Miller v. Pelzer
Decision Date | 23 May 1924 |
Docket Number | No. 23893.,23893. |
Citation | 159 Minn. 375,199 N.W. 97 |
Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Parties | MILLER v. PELZER et al. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from District Court, Olmsted County; Chas. E. Callaghan, Judge.
Action by Susanna Miller against John Pelzer and another. From order sustaining demurrer to complaint, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.
Plaintiff was born out of wedlock and shortly thereafter taken into the home of defendants, who, for a valuable consideration paid by the county, agreed to keep and care for plaintiff until she became 18 years of age. She remained in defendants' home 25 years and now alleges that defendants by deceit and fraud failed to disclose to her at 18 years of age the truth as to her parentage and that she did work for defendants for seven years, worth $2,500, and that she has been damaged in that amount. Held, that the facts fail to show a violation of any legal duty, and hence the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. M. D. Halloran, or Rochester, for appellant.
Burt W. Eaton, of Rochester, for respondents.
Demurrer to a complaint was sustained by trial court, and plaintiff has appealed. Plaintiff, in her complaint, alleges that defendants are husband and wife; that on July 15, 1887, plaintiff was born out of lawful wedlock, and shortly thereafter defendants took her into their home, and for a valuable consideration paid them by Olmsted county defendants agreed to keep and care for plaintiff until she became 18 years of age; that pursuant to this arrangement plaintiff entered the home of the defendants in the year 1887, and she lived there continuously until May 1, 1912, when she married; that during these 25 years she was known as Susanna Pelzer; that during this period, defendants, with intent to deceive her, led her to believe, and she did believe, that she was defendants' natural child; that between July 15, 1905, when plaintiff became 18 years of age, and May 1, 1912, plaintiff performed a woman's work in the house and a man's work in the field, all on defendants' farm, as directed by defendants, and that such work was of the value of $2,500; that during said time, and prior thereto, and thereafter, plaintiff has given to defendants a daughter's attention, love, and service and has sacrificed her time, energy, strength, and devotion for them and deprived herself of entertainment, pleasure, and opportunity of marriage, believing that she was their natural daughter, which belief they intentionally encouraged and sustained with the intention of deceiving the plaintiff and through their deceit and fraud and their willful and intentional acts they have wrongfully deceived the plaintiff and defrauded her to her great damage; that defendants never told plaintiff she was not their daughter but in May, 1921, she learned from others that she was not their child, and at this time she learned of the alleged deceit and fraud practiced upon her; that plaintiff has been damaged in the sum of $2,500.
In so far as this complaint attempts to allege the element of failure to marry because of the alleged fraud and deception, it is insufficient, because it fails to state with any certainty any opportunity which was rejected because of performance of the supposed duty to defendants. It is too general and indefinite in this respect. The complaint, however, as we construe it, sufficiently alleges that, because of such alleged fraud and deception, defendants procured labor and services from plaintiff, and that she has been damaged by this alleged silent deception and fraud.
This action sounds in tort. If the facts disclosed constitute a cause of action, it must be upon the theory that defendants violated a legal duty in concealing from plaintiff, when she arrived at her majority, the truth concerning her paternity. Did they, under the circumstances, owe her a legal duty to make such disclosure to her?
The defendants and plaintiff lived in the relation of parents and child for a quarter of a century. They were a major part of a family. The family relation was, by plaintiff, believed to exist, and the defendants safely guarded the secret and treated plaintiff in such a way that she apparently had no reason to doubt but that defendants were her natural parents. Upon arriving at majority plaintiff continued in this family as a member thereof just the same as she had before. This family relation for all practical purposes was just as sacred as if plaintiff had been the natural daughter.
The peace of society, and of the families composing society, and a sound public policy, designed to subserve the repose of families and the best interests of society, forbid to the minor child a right to appear in court in the assertion of a claim to civil redress for personal injuries suffered at the hands of the parent. An unkind and cruel parent may and should be punished at the time of the offense, if an offender at all, by...
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Calhoun v. Eagan
...by her father could not maintain action), overruled in part in Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash.2d 642, 251 P.2d 149 (1952); Miller v. Pelzer, 159 Minn. 375, 199 N.W. 97 (1924) (action for deceit not permitted); Smith v. Smith, 81 Ind.App. 566, 142 N.E. 128 (1924) (action during majority for assault......
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Balts v. Balts
...parent-child tort immunity doctrine. 13 This court has adopted language verbatim from the Hewlett decision in Miller v. Pelzer, 159 Minn. 375, 377, 199 N.W. 97, 33 A.L.R. 678, citing in addition the decisions of the Tennessee and Washington courts. Subsequently, in Belleson v. Skilbeck, 185......
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Dunlap v. Dunlap
...v. Collins, 237 Mich. 175, 211 N. W. 88, 52 A. L. R. 1118; Taubert v. Taubert, 103 Minn. 247, 114 N. W. 763; Miller v. Pelzer, 159 Minn. 375, 199 N. W. 97, 33 A. L. R. 678; Mannion v. Mannion, 129 A. 431, 3 N. J. Misc. R. 68; Damiano v. Damiano (N. J. Sup.) 143 A. 3; Sorrentino v. Sorrentin......
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Mayberry v. Pryor
...aware of only two cases in which a foster parent has been determined to stand in loco parentis to a foster child. In Miller v. Pelzer, 159 Minn. 375, 199 N.W. 97 (1924), the child was placed with the foster parents shortly after her birth and lived with them for twenty-five years. When she ......