Miller v. Meeks

• Decision Date: 29 June 2000
• Docket Number: No. 1999-CA-00210-SCT.,1999-CA-00210-SCT.
• Citation: 762 So.2d 302
• Parties: Sheila Fox MILLER, Peggy Fox Watz and Gary Merkell Fox, Next Friends and Sole Beneficiaries of the Intestate Estate of M. Merkell Fox v. W. Mark MEEKS, M.D.
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

762 So.2d 302

Sheila Fox MILLER, Peggy Fox Watz and Gary Merkell Fox, Next Friends and Sole Beneficiaries of the Intestate Estate of M. Merkell Fox v. W. Mark MEEKS, M.D.

No. 1999-CA-00210-SCT.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

June 29, 2000.

Barry Stuart Zirulnik, Jackson, James Frederick Ahrend, Gulfport, Attorneys for Appellants.

C. York Craig, Jr., Stuart G. Kruger, Jackson, Attorneys for Appellee.

EN BANC.

MILLS, Justice, for the Court:

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

¶ 1. This case comes on appeal from the Circuit Court of Hinds County. A medical malpractice complaint was filed by Merkell M. Fox against Dr. W. Mark Meeks on February 28, 1995, alleging medical malpractice by Dr. Meeks in his treatment of Fox in 1994. Fox died intestate, and the sole beneficiaries of his estate, Sheila Fox Miller, Peggy Fox Watz and Gary Merkell, "the plaintiffs," were substituted as parties in the lawsuit. Discovery was conducted for a period of approximately three years. The circuit court granted a motion for summary judgment on the basis that Dr. Meeks was an employee of the University of Mississippi Medical Center (hereafter UMMC) and that the applicable statute of limitations had run under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act, Miss.Code Ann. §§ 11-46-1 to -23 (Supp.1999), prior to the filing of the complaint. The plaintiffs filed a Notice of Appeal so that this Court could consider whether the granting of summary judgment was proper.

¶ 2. According to the transcript of the motion hearing, the plaintiffs sought to question Dr. Meeks, who was present under subpoena, regarding his employment status at the hospital, and particularly as to whether he was solely an employee of the hospital. At this point in the proceedings the trial judge made the following pronouncement:

THE COURT: Let me stop you. I need to deal with him because here's what I've done consistently in these cases and here's why. Unless I've been in a coma the last three years and just woke up, let me tell you what I've been doing. I've never been able to determine whether any doctor was an employee of the University or not.

Every time I get one of these cases I invite people to appeal me and I invite the Mississippi Supreme Court to tell me finally whether or not these doctors who work at the University Medical Center are employees of the University Medical Center or are in private practice. Because every single one of them works for the University Medical Center but then has some contract which allows that he engage in private practice and it allows that all above a certain amount of income accrues to him and he can have it. And so it walks, it talks and feels just like a private practice except that when they get sued, they stand behind this shield of immunity and then I'm a State employee. But let me make all the money I can make in this practice under the terms of my contract with the State. So I've never known whether or not they're employees of the State or whether or not they're in private practice.

So every time I get one of these cases I say please, please, I'm putting it on the record, I don't know, Supreme Court. Please tell me who these doctors actually work for ...

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 3. For a summary judgment motion to be granted, there must exist no genuine issues of material fact, and the moving party must be entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Miss. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The standard of review of a lower court's grant of a summary judgment motion is de novo. Short v. Columbus Rubber & Gasket Co., 535 So.2d 61, 63 (Miss.1988). The burden of demonstrating that there is no genuine issue of material fact falls on the party requesting the summary judgment. Id. at 63-64. The court must carefully review all evidentiary matters before it; admissions in pleadings, answers to interrogatories, depositions, affidavits, etc., in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made. McFadden v. State, 542 So.2d 871, 874 (Miss.1989). Issues of fact sufficient to require a denial of a motion for summary judgment are obviously present where one party swears to one version of the matter in issue and another says the opposite. American Legion Ladnier Post No. 42 v. Ocean Springs, 562 So.2d 103, 106 (Miss.1990). If any triable facts exist, the lower court's grant of a summary judgment will be reversed; otherwise the decision will be affirmed. Brown v. Credit Ctr., Inc., 444 So.2d 358, 362 (Miss.1983). When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in Rule 56, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings, his response must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him. If any triable issues of fact exist, the lower court's decision to grant summary judgment will be reversed. Otherwise, the decision is affirmed. Id. An issue of fact may be present where there is more than one reasonable interpretation of undisputed testimony, where materially different but reasonable inferences may be drawn from uncontradicted evidentiary facts, or when the purported establishment of the facts has been sufficiently incomplete or inadequate that the trial judge cannot say with reasonable confidence that the full facts of the matter have been disclosed. Dennis v. Searle, 457 So.2d 941, 944 (Miss.1984).

STATEMENT OF THE LAW

1. DID THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DETERMINE THAT THERE WAS NO GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT REGARDING WHETHER OR NOT DR. MEEKS WAS AN EMPLOYEE OF THE UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER AND THAT HE WAS THEREFORE ENTITLED TO SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY UNDER THE MISSISSIPPI TORT CLAIMS ACT?

¶ 4. The record reveals that in his employment contract with UMMC, Dr. Meeks is referred to as "the employee." The circuit court found that at the time of the alleged negligence Dr. Meeks was an employee of the State of Mississippi under Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-1. The circuit court held that the lawsuit against Dr. Meeks was barred because it had not been filed within the applicable one-year statute of limitations as set forth in Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-11.

¶ 5. The plaintiffs note that on two occasions bills have been introduced in the Mississippi Legislature seeking to alter the term "employee" to include "interns, residents and fellows at UMMC and all other physicians employed by the state or political subdivision...." All such efforts have failed to be enacted into law. The plaintiffs interpret this failure to indicate the legislative intent not to include physicians on the faculty of UMMC under the sovereign immunity shield. They claim that Dr. Meeks, as a physician or faculty member at UMMC, is not an employee within the meaning of Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-1. They argue that since the Legislature did not specifically name physicians in the statute, the solons did not intend to include physicians in the definition of "any employees." This argument is clever, but flawed, because the statute defines an employee as "any officer, employee or servant of the State of Mississippi or a political subdivision of the State," with the exception of those acting as "independent contractors" under contract to the state or a political subdivision. Miss Code Ann. § 11-46-1(f). We decline to infer negative legislative intent solely because the lawmakers chose not to enumerate a laundry list of state "employees." To the contrary, we note that such physicians are not specifically excluded either. Where a statute is clear and unambiguous, no further statutory construction is necessary and the statute should be given its plain meaning. City of Natchez v. Sullivan, 612 So.2d 1087, 1089 (Miss.1992). The enacted statute speaks plainly. Immunity is extended to any state employee who is not acting as an independent contractor.

2. DID THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DETERMINE THAT THE TREATMENT PROVIDED BY DR. MEEKS TO MR. FOX WAS PERFORMED IN THE COURSE OF HIS DUTIES AS AN EMPLOYEE OF UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER, RATHER THAN IN HIS OWN PRIVATE PRACTICE?

¶ 6. The plaintiffs concede that Dr. Meeks is a professor at UMMC, and thus an employee of UMMC. They insist, however, that it is not in his capacity as a professor that he is being sued. The plaintiffs claim that Dr. Meeks "wears two hats." Under the first hat Dr. Meeks is a professor, and employee, of UMMC training and teaching medical students. Under the second hat the plaintiffs claim that Dr. Meeks holds himself out as a private practitioner and that when he sees patients in the outpatient clinic as a member of the University of Mississippi Clinical Association ("Association") he is actually engaged in the private practice of medicine at a private clinic. The plaintiffs argue that the MTCA does not apply to activities undertaken under the auspices of the Association since such activities do not occur within the course and scope of UMMC employment responsibilities. They state that since they seek relief for alleged malpractice while the physician was wearing this second hat, the MTCA should not apply.

¶ 7. The order granting summary judgment finds that Dr. Meeks is an employee under the MTCA and enjoys sovereign immunity under the MTCA. No finding was made to determine whether Dr. Meeks "wore two hats." In other words, did he practice private medicine while also serving as an employee of UMMC?

¶ 8. Dr. Meeks entered into an employment contract with UMMC in April, 1993. Under the terms of this agreement, Dr. Meeks was paid a base salary of $77,279.00 with the right to earn 100% of additional income generated through fees up to $140,000, inclusive of the base salary, and 50% of any additional fees thereafter.

¶ 9. The private practice alleged by the plaintiffs on the part of Dr. Meeks took place in the "UMMC Pavilion," an outpatient clinic on campus at UMMC. The record reveals that the UMMC Pavilion is not a "private clinic" as ordinarily defined. UMMC...