Miller v. Life Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc.

• Decision Date: 18 December 2020
• Docket Number: S-20-0076
• Citation: 478 P.3d 164
• Parties: Rick MILLER, appointed Wrongful Death Representative for the Estate of Julia Faye Miller, deceased, Petitioner, v. LIFE CARE CENTERS OF AMERICA, INC., a foreign corporation and Casper Operations, LLC, a foreign LLC, d/b/a Life Care Center of Casper, Respondents.
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

478 P.3d 164

Rick MILLER, appointed Wrongful Death Representative for the Estate of Julia Faye Miller, deceased, Petitioner,

v.LIFE CARE CENTERS OF AMERICA, INC., a foreign corporation and Casper Operations, LLC, a foreign LLC, d/b/a Life Care Center of Casper, Respondents.

S-20-0076

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

December 18, 2020

Representing Petitioner: Diana Rhodes, Tracy Rivinus, Lori Brand of Rhodes Law Firm, LLC, Cheyenne, Wyoming. Argument by Ms. Brand.

Representing Respondents: Lena K. Moeller and Amy M. Iberlin of Williams, Porter, Day, and Neville, P.C., Casper, Wyoming. Argument by Ms. Iberlin.

Before DAVIS, C.J., and FOX, KAUTZ, BOOMGAARDEN, and GRAY, JJ.

KAUTZ, Justice.

[¶1] Rick Miller (Rick) signed a "Voluntary Agreement for Arbitration" (Arbitration Agreement or Agreement) on behalf of his mother, Julia Faye Miller (Julia), shortly after she was admitted to Life Care Center of Casper (LCCC). Following her death, Rick, as wrongful death representative of Julia's estate, filed a civil action against Life Care Centers of America, Inc. and Casper Operations, LLC d/b/a Life Care Center of Casper (collectively Life Care). Life Care filed a motion to compel arbitration under the Agreement. The district court granted Life Care's motion, and we granted Rick's petition for a writ of review. Because we conclude Rick lacked authority to execute the Agreement, we reverse and remand to the district court for further proceedings.

ISSUES

[¶2] The dispositive issues in this case are:

1. Did Julia's Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care (DPOAHC) give Rick actual authority to enter into the Arbitration Agreement?

2. Did Rick have apparent authority to enter into the Arbitration Agreement on behalf of Julia?

3. Was Rick authorized as Julia's "surrogate" under the Wyoming Health Care Decisions Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 35-22-401 through 416 (LexisNexis 2019), to execute the Arbitration Agreement?

FACTS

[¶3] On September 18, 2013, Julia executed a DPOAHC appointing Rick as her agent for health care decisions "[i]n the event [she was] determined to be incapable of providing informed consent for medical treatment and surgical and diagnostic procedures[.]" The agent's authority was spelled out in detail:

My agent is authorized to act for me in all matters relating to my health care. My agent's powers include, but are not limited to:

• Full power to consent, refuse consent, or withdraw consent to all medical, surgical, hospital and relating to health care treatments and procedures on my behalf, according to my wishes as stated in this document, or as stated in a separate Living Will, Health Care Directive, or other similar type document, or as expressed to my agent by me;

• Full power to make decisions on whether to provide, withhold, or withdraw artificial nutrition and hydration on my behalf, according to my wishes as stated in this document, or as stated in a separate Living Will, Health Care Directive, or other similar type document, or as expressed to my agent by me; • Full power to review and receive any information regarding my physical or mental health, including medical and hospital records ...;

• Full power to sign any releases in order to obtain this information;

• Full power to sign any documents required to request, withdraw, or refuse treatment or to be released or transferred to another medical facility.

[¶4] The DPOAHC further explained the agent's obligations as:

My agent will make health care decisions for me in accordance with this document, and in accordance with any instructions I give in a Living Will, Health Care Directive or other such document (either included in this document or as a separate document), and my other wishes to the extent known to my agent. To the extent my wishes are unknown, my agent will make health care decisions for me in accordance with what my agent determines to be in my best interest. In determining my best interest, my agent will consider my personal values to the extent known to my agent.

The DPOAHC specifically limited the agent's power: "My agent does not have authority to act for me for any other purpose unrelated to my health care."

[¶5] Just before the signature line, Julia made the following affirmations:

I fully understand that by signing this document, I will permit my agent to make health care decisions for me. I understand that my signature on this document gives my agent authority to provide, withhold, or withdraw consent to health care treatments or procedures on my behalf; to apply for public benefits to defray the cost of my health care; and to authorize my admission to or transfer from a health care facility. ...

[¶6] Julia was admitted twice to LCCC, Life Care's skilled nursing facility in Casper, Wyoming. This case focuses on Life Care's actions during Julia's second stay at LCCC, which began on June 16, 2015. Life Care concedes Julia was legally incapacitated at the time of admission. Because of Julia's incapacity, Rick acted as her agent under the DPOAHC for her admission into LCCC; Rick provided the DPOAHC to LCCC.

[¶7] Signing as Julia's "Legal Representative," Rick executed an Arbitration Agreement each time Julia was admitted to LCCC. However, Rick did not sign the second Arbitration Agreement until two days after Julia's admission. The first page of the Arbitration Agreement began with an explanation of the arbitration process and the benefits of resolving disputes by arbitration rather than civil litigation. It then stated: "The following arbitration agreement is optional. By signing it, you will give up your constitutional right to a jury or court trial and you agree that any dispute between you and the facility will be subject to arbitration."

[¶8] The "Agreement" section, which was also on the first page, stated:

The following is an agreement (the "Arbitration Agreement") to arbitrate any dispute that might arise between Julia Miller [handwritten] (the "Resident") and Life Care Center of Casper [handwritten] (the "Facility").... In consideration of the benefits of the use of arbitration in the efficient resolution of conflicts and other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged by all parties hereto, intending to be legally bound, the parties hereby agree as follows:

The parties agree that they shall submit to binding arbitration all disputes against each other and their agents, affiliates, governing bodies and employees arising out of or in any way related or connected to the Resident's stay and care provided at the Facility, including but not limited to any disputes concerning alleged personal injury to the Resident caused by improper or inadequate care, including allegations of medical malpractice; any disputes concerning whether any statutory provisions relating to the Resident's rights under Wyoming law were violated; and any other dispute under Wyoming or federal law based on contract, tort, or statute. ...

[¶9] The third page of the Arbitration Agreement¹ included the acknowledgement and signature lines:

THE UNDERSIGNED ACKNOWLEDGE THAT EACH OF THEM HAS READ THIS ARBITRATION AGREEMENT AND UNDERSTANDS THAT BY SIGNING THIS ARBITRATION AGREEMENT EACH HAS WAIVED HIS/HER RIGHT TO A TRIAL, BEFORE A JUDGE OR JURY, AND THAT EACH OF THEM VOLUNTARILY CONSENTS TO ALL OF THE TERMS OF THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT.

Immediately following the capitalized statement, there were signature lines for the "Resident," the "Legal Representative," and the "Facility Representative." The Facility Representative and Rick, as Julia's Legal Representative, signed the Arbitration Agreement; Julia did not sign it.

[¶10] Julia died on August 14, 2017, allegedly from injuries sustained during a series of mishaps at LCCC. Rick was appointed the wrongful death representative of her estate and filed a claim with the State of Wyoming Medical Review Panel. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 9-2-1513 through 1523 (LexisNexis 2019) (Wyoming Medical Review Panel Act of 2005). The panel dismissed the claim, allowing Rick to pursue legal action.

[¶11] Rick filed a complaint in the district court on October 31, 2019, stating claims of negligence and premises liability against Life Care. Less than a month later, Life Care filed a motion to compel arbitration. Rick opposed the motion, and the district court held a hearing on the matter. The court granted Life Care's motion to compel arbitration and stayed the district court proceedings. We granted Rick's petition for writ of review.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶12] The parties disagreed about whether their dispute had to be arbitrated. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-36-104 (LexisNexis 2019) states:

(a) On application of a party showing an arbitration agreement and the opposing party's refusal to arbitrate, the court shall order the parties to proceed with arbitration. If the opposing party denies the existence of the agreement to arbitrate, the court shall proceed summarily to determine the issue raised and shall order or deny arbitration accordingly.

See also, 9 U.S.C. § 4 (similar provision of the Federal Arbitration Act); Am. Nat'l Bank of Denver v. Cheyenne Housing Auth., 562 P.2d 1017, 1020 (Wyo. 1977) ("The role of the [c]ourt in such an instance, where one party seeks to enforce an arbitration agreement and the other party contends that the agreement does not apply to the dispute, is to proceed summarily to the determination of the issue so raised.") (citation and quotation marks omitted).

[¶13] In Hancock v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., Inc., 701 F.3d 1248, 1261 (10th Cir. 2012), the Tenth Circuit described a framework similar to summary judgment practice for reviewing a request to arbitrate. When the parties dispute the existence of an enforceable agreement to arbitrate, a court may grant a motion to compel arbitration if " ‘there are no genuine issues of material fact regarding the parties’ agreement.’ " Id. (quoting Avedon Eng'g, Inc. v. Seatex, 126 F.3d 1279, 1283 (10^th Cir. 1997) ). The moving party has the burden of establishing the existence...