Miller v. Morris, 878S179
| Citation | 270 Ind. 505,386 N.E.2d 1203 |
| Decision Date | 26 March 1979 |
| Docket Number | No. 878S179,878S179 |
| Parties | Garland MILLER, in his official capacity as County Clerk of Delaware County, Indiana, Appellant (Defendant below), v. Linda MORRIS, Appellee (Plaintiff below). |
| Court | Supreme Court of Indiana |
Theo. L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Robert C. Swain, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellant.
Kenneth J. Falk and Dean L. Sutton, Muncie, for appellee.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Delaware Superior Court in which the court held that a portion of Ind. Code § 31-1-3-3 (Burns Supp. 1978) is unconstitutional. The statute deals with restrictions on the issuance of marriage licenses and provides in part that a marriage license shall not be issued to any person who has dependent children unless that person proves that he is supporting or contributing to the support of each dependent child in compliance with any court orders for such support. The judge relied upon the recent United States Supreme Court decision of Zablocki v. Redhail, (1978) 434 U.S. 374, 98 S.Ct. 673, 54 L.Ed.2d 618, which held that a similar statutory provision in Wisconsin was unconstitutional.
The facts which gave rise to this appeal are as follows. Linda Morris is engaged to marry Larry Sherrell who was divorced in 1973. At the time of his divorce, Sherrell was ordered to pay child support of $30 per week. In September, 1977, Morris and Sherrell applied for a marriage license at the Delaware County Clerk's office. Their application was denied because at that time Sherrell was over $3,000 in arrears on his support payments. Subsequently in October, Morris filed a complaint against the Delaware County Clerk challenging the constitutionality of the statute. The trial court granted summary judgment in her favor and the state has now appealed pursuant to Ind.R.App.P. 4(A)(8) which is applicable because a portion of a statute of this state has been declared unconstitutional.
The statute in question states:
Ind. Code § 31-1-3-3 (Burns Supp. 1978), (emphasis added).
The trial judge found that the italicized portion of this statute was unconstitutional for the reasons given by the United States Supreme Court in Zablocki v. Redhail, supra, and the Court ordered the last phrase of the statute severed from the statute and the remaining provisions left intact.
In evaluating the constitutionality of the challenged portion of this statute, we must be guided by the standards set forth in Zablocki. We first look at the nature of the classification created by the statute and the individual interests affected. The statute creates two readily identifiable classes of Indiana residents. The first class contains all those individuals who have no children, or who are not under any court ordered support obligations, or who are complying with their court ordered support obligations. The second class contains those who are not supporting their dependent children in compliance with their court ordered support obligations.
The United States Supreme Court has clearly established that the right to marry is a fundamental liberty protected by the Due Process Clause and that it is among the personal decisions protected by the right of privacy. Zablocki v. Redhail, supra; Carey v. Population Services International, (1977) 431 U.S. 678, 97 S.Ct. 2010, 52 L.Ed.2d 675; Loving v. Virginia, (1967) 388 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1817, 18 L.Ed.2d 1010. Under the challenged provision, no Indiana resident in the affected class may marry without proof that he is complying with support orders. The result of this provision is to prohibit absolutely members of this class from being issued a marriage license, and hence, it interferes with their fundamental right to marry.
The Wisconsin statute which was considered by the United States Supreme Court in Zablocki set out substantially the same class as does our statute. It then required members of this class to have a court order showing compliance with support obligations and showing that children covered by support orders were "not likely thereafter to become public charges." Wis.Stat. § 245.10(1) (1973). While this statute added an additional requirement about a showing of future ability to support dependent children, the affected class and the effect on this class are the same as under our challenged provision.
The state argues that our statute is not an absolute prohibition against the freedom to marry since members of the affected class can seek modifications of their support orders or support agreements and then proceed to marry. However, this same argument was dealt with in Zablocki. The Court found that having to seek a court order showing compliance with support obligations caused such a burden that it would prevent some members of the affected class from exercising their right to marry. And even those who followed through with the court order and met the statute's requirements would suffer a "serious intrusion" into their freedom of choice over a fundamental right. The same burden and serious intrusion exist with our challenged provision since it requires the members of the affected class either to pay all back support obligations or to seek a modification of such obligation through a court order. It therefore significantly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right.
We now turn to the examination of the state's interests which this statute seeks to protect. The Court said in Zablocki v. Redhail, supra :
"When a statutory classification significantly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right, it cannot be upheld unless it is supported by sufficiently important state interests and is closely tailored to effectuate only those interests." 434 U.S. at 388, 98 S.Ct. at 682, 54 L.Ed.2d at 631.
It is true as the state points out that marriage is a social relationship subject to state regulation. Reasonable regulations that do not significantly interfere with decisions to enter into the marital relationship have been upheld. Califano v. Jobst, (1978) 434 U.S. 47, 98 S.Ct. 95, 54 L.Ed.2d 228.
The state first points out that the challenged provision discourages the conception of children by persons who are unable to accept responsibility for them and therefore protects the welfare of future children. However, it is obvious that the provision is not narrowly drawn to effectuate this interest. Marriage is not a necessary predicate to the birth of children, and preventing a contemplated marriage may only result in children being born out of wedlock. Instead of protecting the welfare of future children, the statute may have the opposite effect, in that it will promote cohabitation without marriage. The statute also makes no attempt to diagnose persons who would be unwilling to accept responsibility for their children by any other test except a financial one. The provision is underinclusive in these respects.
Furthermore, the statute does not allow for the possibility that the new spouse will actually better the applicant's financial situation and improve his ability to satisfy both prior and future support obligations. In this respect the statute is substantially overinclusive as well.
The state argues that the statute protects existing children, as well as possible future offspring. As the Court noted in Zablocki v. Redhail, supra, this justification is both irrational and not narrowly drawn.
"This 'collection device' rationale cannot justify the...
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Browder v. Harmeyer
...by the Due Process Clause and that it is among the personal decisions protected by the right of privacy." Miller v. Morris, (1979) 270 Ind. 505, 386 N.E.2d 1203, 1204; Zablocki v. Redhail, (1978) 434 U.S. 374, 98 S.Ct. 673, 54 L.Ed.2d 618. It is further without dispute that potential adopti......
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...The statute merely recognizes that, although "marriage is a social relationship subject to state regulation," Miller v. Morris, 386 N.E.2d 1203, 1205 (Ind. 1979), people choose to ommence this relationship differently. Many couples—even those who do not otherwise identify with a particular ......