Miller v. Long-Airdox Co.

• Decision Date: 01 October 1990
• Docket Number: No. 89-1875,LONG-AIRDOX,89-1875
• Citation: 914 F.2d 976
• Parties: Larry MILLER and Kimberly Miller, Plaintiffs, v.COMPANY, a corporation, Defendant-Third Party Plaintiff-Appellant, v. AMAX COAL COMPANY, Third Party Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Page 976

914 F.2d 976

Larry MILLER and Kimberly Miller, Plaintiffs, v. LONG-AIRDOX COMPANY, a corporation, Defendant-Third Party Plaintiff-Appellant, v. AMAX COAL COMPANY, Third Party Defendant-Appellee.

No. 89-1875.

United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit.

Argued Feb. 28, 1990.

Decided Oct. 1, 1990.

Thomas Keefe, Cook, Shevlin, Keefe & Ysursa, Belleville, Ill., for plaintiffs.

W. Thomas Coghill, Jr., James P. Leonard, Kurt E. Reitz, Mark S. Schuver, Thompson & Mitchell, Belleville, Ill., for defendant-third party plaintiff-appellant.

G. Daniel Kelley, Gary J. Dankert, Ice, Miller, Donadio & Ryan, Indianapolis, Ind., Terry Black, Campbell, Furnall, Moore & Jacobsen, Mt. Vernon, Ill., for third party defendant-appellee.

Before BAUER, Chief Judge, and POSNER and MANION, Circuit Judges.

MANION, Circuit Judge.

Larry Miller, a miner who lived in Indiana, worked for Amax Coal Company in Amax's Wabash underground mine. Most of the Wabash mine is located in Illinois, and all entry portals to the mine are located in Illinois. Part of the mine, however, extends east under the Wabash River into Gibson County, Indiana. On April 19, 1985, Miller was working in the Indiana portion of the mine on a machine known as a "feeder." Tragically, Miller's right hand became caught in a sprocket on the feeder. Miller's right arm was mangled, and eventually had to be amputated.

Miller collected benefits under Illinois' workers' compensation law. Miller also sued Long-Airdox Company, the feeder's manufacturer, in Illinois state court. Long-Airdox removed the case to federal court (the basis of removal being diversity of citizenship). In federal court Long-Airdox filed a third-party claim for contribution against Amax, alleging that Amax negligently operated the feeder. Since Amax and Long-Airdox were both incorporated under Delaware law, no diversity of citizenship existed between them. However, the third-party claim fell within the district court's ancillary jurisdiction because it arose out of the "same occurrence or transaction" as Miller's claim. See Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Sullivan, 846 F.2d 377, 381-82 (7th Cir.1988); see also Shields v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 810 F.2d 397, 398 (3d Cir.1987).

Amax filed a summary judgment motion, contending that Indiana law applied to Long-Airdox's contribution claim, and that Indiana law does not allow contribution among joint tortfeasors. See Elcona Homes Corp. v. McMillan Bloedell, Ltd., 475 N.E.2d 713, 715 (Ind.App.1985); Barker v. Cole, 396 N.E.2d 964, 971 (Ind.App.1979). The district court agreed with Amax and entered judgment dismissing Long-Airdox's contribution claim. Long-Airdox appeals. Although Miller's claim against Long-Airdox remains to be resolved, the district court properly entered judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b) so we have jurisdiction over this appeal.

On appeal, Long-Airdox contends the district court erred by applying Indiana rather than Illinois law to Long-Airdox's contribution claim. The parties agree that the choice-of-law rules of Illinois, the forum state in this action, govern which state's law applies to Long-Airdox's contribution action. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 61 S.Ct. 1020, 85 L.Ed. 1477 (1941); Shields, 810 F.2d at 399; see also Pittway Corp. v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 641 F.2d 524, 526 (7th Cir.1981). In tort cases (including third-party actions for contribution), Illinois has adopted the "most significant relationship" test of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. See Ingersoll v. Klein, 46 Ill.2d 42, 262 N.E.2d 593 (1970); Vickrey v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 146 Ill.App.3d 1023, 100 Ill.Dec. 636, 638-39, 497 N.E.2d 814, 816-17 (4th Dist.1986); see also Pittway, 641 F.2d at 526.

As its name implies, the "most significant relationship" test seeks to find which state bears the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties involved in the action, and then applies that state's laws. Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws Sec. 145(2) sets out several contacts a court is to analyze to determine which state has the most significant relationship with the litigation. Those contacts include: the place where the injury occurred; the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred; the parties' domiciles, residences, places of incorporation, and places of business; and the place where the parties' relationship, if any, is centered. Generally, in a tort case, the two most important contacts are the place where the injury occurred and the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred. Illinois law presumes that the law of the state where the injury occurred will govern "unless another state has a more significant relationship to the occurrence or to the parties involved." Ferguson v. Kasbohm, 131 Ill.App.3d 424, 86 Ill.Dec. 605, 607, 475 N.E.2d 984, 986 (1st Dist.1985); see also Ingersoll, 262 N.E.2d at 596; Pittway, 641 F.2d at 526. This presumption is most difficult to overcome where the conduct causing the injury occurred in the same state where the injury occurred. "When the injury occurred in a single, clearly ascertainable state and when the conduct which caused the injury also occurred there, that state will usually be the state of the applicable law with respect to most issues involving the tort." Restatement Sec. 145, Comment e, at 420.

It is undisputed that Miller's injury occurred in Indiana. We agree with Amax and the district court that the conduct that caused Miller's injury also occurred in Indiana. Long-Airdox argues feebly that Amax's negligence might have occurred in Illinois because Amax might have altered the feeder (by removing or altering a guard from the machine meant to keep people from getting caught in the sprocket as Miller did) in Illinois. But Long-Airdox makes this argument on appeal only in its reply brief, and in the district court Long-Airdox never challenged Amax's assertion that the conduct causing Miller's injury occurred in Illinois. We could thus hold that Long-Airdox has waived this argument. See Reynolds v. East Dyer Development Co., 882 F.2d 1249, 1253 n. 2 (7th Cir.1989). In any event, Long-Airdox's argument is pure speculation: nothing in the record indicates where Amax might have altered the guard (or even that Amax did alter the guard). More importantly, the relevant conduct here was not so much removing or altering the guard as it was actually operating the feeder with the guard removed or altered. Altering or removing the guard could harm Miller only if Amax operated the feeder in that condition; there is no question that Amax employees were operating the feeder in Indiana when Miller's injury occurred.

Long-Airdox points out several Illinois contacts in this case. For example, although Amax's principal place of business is in Indiana, Amax conducts substantial operations in Illinois. Most of the Wabash mine lies beneath Illinois, and the entry portals to the mine are in Illinois. Both Amax and Long-Airdox are licensed to do business in Illinois, and both maintain offices in Illinois. Amax hired and paid Miller in Illinois; it is fair to say the relationship between Amax and Miller was centered in Illinois. But despite these Illinois contacts, we would be inclined to agree with Amax, absent some other exceptional circumstance, that Indiana law should govern Long-Airdox's contribution action. This result would follow from Illinois law's presumption that the law of the state where the injury occurred will normally apply, a presumption strengthened by the fact the conduct injuring Miller occurred in the same state (Indiana). After all, Indiana has a strong interest "in having its law applied to a dispute that concerns the consequences of torts committed" within its borders. Shields, 810 F.2d at 401. We do not think the Illinois contacts Long-Airdox has identified would be sufficient, in the normal case, to give Illinois a more significant relationship with the occurrence and the parties than Indiana has.

This is not, however, the normal case, and there is one factor in this case that persuades us Illinois rather than Indiana law should govern Long-Airdox's contribution claim. An Indiana statute provides:

In the case of any mine or mines, the shaft or opening of which is located in any state other than the state of Indiana, the employees in the entries or workings of such mines extending into and within the state of Indiana, shall be controlled and governed by the laws of the state in which the shaft or opening of such mine is located in any and all matters pertaining to their employment, including compensation laws and suits for damages for personal injuries.

Ind.Code Ann. Sec. 22-10-2-6 (West 1981) (emphasis added). Indiana law itself provides that Illinois law is to govern both...