Miller v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. Ry. Co.
Decision Date | 28 September 1923 |
Citation | 195 N.W. 33,50 N.D. 206 |
Court | North Dakota Supreme Court |
Parties | MILLER v. MINNEAPOLIS, ST. P. & S. S. M. RY. CO. |
In an action for personal injuries brought under the federal Employers' Liability Act (U. S. Comp. St. §§ 8657-8665), it is held that negligence and proximate cause were questions for the jury.
Negligence is the basis of liability under the federal Employers' Liability Act (U. S. Comp. St. §§ 8657-8665), and there can be no recovery thereunder in the absence of negligence on the part of the railway company or some of its employees.
Under federal Employers' Liability Act (U. S. Comp. St. §§ 8657-8665), negligence and proximate cause become questions of law only when the facts are undisputed, and reasonable men in the exercise of reason and judgment can draw but one inference from them.
Appeal from District Court, Stutsman County; Coffey, Judge.
Action by Charles Miller against the Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Railway Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.S. E. Ellsworth, of Jamestown, and John E. Palmer, of Minneapolis, Minn., for appellant.
Knauf & Knauf, of Jamestown, for respondent.
This is an action for personal injuries, brought under the federal Employers' Liability Act (U. S. Comp. St. §§ 8657-8665). It was tried to a jury, and a verdict returned in favor of the plaintiff for $500. Defendant moved for judgment notwithstandingthe verdict, or for a new trial. The motion was denied, and defendant has appealed from the judgment.
The sole question presented on this appeal is the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict. In other words, it is contended by the defendant that the court erred in denying its motion for a directed verdict and its motion for judgment, notwithstanding the verdict.
The complaint alleges:
The answer admits that the plaintiff was employed by the defendant as a section laborer on or about the time the injury was sustained; but alleges that the injury was of a slight and temporary character, and denies that such injury was occasioned by any negligence on the part of the defendant or its employees. It also alleges that whatever injury plaintiff sustained was caused solely by his own negligence; and that the injury, if any, was due to risks and hazards knowingly and voluntarily assumed by the plaintiff.
The plaintiff testified:
On cross-examination plaintiff testified:
“Henry Davey and I were fellow laborers that day, both working under the direction of the same foreman. The accident occurred between 3 and 4 o'clock in the afternoon. We pulled the old ties out with the pick. That is the way it was done. It was a heavy tie. We both pulled on the same pick. If Davey hadn't had hold of the handle I don't believe I would have been hurt. I blame him that way, both of us having hold of that one handle. We were both pulling the tie up to the time I struck the rock. I don't think I would have pulled the tie against my foot if Davey hadn't been there.
Q. Was it all Mr. Davey's fault? A. Why, it was his fault. If he hadn't had hold of the handle at that time, I wouldn't have gotten hurt.
Q. Your pulling, the force you were using, wouldn't have brought the tie against your foot? A. No; it wouldn't, because if a man lost his hold, he would have went over, and the tie would have stopped.
Q. Now, Mr. Miller, after you fell down, and recovered your balance again, and got your foot out of the place, where was Henry Davey; beside you? A. No, sir; he was up on the track, at that time.
Q. He had gone back where Mike Davey was working on the track? A. No one had come down there where I was at all.
Q. Isn't it true, Mr. Miller, that just as soon as you started down the embankment with that tie, pulling that pick-as soon as you started away from the track that Mr. Davey went back to assist his father in putting in the new tie? A. No, sir.
Q. That is true, isn't it? A. After we got the tie down, he went back.
Q. And you want it understood here now that he kept pulling down the side of the embankment, seven or eight feet high, all the time, until you reached the bottom? A. Yes, sir; that is it.
Q. When you recovered your balance, he was back up on the track? A. Yes, sir. * * *
Q. Isn't it true, Mr. Miller, that on the 11th day of June or a month after the accident, that you didn't blame Mr. Henry Davey for this accident in any way? Isn't that true? A. No; I didn't blame Henry Davey. If he hadn't had hold of the pick, I wouldn't have blamed him. But I told him it that way, as I told Mr. Hendershot, if we had two picks I would never got hurt. * * *”
On redirect examination plaintiff testified:
“Q. Now, I don't know if you have made it just plain to the jury as to the pulling out of that tie, and pulling it down the side of the embankment; just explain to the jury whether you went straight down, or whether you shifted to one side or what. A. We started straight down,...
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Johnson v. Minneapolis, St. Paul and Sault Ste. Marie Railway Company, a Corp.
... ... employees. A party in order to recover under the act must ... allege and prove: (1) The existence of some duty on the part ... of the defendant toward the plaintiff. (2) A failure to ... discharge that duty. (3) Injury proximately resulting from ... such failure. See Miller v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste ... M. R. Co. 50 N.D. 206, 195 N.W. 33; Froelich v ... Northern P. R. Co. 42 N.D. 550, 173 N.W. 822; Wingen ... v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. R. Co. 42 N.D. 517, ... 173 N.W. 832; Koofos v. Great Northern R. Co. 41 ... N.D. 176, 170 N.W. 859; Manson v ... ...
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Johnson v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. Ry. Co.
...toward the plaintiff; (2) a failure to discharge that duty; (3) injury proximately resulting from such failure. See Miller v. Railway Co. (N. D.) 195 N. W. 33;Froelich v. Railway Co., 42 N. D. 550, 173 N. W. 822;Wingen v. Railway Co., 42 N. D. 517, 173 N. W. 832;Koofos v. Railway Co., 41 N.......
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Sullivan v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. Ry. Co., 5210.
...part of other employees which are directly responsible for an injury. The language of this court in Miller v. Mpls., St. P. & S. Ste. M. R. Co., 50 N. D. 206, 195 N. W. 33, at page 215 of the official report and page 36 of the Northwestern report, is applicable here: “And, of course, the pl......