Miller v. Loyola University of New Orleans

• Decision Date: 30 September 2002
• Docket Number: No. 2002-CA-0158.,2002-CA-0158.
• Citation: 829 So.2d 1057
• Parties: Leonce Jennings MILLER, III v. LOYOLA UNIVERSITY OF NEW ORLEANS.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US

Page 1057

829 So.2d 1057

Leonce Jennings MILLER, III v. LOYOLA UNIVERSITY OF NEW ORLEANS.

No. 2002-CA-0158.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.

September 30, 2002.

Rehearing Denied November 15, 2002.

Leonce Jennings Miller, III, Gretna, LA, In Proper Person, Plaintiff/Appellant.

Richard E. McCormack, Fritchie, Urquhart & Moore LLC, New Orleans, LA, for Defendant/Appellee.

(Court composed of Judge STEVEN R. PLOTKIN, Judge PATRICIA RIVET MURRAY, Judge TERRI F. LOVE).

Judge TERRI F. LOVE.

Leonce Jennings Miller, III ("Miller") brought this action against Loyola University of New Orleans ("Loyola") alleging that the school of law failed to provide a complete and satisfactory instruction of a course entitled "The Legal Profession." Loyola filed a peremptory exception of no cause of action and Miller was given leave to amend his petition. Loyola filed a second peremptory exception of no cause of action, which the trial court sustained. For the reasons outlined below we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Miller is a part-time student in the evening division of Loyola University of New Orleans School of Law. In the fall semester of 2000, he enrolled in a course entitled "The Legal Profession." The purpose of the course was to teach professional and ethical issues related to the legal profession.

Professor Cynthia Lepow, a tenured professor, was selected to instruct this course. Professor Lepow's specialty is tax law, and this was the first time that she had been called upon to instruct this course.

Miller alleges several deficiencies in Professor Lepow's instruction. Miller complains that Professor Lepow did not timely order materials for class, that she changed the course time without permission from the law school, Professor Lepow had the students perform class presentations on subjects she was obligated to teach, Professor Lepow only covered approximately 60% of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct with her lectures and all of the student presentations combined, and finally, Professor Lepow gave a final examination consisting of materials from the National Conference of Bar Examiners and her original questions, which contained serious errors.

Miller was not present when the course evaluations were distributed, so he went to the Dean's office and requested he be allowed to complete a student evaluation. After Miller lodged his various complaints, he met with the Associate Dean of the Law School, Rev. Lawrence Moore, S.J., and requested a refund of the cost of the course, that the course be removed form his transcript, and that he be allowed to re-take the class with another professor. Rev. Moore advised Miller to submit a written complaint to the Loyola Law School Faculty Petitions Committee.

The Faculty petitions Committee renounced jurisdiction of this matter, and James Klebba, the Dean of the Law School, convened a special ad hoc committee to review this case, which consisted of former Deans and Associate Deans of the law school. The committee found: 1) that Professor Lepow violated the faculty handbook by making an arbitrary and unauthorized change in the time that the course was scheduled; 2) that Professor Lepow failed to timely request books for the course; 3) that Professor Lepow gave a final examination that contained errors and copied questions from the National Conference of Bar Examiners materials; 4) that the overall effectiveness of the professor was below satisfactory; 5) that the professor's responses to questions asked were below satisfactory; 6) that the professor excused one student from half of the regularly scheduled classes and this presented a problem with the Socratic method of teaching; and 7) that the professor had difficulty in communicating the course material to the students. The Dean adopted all of the committee recommendations and Professor Lepow was sanctioned with the procedures set out on the faculty handbook,

Miller filed this action to recover the cost of the course and other damages including reimbursement for taking the course a second time at his own expense. His amended petition asserts the following theories of liability against Loyola: 1) Loyola was negligent for failing to provide a qualified professor to teach the legal profession course; 2) Loyola was negligent for failing to have the requisite number of professors required to teach their course offerings as was outlined in the School of Law course listing for the Fall 2000 semester; 3) Loyola breached "[its] conventional obligation" by accepting payment for the course, then not giving complete instruction in the subjects as stated in the law bulletin; 4) Loyola breached its obligation to provide the course of instruction reasonably expected for a recognized accredited institution of higher education; Loyola was monetarily unjustly enriched; 6 Loyola breached its obligation to provide the course at the time it was listed in the course schedule; 7) Loyola breached its obligation to supply the course instruction necessary to pass the MPRE examination and to practice in the profession of law; 8) Loyola was negligent for falsely representing the course of instruction, the details of the course of instruction and the time the course was offered; 9) Miller detrimentally relied on Loyola's promise to provide a specific course of instruction as outlined in the catalog, at the time published, and to provide the necessary course of instruction required to practice in the legal profession, which Loyola failed to keep; Loyola knew plaintiff would rely on its promises; and, Miller is irreparably harmed by Loyola's refusal to remove the course from his official transcript and Miller's lost time and effort toward the pursuit for his Juris Doctor degree, including additional time required to retake the course and the delay in graduation and his ability to practice law.

Loyola asserts that Miller, along with the other students of Professor Lepow's class, were given the opportunity to audit the course the following semester at no charge. However, Miller refused this opportunity, enrolling in the course in the fall semester of 2001 at his own expense.

DISCUSSION

Dismissal of a claim is justified only when the allegations of the petition itself clearly show that the plaintiff does not state a cause of action. Farmer v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 2001-0667, p. 2 (La. App. 4th Cir. 12/27/01), 806 So.2d 89, 91. A court appropriately maintains the peremptory exception of no cause of action only when, conceding the correctness of the well-pleaded facts, the plaintiff has not stated a claim for which he can receive legal remedy under the applicable substantive law. Id. at p. 3, 806 So.2d at 91. In reviewing a trial court's ruling on the exception, the appellate court should conduct a de novo review.

In Miller's first assignment of error, he asserts that the trial court incorrectly held that he failed to state a cause of action against Loyola for various breaches of contract for specific promises it made regarding the content to a college course offered, the time the course was offered and the quality of the educational instruction the school promised. In his second assignment of error. Miller asserts that the trial court incorrectly held that he failed to state a cause of action against Loyola for various acts of negligence committed by the school and one of its professors. We will address these assignments of error together.

The great weight of authority generally holds that the law recognizes no cause of action for "educational malpractice", either in tort or contract, by a student against a private educational institution asserting inadequate or improper instruction. Bittle v. Oklahoma City University, 6 P.3d 509, 514 (Ct.App. Div. 3 4/21/00). The courts uniformly reason that such a claim runs afoul of established public policy with both accords educational institutions broad discretion in matters purely academic ... and directs judicial non-interference in the decisions with that discretion. Id. . . [W]e are persuaded by the overwhelming weight of authority from other jurisdictions that, absent a specific, identifiable agreement for the provision of particular services, the public policy ... militates against recognition of a claim by a student against a private educational institution arising from the institution's alleged improper or inadequate instruction however denominated— either in tort or contract—for "educational malpractice." Bittle, 6 P.3d at 515.

In Ross v. Creighton University, 957 F.2d 410 (7th Cir.1992), the Court of Appeals discussed the issue as follows:

Courts have identified several policy concerns that counsel against allowing claims for educational malpractice. First, there is a lack of a satisfactory standard of care by which to evaluate an educator. Theories of education are not uniform, and "different but acceptable scientific methods of academic training [make] it unfeasible to formulate a standard by which to judge the conduct of those delivering the services." Second, inherent uncertainties exist in this type of case about the cause and nature if damages. "Factors such as the student's attitude, motivation, temperament, past experience and home environment may all play an essential and immeasurable role in learning." Consequently, it may be a "practical impossibility [to] prov[e] that the alleged malpractice of the teacher proximately caused the learning deficiency of the plaintiff student." A third reason for denying this cause of action is the potential it presents for a flood of litigation against schools "education is a service rendered on an immensely greater scale than other professional services." The sheer number of claims that could arise if this cause of action were allowed might overburden schools. The final reason courts have cited for denying this cause of action is that it threatens to embroil the courts into overseeing the day-to-day...