Miller v. Miller, Record No. 2354-06-4 (Va. App. 9/11/2007)
| Decision Date | 11 September 2007 |
| Docket Number | Record No. 2354-06-4. |
| Parties | CHESTER E. MILLER v. LINDA S. MILLER LINDA S. MILLER v. CHESTER E. MILLER |
| Court | Virginia Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Prince William County LeRoy F. Millette, Jr., Judge
Catherine S. Croft (Farrell & Croft, P.C., on briefs), for Chester E. Miller.
Elizabeth Munro von Keller (Arthur Von Keller IV, on briefs), for Linda S. Miller.
Present: Judges Benton, Elder and Beales
Chester E. Miller (husband) appeals from a final decree of divorce from Linda S. Miller (wife) entered by the Prince William County Circuit Court on August 16, 2006, and from the accompanying Court Order Acceptable for Processing (COAP) that the trial court entered on the same day as the final decree. Wife also appeals from the final decree. We have consolidated their appeals and address their contentions here.
Husband argues that the trial court erred in finding the antenuptial agreement between the parties was ambiguous and accepting parol evidence on the intentions of the parties. He argues this error was compounded when the court interpreted the antenuptial agreement as allowing distribution of his pension and allowing an award of spousal support to wife. He also claims the trial court erred when it included language in the COAP allowing wife to transfer her interest in the pension to an alternate payee should she predecease husband. In her appeal, wife argues that the trial court erred in finding the antenuptial agreement remained valid, even though the court also found the parties mutually intended to revoke the agreement. Wife claims she relied to her detriment on the revocation of the agreement. For the reasons noted herein, we affirm the trial court's rulings.
Prior to their marriage in 1987, the parties signed an antenuptial agreement in wife's home country of Canada, but stipulated that the laws of the Commonwealth of Virginia would govern their contract. Several months after the birth of their first child in 1988, the parties agreed that they no longer needed the antenuptial agreement and threw the only known copy of it into a fire. After the parties separated in 2004, wife discovered that her mother had another copy of the antenuptial agreement. The parties agree that this newly discovered document is an exact copy of the original agreement.
Paragraph 1 of the antenuptial agreement sets the term of the contract at "199 years from the date hereof or until the parties herein shall mutually agree to its termination." Paragraph 2 of the agreement states:
Each party shall during his or her lifetime keep and retain sole ownership, control and enjoyment of all property, real and personal now owned or hereafter acquired by him or her, free and clear of any claim by the other. Complete lists of [husband's] and [wife's] personal property are attached as Exhibits A and B respectively.1
In paragraph 9, the agreement states:
In the event of dissolution of the contemplated marriage between [wife] and [husband], these sums ([wife $10,032.00 Canadian and [husband] $48,876.00 American) shall be returned free and clear in whole or proportionately prior to any equitable distribution of marital property, after calculating the amounts in a common currency at the rate of exchange at the time of calculation.
Paragraph 10 provides, The agreement does not contain a section of definitions and does not define marital property or separate property. The agreement does not mention spousal support or alimony.
The trial court found that, although the parties mutually intended to revoke the antenuptial agreement when they threw it into the fire, the agreement was still binding because the revocation was not in writing as required by Code § 20-153. The Court then found the antenuptial agreement was ambiguous and accepted parol evidence.
Wife testified that the pensions existing at the time of the marriage were separate property under the agreement, but she did not intend to waive any rights to future accruals of pensions when she signed the agreement. She also testified that the agreement was not intended to prevent her from developing an interest in property acquired during the marriage, and she did not think her husband interpreted the agreement that way until divorce proceedings started. The agreement, according to wife's testimony, was intended only to protect the parties' interests in the property that they owned prior to the marriage and did not address any other issues.
During initial questioning by his counsel, husband essentially agreed that the antenuptial agreement covered only property existing when the parties were wed. Husband later said he thought all the property that he bought during the marriage would be his separate property. The trial court found the agreement was not intended to cover property acquired during the marriage but instead was designed to protect the assets that the parties owned before the marriage. The trial court also found the agreement did not address spousal support.
As part of the equitable distribution award, the trial court awarded a portion of husband's Federal Employees Retirement System (FERS) pension, acquired after the marriage, to wife. The COAP entered for submission to the federal government included a provision that allowed wife, in the event of her death, to award her share of the pension to the parties' children.
Husband was ordered to pay $1,300 per month in spousal support to wife for four years, then $500 per month for an additional four and a half years.
Wife argues that the parties effectively revoked the antenuptial agreement. Alternatively, she argues that equitable estoppel prevented husband from asking the trial court to enforce the agreement. Husband argues that they did not revoke the agreement and estoppel does not apply.
At the time that the parties signed the antenuptial agreement (and still today) Code § 20-153 stated: "After marriage, a premarital agreement may be amended or revoked only by a written agreement signed by the parties." Wife acknowledges that the parties did not revoke the agreement in writing. However, she contends Code § 20-150(8) permits parties to contract regarding "[a]ny other matter, including their personal rights and obligations, not in violation of public policy or a statute imposing a criminal penalty." She argues that the parties included in their agreement a provision allowing the parties to "mutually agree to its termination" and, thereby, they contracted to permit revocation of the antenuptial agreement without another written agreement. Alternatively, wife argues that she relied to her detriment on the representation of husband that the agreement was revoked, so husband should be estopped from arguing for enforcement of the antenuptial agreement.
The issues presented here involve questions of both law and fact. We defer to the trial court's decisions on questions of fact, such as whether the parties intended to revoke the agreement, but review de novo questions of law, such as the interpretation of the code sections governing antenuptial agreements. See Gaffney v. Gaffney, 45 Va. App. 655, 665, 613 S.E.2d 471, 476 (2005).
Code § 20-153 clearly and specifically states that "[a]fter marriage, a premarital agreement may be amended or revoked only by a written agreement signed by the parties." (Emphasis added.) As Virginia law governs the antenuptial agreement here, this statute's mandates are part of that contract. See Harbor Gate Owners' Ass'n v. Berg, 232 Va. 98, 106, 348 S.E.2d 252, 257 (1986) (). As the parties did not execute a signed, written document revoking the 1987 agreement, that original agreement remained in effect.
Wife acknowledges that Code § 20-153 generally applies to all antenuptial agreements. However, she argues that, as permitted by Code § 20-150(8), the parties included in Paragraph 1 of the antenuptial agreement an enforceable provision that allowed the parties to "mutually agree to its termination" without a writing. We disagree.
Code § 20-150 lists the matters that parties may address in antenuptial agreements. Subsection 8 allows such agreements to address "[a]ny other matter, including their personal rights and obligations, not in violation of public policy or a statute imposing a criminal penalty." We find that this subsection does not permit parties to include provisions in abrogation of requirements of Code § 20-153.
First, Code § 20-153 specifically states that premarital agreements can only be revoked in writing. This statute includes no exceptions. We "must accept its plain meaning." Perez v. Capital One Bank, 258 Va. 612, 616, 522 S.E.2d 874, 876 (1999). Given this specific wording, in contrast to the general wording of Code § 20-150(8), we find the specific wording of Code § 20-153 must control and parties may not deviate from its restrictions.
Second, Paragraph 1 of the parties' agreement did not specifically authorize a method of revocation other than in writing. It simply says that they can mutually agree to revoke the agreement. Paragraph 1 addresses when the parties can revoke the agreement, but it does not address how the parties can effect and memorialize their revocation other than as required by Code § 20-153. Cf. Hardesty v. Hardesty, 40 Va. App. 663, 581 S.E.2d 213 (2003) (en banc) (...
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