Miller v. Miller

Decision Date19 June 2013
Docket NumberNo. 20120424.,20120424.
Citation2013 ND 103,832 N.W.2d 327
PartiesLeslie Wade MILLER, Plaintiff and Appellant v. Jenny Lynn MILLER, n/k/a Jenny Sailer, Defendant and Appellee.
CourtNorth Dakota Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Lynn M. Boughey, Bismarck, N.D., for plaintiff and appellant.

Sherry Mills Moore, Bismarck, N.D., for defendant and appellee.

KAPSNER, Justice.

[¶ 1] Leslie Wade Miller appeals from an order denying without an evidentiary hearing his motion to change the primary residential responsibility for his son, B.P.M., from Jenny Lynn Miller, now known as Jenny Sailer, to himself. We affirm, concluding the district court did not err in ruling Miller failed to establish a prima facie case justifying a change of primary residential responsibility.

I

[¶ 2] Miller and Sailer were divorced in 2003. Under the parties' agreement, Sailer was granted primary residential responsibility for the couple's two children and Miller was granted parenting time. In 2007 Miller brought a motion to change the primary residential responsibility for B.P.M., the oldest child. Miller alleged that B.P.M., “a special needs child,” was not happy living with Sailer and that Sailer had improperly taken B.P.M. off medication, removed him from special education classes, moved several times, and lived with a boyfriend. The district court denied the motion, concluding Miller had not established a prima facie case to require an evidentiary hearing.

[¶ 3] In March 2012, Miller again moved to change primary residential responsibility for B.P.M., who was then 15 years old and an eighth-grade student. In support of the motion, Miller presented his affidavit, B.P.M.'s affidavit, and several of B.P.M.'s report cards. Many allegations mirrored those made in support of the 2007 motion. Miller also alleged Sailer had arguments with B.P.M., had contacted law enforcement about his behavior, and had taken him to juvenile youth services and threatened to send him to Dakota Boys Ranch. Miller alleged Sailer interfered with his relationship with B.P.M., did not provide for B.P.M.'s needs, and B.P.M.'s poor school performance improved during a two-month period he lived with Miller. B.P.M. alleged he argued with Sailer and stated he preferred to live with Miller. In response to the motion, Sailer presented her affidavit and several of B.P.M.'s class grade reports. Sailer provided details to counter or explain the allegations made against her and objected to hearsay statements contained in the documents filed by Miller.

[¶ 4] The district court denied Miller's motion without holding an evidentiary hearing, concluding the affidavits and other evidence presented in support of the motion did not establish a prima facie case justifying a change of primary residential responsibility. The court interpreted the “central theme” of the motion to be “that B.P.M., now age 15, does not agree with some of the restrictions and requirements Jenny imposes upon him, and that B.P.M. has stated a preference to live with Leslie.” The court concluded “the conduct identified in the opposing affidavits suggests that he is not of sufficient maturity for the Court to give substantial weight to his preference.”

II

[¶ 5] Miller argues the district court erred in ruling he failed to establish a prima facie case to support a change of primary residential responsibility.

[¶ 6] Under N.D.C.C. § 14–09–06.6(6), a court may modify primary residential responsibility after a two-year period following the date of entry of an order establishing primary residential responsibility if the court finds [o]n the basis of facts that have arisen since the prior order or which were unknown to the court at the time of the prior order, a material change has occurred in the circumstances of the child or the parties,” and the “modification is necessary to serve the best interest of the child.” A motion must be denied without an evidentiary hearing “unless the court finds the moving party has established a prima facie case justifying a modification.” N.D.C.C. § 14–09–06.6(4). In Thompson v. Thompson, 2012 ND 15, ¶ 6, 809 N.W.2d 331, this Court said:

Whether the moving party established a prima facie case is a question of law, which is reviewed de novo on appeal. Wolt v. Wolt, 2011 ND 170, ¶ 9, 803 N.W.2d 534. The moving party has the burden to establish a prima facie case justifying modification. Ehli v. Joyce, 2010 ND 199, ¶ 7, 789 N.W.2d 560. This Court has said:

A prima facie case is a bare minimum and requires facts which, if proved at an evidentiary hearing, would support a change of custody that could be affirmed if appealed. When determining whether a prima facie case has been established, a court may not weigh conflicting allegations in affidavits. However, allegations alone do not establish a prima facie case, affidavits must include competent information, which usually requires the affiant to have first-hand knowledge, and witnesses are generally not competent to testify to suspected facts. Affidavits are not competent if they fail to show a basis for actual personal knowledge, or if they state conclusions without the support of evidentiary facts.

Id. (citations omitted). A material change in circumstances is an important new fact that was unknown at the time of the prior custody decision. Id. at ¶ 8. A material change in circumstances may exist when there has been an attempt to alienate a child's affection for a parent or when there has been a frustration of visitation. Id. A significant change in the actual arrangement for primary residential responsibility from the arrangement contemplated by the prior order may also be a material change in circumstances. See id. at ¶ 10.

A mature child's reasonable preference to live with a particular parent may constitute a material change in circumstances to justify a change in primary residential responsibility if there are persuasive reasons for that preference. See, e.g., Frison v. Ohlhauser, 2012 ND 35, ¶ 7, 812 N.W.2d 445;Lechler v. Lechler, 2010 ND 158, ¶ 11, 786 N.W.2d 733.

[¶ 7] Some of the hearsay in Miller's affidavit relates to his allegations about Sailer taking B.P.M. off of medications, Sailer's living arrangements, and Sailer's educational choices for B.P.M. These allegations were also contained in an affidavit filed in Miller's unsuccessful 2007 attempt to change the primary residential responsibility for B.P.M. ‘Under res judicata principles, it is inappropriate to rehash issues which were tried or could have been tried by the court in prior proceedings.’ Laib v. Laib, 2010 ND 62, ¶ 10, 780 N.W.2d 660 (quoting Wetch v. Wetch, 539 N.W.2d 309, 311 (N.D.1995)). Consequently, Miller's allegations raised and rejected by the district court in 2007 cannot serve as a basis to support his motion to change the primary residential responsibility for B.P.M. in these proceedings.

[¶ 8] Miller contends a de facto change of primary residential responsibility occurred when, with Sailer's consent, B.P.M. lived with him for a two-month period from October 2011 until December 2011. Although a “significant change in the actual arrangement for primary residential responsibility from the arrangement contemplated by the prior order may also be a material change in circumstances,” Thompson, 2012 ND 15, ¶ 6, 809 N.W.2d 331,N.D.C.C. § 14–09–06.6(3)(c) suggests that a de facto change in primary residential responsibility cannot occur unless the “primary residential responsibility for the child has changed to the other parent for longer than six months.” The two-month period alleged here is insufficient as a matter of law. Cf. Ehli v. Joyce, 2010 ND 199, ¶¶ 2, 10, 789 N.W.2d 560 (where judgment allowed parties to share time equally with child, party's allegation that she actually had child 95 percent of the time raised a prima facie case that there was more than a minor variance from the initial judgment).

[¶ 9] Miller argues that his life has “improved” while Sailer's life has “declined,” and Sailer has failed to provide for B.P.M.'s needs. In his affidavit, Miller asserted [m]y life has improved greatly” and “I have a more steady job,” while “Jenny's life has declined, particularly in regards to her relationship with BPM” because they argue constantly.” B.P.M. in his affidavit complained that “my mom and I argued all the time.” Miller further asserted “I have always had to provide boots and clothing throughout the years and when BPM came to live with me I had to buy him new everything ... because he came with the clothes on his back.” Miller's assertion about the improvements in his life is a conclusory allegation, see, e.g., Sweeney v. Kirby, 2013 ND 9, ¶ 5, 826 N.W.2d 330, and in any event would not by itself be sufficient to show a significant change in circumstances. See, e.g., Interest of Thompson, 2003 ND 61, ¶ 7, 659 N.W.2d 864. Furthermore, arguments between teenagers and their parents are common and...

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5 cases
  • Jensen v. Jensen
    • United States
    • North Dakota Supreme Court
    • 29 d4 Agosto d4 2013
    ...to resolve conflicting evidence and determine whether a modification of primary residential responsibility is warranted.See also Miller v. Miller, 2013 ND 103, ¶ 11, 832 N.W.2d 327;Schumacker, 2011 ND 75, ¶ 8, 796 N.W.2d 636. We did not, however, intend these restatements of prior caselaw t......
  • Anderson v. Jenkins
    • United States
    • North Dakota Supreme Court
    • 25 d3 Setembro d3 2013
    ...J., dissenting); Thompson v. Thompson, 2012 ND 15, ¶ 6, 809 N.W.2d 331;see also Ehli v. Joyce, 2010 ND 199, ¶ 7, 789 N.W.2d 560;Miller v. Miller, 2013 ND 103, ¶ 6, 832 N.W.2d 327. A prima facie case is established through affidavits that include competent information. Charvat, at ¶ 20 (Mari......
  • Johnshoy v. Johnshoy
    • United States
    • North Dakota Supreme Court
    • 24 d4 Junho d4 2021
    ...the 15-year-old child demonstrated a lack of maturity in earning D's and F's in school despite being capable of earning A's. Miller v. Miller , 2013 ND 103, ¶¶ 12-13, 832 N.W.2d 327. No evidence was submitted to the district court that would permit an inference that the child is of sufficie......
  • Painte v. Director
    • United States
    • North Dakota Supreme Court
    • 19 d3 Junho d3 2013
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