Miller v. Marr, 97-1380
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (10th Circuit) |
| Writing for the Court | Before PORFILIO, KELLY, and HENRY; PAUL KELLY, Jr. |
| Citation | 141 F.3d 976 |
| Parties | George Lee MILLER, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Richard MARR; Attorney General for the State of Colorado, Respondents-Appellees. |
| Docket Number | No. 97-1380,97-1380 |
| Decision Date | 14 April 1998 |
Page 976
v.
Richard MARR; Attorney General for the State of Colorado,
Respondents-Appellees.
Tenth Circuit.
Page 977
Submitted on the Briefs: *
George Miller, pro se.
Before PORFILIO, KELLY, and HENRY, Circuit Judges.
PAUL KELLY, Jr., Circuit Judge.
Mr. Miller, an inmate, appeals from the dismissal of his habeas corpus petition, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Upon recommendation of the magistrate judge, the district court dismissed the action as untimely under the one-year limitation period contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), enacted under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214. He now appeals, conceding that the petition was filed beyond the time limit in § 2244(d)(1), see Aplt. Br. (Form A-11) at 11-11A, but contending that the delay should be imputed to the state due to lack of access to legal materials. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B). We grant Mr. Miller's motion for leave to proceed on appeal without prepayment of costs or fees, grant his application for a certificate of appealability on the above issue, see 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c), and affirm the district court's judgment of dismissal.
Mr. Miller pled guilty to second degree murder and attempted second degree assault in Colorado in 1989. He was sentenced to forty years and thirteen years on the respective convictions, the sentences to run consecutively. He unsuccessfully appealed to the Colorado Court of Appeals, and the Colorado Supreme Court denied certiorari on March 25, 1991. Thereafter, Mr. Miller filed a motion for state postconviction relief, unsuccessfully appealed to the Colorado Court of Appeals, and the Colorado Supreme Court denied certiorari on October 4, 1993.
In his petition dated July 10, 1997, Mr. Miller raises two grounds for relief: (1) he was given an unduly harsh sentence, and (2) he received inadequate advice that his sentences could be consecutive upon entering his plea. He indicates that the first ground was raised on direct appeal; the second was raised in his motion for postconviction relief. To avoid the one-year limitation period, Mr. Miller was required to file prior to April 24, 1997, one year after the enactment of the AEDPA. See United States v. Simmonds, 111 F.3d 737, 746 (10th Cir.1997).
Mr. Miller contended below that the one-year limitation on filing a first habeas petition violated the Suspension Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2, the Constitution's prohibition on suspending the writ. Whether the one-year limitation period violates the Suspension Clause depends upon whether the limitation period renders the habeas remedy "inadequate or ineffective" to test the legality of detention. Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 381, 97 S.Ct. 1224, 1229-30, 51 L.Ed.2d 411 (1977); United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 223, 72 S.Ct. 263, 274, 96 L.Ed. 232 (1952). The burden is on the petitioner to demonstrate inadequacy and ineffectiveness. See Bradshaw v. Story, 86 F.3d 164, 167 (10th...
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