Miller v. Maddox

• Decision Date: 03 August 2017
• Docket Number: No. 17-5021,17-5021
• Citation: 866 F.3d 386
• Parties: Andrea MILLER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Woodston MADDOX, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

866 F.3d 386

Andrea MILLER, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Woodston MADDOX, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 17-5021

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Decided and Filed: August 3, 2017

COUNSEL ON BRIEF: Kyle F. Mothershead, Nashville, Tennessee, R. Andrew Free, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellant. Keli J. Oliver, Melissa Roberge, DEPARTMENT OF LAW OF THE METROPOLITAN DEPARTMENT OF NASHVILLE AND DAVIDSON COUNTY, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellee.

Before: MOORE, STRANCH, and DONALD, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

BERNICE BOUIE DONALD, Circuit Judge.

Andrea Miller was arrested, charged, and indicted on charges of reckless driving and resisting arrest, based on false statements made by officer Woodston Maddox. The district court granted summary judgment in Maddox's favor on Miller's malicious prosecution claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We conclude that Maddox is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law and is not entitled to either absolute or qualified immunity. Accordingly, we REVERSE the district court's judgment.

I.

Miller brought a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Maddox arising from her alleged reckless driving and resisting of arrest. The district court granted Maddox's motion for summary judgment and dismissed Miller's complaint, reasoning that Miller could not establish an exception to the general rule that the issuance of an indictment conclusively establishes probable cause, and that Maddox was entitled to absolute immunity from a § 1983 suit based on statements he made to the night court commissioner.

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II.

This court reviews a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo . Jackson v. VHS Detroit Receiving Hosp., Inc. , 814 F.3d 769, 775 (6th Cir. 2016). Summary judgment is appropriate "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A dispute is "genuine" "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party." Ford v. Gen. Motors Corp. , 305 F.3d 545, 551 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ). The moving party bears the initial burden of establishing that there are no genuine issues of material facts, which it may accomplish "by demonstrating that the nonmoving party lacks evidence to support an essential element of its case." Id. (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322–23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) ). In response, the nonmoving party must present "significant probative evidence" that will reveal that there is more than "some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Moore v. Philip Morris Cos., Inc. , 8 F.3d 335, 340 (6th Cir. 1993). The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the nonmovant's position will not suffice to avoid summary judgment. Anderson , 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

III.

We have recognized that a plaintiff may bring a malicious prosecution claim under the Fourth Amendment based on a defendant officer's wrongful investigation, prosecution, conviction, and incarceration of a plaintiff. Barnes v. Wright , 449 F.3d 709, 715–16 (6th Cir. 2006). To succeed on such a claim, Miller must establish that (1) a criminal prosecution was initiated against her and Maddox made, influenced, or participated in the prosecution decision; (2) there was no probable cause to support the charges; (3) as a result of the legal proceedings, Miller suffered a deprivation of liberty "apart from the initial seizure"; and (4) the criminal proceedings ended in Miller's favor. Sykes v. Anderson , 625 F.3d 294, 308–09 (6th Cir. 2010). The last element is not in dispute in this case.

a.

Miller first insists that because, in affirming the denial of Maddox's motion to dismiss, this court found in her favor on the first and third elements, the law of the case doctrine conclusively establishes that those elements are met and precludes our review of those issues on summary judgment.

Initially, despite Miller's claims to the contrary, our prior decision did not resolve whether her allegations of post-process detention deprived her of liberty so as to satisfy the third element. Rather, it mentioned, in passing when rejecting Maddox's argument that Miller's claim should be construed as one for false imprisonment, that "the detention that Miller challenges is the three-to-four-hour period of confinement that resulted from the allegedly wrongful institution of this legal process." Order, R. 20 at 4, Case No. 14-6216. We noted that this was "the exact harm that a malicious-prosecution claim is intended to remedy." Id. We therefore, did not resolve the third element.

Furthermore, the law of the case doctrine does not prohibit our review of these issues. Under the law of the case doctrine, "when a court decides upon a rule of law, that decision should continue to govern the same issues in subsequent stages in the same case." Scott v. Churchill , 377 F.3d 565, 569–70 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting

866 F.3d 390

Arizona v. California , 460 U.S. 605, 618, 103 S.Ct. 1382, 75 L.Ed.2d 318 (1983) ). Importantly, however, this doctrine is intended to enforce a district court's adherence to an appellate court's judgment, and so is applied only loosely when we reconsider our own decisions. Williams v. McLemore , 247 Fed.Appx. 1, 7 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing United States v. Dunbar , 357 F.3d 582, 592 (6th Cir. 2004) ); see also Patterson v. Haskins , 470 F.3d 645, 660–61 (6th Cir. 2006) (noting the prudential nature of the law of the case doctrine). Consistent with this latter principle, we have also held that this court's prior "holding on a motion to dismiss does not establish the law of the case for purposes of summary judgment, when the complaint has been supplemented by discovery." McKenzie v. Bell S outh Telecomms . , Inc. , 219 F.3d 508, 513 (6th Cir. 2000) ; see also Williams , 247 Fed.Appx. at 7 (citing Behrens v. Pelletier , 516 U.S. 299, 309, 116 S.Ct. 834, 133 L.Ed.2d 773 (1996) ) (observing that the denial of qualified immunity in a motion to dismiss does not trigger the law of the case doctrine following the denial of the defendant's motion for summary judgment). So we may consider issues not expressly or impliedly decided by the previous opinion. McKenzie , 219 F.3d at 513 (quoting Jones v. Lewis , 957 F.2d 260, 262 (6th Cir. 1992) ). Given the prudential nature of the law of the case doctrine and the fact that we previously decided these issues under a standard more favorable to Miller, we conclude that this doctrine does not bar us from revisiting these issues.

We now turn to the three elements of malicious prosecution at issue in this case.

b.

To succeed on her claim, Miller must first establish that a criminal prosecution was initiated against her and that Maddox made, influenced, or participated in the prosecution decision. Sykes , 625 F.3d at 308. Neither party disputes that a criminal prosecution was initiated against Miller. Rather, the dispute centers on whether Maddox made, influenced, or participated in the prosecution decision. "To be liable for ‘participating’ in the decision to prosecute, the officer must participate in a way that aids in the decision, as opposed to passively or neutrally participating." Sanders v. Jones , 845 F.3d 721, 731 (6th Cir. 2017) (quoting Webb v. United States , 789 F.3d 647, 660 (6th Cir. 2015) ). In Sykes , for instance, we concluded that an officer influenced or participated in the decision to prosecute the plaintiffs where the officer gave false testimony at a preliminary hearing, which was material because the officer was the only one to testify. 625 F.3d at 312–14. We further held that a second officer likewise participated or influenced the decision to prosecute the plaintiffs when the officer made misrepresentations and omissions in his application for an arrest warrant and investigative report, which were relied on by the prosecutors in proceeding against the plaintiffs. Id. at 314–17.

Here, Maddox swore as a "prosecutor" in an affidavit for an arrest warrant that Miller ran a stop sign, then proceeded to speed down the street, became verbally confrontational when Maddox asked her to get out of the vehicle, then jerked and twisted away from him when he tried to physically remove her. As a result, the night commissioner issued an arrest warrant. Later, at a preliminary hearing, Maddox testified to these same facts. Based on Maddox's testimony, the court found sufficient evidence to bind Miller's case over to the grand jury. It appears that Maddox was the only witness to testify during that hearing. Although it may be true that Maddox never directly spoke with the prosecutor regarding the case, because Maddox swore out the warrant affidavit

866 F.3d 391

that was submitted to the night commissioner and was the only witness to testify in the preliminary hearing, we conclude that he at least influenced or participated in the prosecution decision. See id. at 312–17.

c.

We next turn to the issue of whether there was probable cause to support the charges. The district court resolved the claim on...