved by the pandemic, not all grievances are redressable by courts of law. As explained below, Miller has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, so the Court grants Lewis's motion.

Background

Lewis is a private Catholic university located in Romeoville, Illinois. It educates approximately 6,400 undergraduate and graduate students. Lewis—in normal times—offers both a traditional, in-person student experience as well as an online learning experience. Miller was a traditional student at Lewis. She began in fall 2016 and graduated in spring 2020.

During the spring 2020 semester, as the country began confronting the COVID-19 pandemic, Lewis made several changes to its academic program. On March 12, 2020, the University announced that "[a]ll courses originally scheduled to be face-to-face will be delayed by one week, resuming in a fully online format on Monday, March 23." Am. Compl. ¶ 4. At the time, Lewis had not decided whether face-to-face learning would resume. But, on March 19, 2020, the University determined that the remainder of the 2020 school year (spring and summer terms) would be "delivered through online only learning methods." Id. ¶ 4. Lewis also told students that "residence halls would remain closed through the conclusion of the summer terms." Id.

Miller does not take direct issue with the University's elimination of in-person learning. See id. ¶ 8. Instead, she challenges Lewis's decision to "retain monies paid by [her and those she wishes to represent] when [Lewis] failed to provide [ ] in-person and on-campus classes and services." Id. For the spring 2020 semester, Miller paid approximately $16,860 in tuition and mandatory fees. She has not been given a partial refund for the value of the in-person classes that were moved online, nor has she received a partial refund for the mandatory fees she paid despite Lewis's discontinuation of on-campus services. Miller asserts that Lewis's failure to provide an in-person education and on-campus services, while also retaining the full amount of her tuition and fees, constitutes a breach of contract and unjust enrichment.

Central to her breach-of-contract claim is Miller's allegation that she entered into a contract with Lewis under which, in exchange for tuition and fees, Lewis "would provide in-person and on-campus educational services, experiences, opportunities, and other related services." Id. ¶¶ 35, 70. According to Miller, the terms of this contract are set forth in various "marketing materials, advertisements, publications, and other documents from [Lewis], including but not limited to the Lewis University Course Schedule." Id. ¶ 70.

With regard to her unjust enrichment claim, Miller claims that she paid tuition and fees "with the expressed understanding that such costs included the in-person classes, services, opportunities, and experiences that Defendant had previously marketed, promoted, or made available prior to COVID-19." Id. ¶ 84. In her view, by retaining the full amount of tuition and fees even after failing to provide the benefits that Miller and her classmates expected, the school was unjustly enriched at her and others’ expense.

Miller seeks compensatory damages, disgorgement, equitable relief, and other forms of relief.

Discussion

To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the complaint must contain "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Hecker v. Deere & Co. , 556 F.3d 575, 580 (7th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). A claim is plausible on its face "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." McCauley v. City of Chicago , 671 F.3d 611, 615 (7th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).

When ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court must construe "all well-pleaded allegations of the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Appert v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, Inc. , 673 F.3d 609, 622 (7th Cir. 2012) (alterations accepted) (internal quotation marks omitted). But "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).

A. Educational malpractice

Lewis contends in its motion that Miller's breach-of-contract claim is really an educational malpractice claim, which is not cognizable under Illinois law. See Waugh v. Morgan Stanley & Co. , 2012 IL App (1st) 102653, ¶¶ 28–44, 359 Ill.Dec. 219, 966 N.E.2d 540, 549–54 ("If a claim raises questions about the reasonableness of an educator's conduct in providing educational services, or if a claim requires an analysis of the quality of education, it is a claim for educational malpractice" and "the tort of educational malpractice is not recognized in Illinois.") The Court disagrees.

In this context, to state a viable claim for breach of contract—and therefore avoid a claim sounding in educational malpractice—"the plaintiff must do more than simply allege that the education was not good enough." See Ross v. Creighton Univ. , 957 F.2d 410, 417 (7th Cir. 1992). Rather, the plaintiff must allege that the educational institution "failed to perform [a promised educational] service at all." Id. Miller has done that here. She alleges that she was promised an in-person learning experience, paid for it, did not receive it, and should recover damages as a result. In other words, Miller has put forward a fairly straightforward breach-of-contract claim.

Lewis contends that Miller must be alleging a difference in the quality between the in-person education she wishes she had received and the online education she received, or else her claim could not stand. But just because Miller argues that an online education does not have the same value as an in-person education does not mean that she is challenging the quality of the education she received. Instead, to the extent she discusses the difference in "market value" between in-person and online education, "that discussion is limited to alleging damages from the defendant's alleged breach of contract, not an allegation that any decreased value constitutes the breach of contract." See Oyoque v. DePaul Univ. , No. 20 C 3431, 520 F.Supp.3d 1058, 1061–62 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 21, 2021) (Kennelly, J.). This is markedly different from claiming educational malpractice. See Waugh , 2012 IL App (1st) 102653, ¶ 29, 359 Ill.Dec. 219, 966 N.E.2d at 549 (listing the three "broad categories of educational malpractice claims: ‘(1) the student alleges that the school negligently failed to provide him with adequate skills; (2) the student alleges that the school negligently diagnosed or failed to diagnose his learning or mental disabilities

; or (3) the student alleges that the school negligently supervised his training.’ ").

To summarize, Miller's breach-of-contract claim does not sound in educational malpractice because her complaint does not challenge the adequacy of the education she received, and the resolution of her claim would not require "second-guessing the professional judgment of the University faculty on academic matters." See Ross , 957 F.2d at 417.

B. Breach of contract (Count 1)

Next, the Court considers whether Miller has stated a claim for breach of contract. In Illinois, a plaintiff claiming breach of contract must allege: "(1) the existence of a valid and enforceable contract; (2) substantial performance by the plaintiff; (3) a breach by the defendant; and (4) resultant damages." Sevugan v. Direct Energy Servs., LLC , 931 F.3d 610, 614 (7th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted).

As discussed above, in the educational context plaintiffs "must do more than simply allege that the education was not good enough. Instead, [plaintiffs] must point to an identifiable contractual promise that the [educational institution] failed to honor." Ross , 957 F.2d at 416–17 ; see also Charleston v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Illinois at Chicago , 741 F.3d 769, 773 (7th Cir. 2013) ("[T]he student's complaint must be specific about the source of [the] ... contract, the exact promises the university made to the student, and the promises the student made in return."). "The catalogues, bulletins, circulars, and regulations of the institution made available to the matriculant may become a part of the contract." Bissessur v. Indiana Univ. Bd. of Trs. , 581 F.3d 599, 602 (7th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation...