Miller v. Price
| Decision Date | 29 July 2014 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 5:12-cv-02207-WMA-TMP |
| Parties | MARCUS F. MILLER, Petitioner, v. CHERYL PRICE, Warden, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama |
On June 24, 2014, the magistrate judge filed his Report and Recommendation in the above-styled cause, recommending that this petition for habeas corpus relief filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 be denied and dismissed with prejudice, finding that the habeas petitioner was untimely filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). Marcus F. Miller ("Petitioner") timely filed his objections to the Report and Recommendation, contending that it is not time barred. (Doc. 30). Having now carefully reviewed and considered de novo all the materials in the court file, including the Report and Recommendation, the Court agrees with Petitioner that the instant habeas action is not time barred. Therefore, the magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation is REJECTED. Nevertheless, for the reasons expressed herein, the court finds that petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief, and his petition is due to be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
In his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus, the Petitioner challenges the constitutional validity of the sentence he received originally on April 9, 1999, to life without the possibility of parole ("LWOP"). (Doc. 1, p. 2). Throughout the progression of the action, however, it is clear that the Petitioner actually is attempting to challenge the reinstatement of his LWOP sentence on February 19, 2009. The conflicting dates present an issue when calculating the one-year time limit provided in AEDPA for filing a habeas petition. The magistrate judge, in his Report and Recommendation, determined that -regardless of which date is used - the Petitioner's action is time-barred under AEDPA's one-year limitations period. The Petitioner, however, argues in his objections to the Report and Recommendation that the time was miscalculated with regard to the "resentencing" date and that his habeas petition filed pursuant to that resentencing was timely. Even though the court agrees that the instant habeas action is not time barred, he is not entitled to relief on the merits of the claim.
An understanding of the court's reasoning requires an unfortunate excursion into the minutae of the state-court procedure in this case. On April 9, 1999, following a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted in Case No. CC-98-1363 of the offenses of first-degree robbery and first-degree burglary. Upon proof of three prior felony convictions, the trial court sentenced the Petitioner, pursuant to the Habitual Felony Offender Act, to life imprisonment withoutthe possibility of parole ("LWOP"). In January 2005, the Petitioner filed a Rule 32 petition in Case No. 86-442, seeking to have one of the prior convictions used to enhance his sentence set aside. To be clear, the Rule 32 petition was not filed in the LWOP case (CC-98-1363), but in the case in which the allegedly invalid conviction occurred (CC-86-442). On May 6, 2005, the Madison County Circuit Court granted the Rule 32 petition and vacated the conviction in CC-86-442. Because that conviction was one of three used to enhance Petitioner's sentence in CC-98-1363 to LWOP, the court allowed him to make an oral Rule 32 motion in CC-98-1363 to vacate the LWOP sentence. That oral motion was granted, the court vacated the LWOP sentence, and then immediately resentenced Petitioner to life with the possibility of parole. On the same day, however, following the hearing, the State moved for the circuit court to reconsider and rescind its resentencing order and to reinstate the Petitioner's original LWOP sentence. In support, the State proffered another valid prior felony conviction to replace the prior conviction that had been vacated. The court rescinded its order reducing Petitioner's sentence to a life sentence, but it did not rescind the grant of Rule 32 relief in CC-86-442. This effectively left the Petitioner unsentenced in CC-98-1363 until February 19, 2009, when, in light of the newly proffered felony conviction, the trial court again sentenced Petitioner to life without the possibility of parole. In an opinion entered on April 20, 2009, the circuit court denied Petitioner's oral Rule 32 petition, concluding that it was proper for the State to substitute another felony conviction for the invalidated one and that Petitioner's reinstated sentence of life without the possibility ofparole was proper. (See Doc. 29, pp. 2-5). Petitioner them moved the court to alter or amend its order denying the relief of resentencing to a life sentence, but it was denied. Petitioner appealed from the denial of his oral Rule 32 motion, but it was affirmed by the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals on July 16, 2010. In doing so, the appellate court agreed with the trial court that the State can be allowed to substitute a felony conviction for one invalidated if proper notice is give to the defemdant. As a result, the court held "the circuit court properly sentenced Miller to life imprisonment without possibility of parole." (Doc. 6-6, at 10). The Alabama Supreme Court denied certiorari on October 8, 2010.
Petitioner filed another Rule 32 petition on December 2010, expressly attacking the February 19, 2009 "resentencing," but that petition was summarily denied and Petitioner dismissed the appeal from the denial. He filed yet another Rule 32 challenge to the resentencing on May 17, 2011, which ultimately was denied by the trial court. The denial was affirmed on appeal on April 19, 2013, rehearing was denied, and the Alabama Supreme Court denied certiorari on August 16, 2013. (Doc. 23-3). The instant habeas action was filed while the appeal of the May 17 Rule 32 petition was pending.
The petition is not time barred because the May 17, 2011 Rule 32 was a timely, "properly filed" post-conviction petition that tolled the one-year limitation of § 2244(d). First, it is clear that in this action Petitioner is challenging his "resentencing" on February 19, 2009. It is also clear that a "resentencing" is what occurred on that date. As the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals noted in its opinion of April 19, 2013, the state circuit court nolonger had jurisdiction over the Rule 32 petition, which had been granted in May 2005. The only thing the court had jurisdiction to do was to resentence the Petitioner after it had vacated the prior LWOP sentence in May 2005. "Clearly then, the February 2009 hearing was a resentencing hearing and not a hearing on Miller's May 2005 oral Rule 32 petition." (Doc. 23-1, p. 2, note 2). Thus, the current sentence under attack by Petitioner is that LWOP sentence imposed on February 19, 2009.
If the procedural history of this case were not confusing enough, it gets even more confusing. What is the "finality date" for purposes of triggering the § 2244(d) one-year limitation for filing a habeas challenge to the February 19, 2009, resentencing? The "finality date" usually is the date on which all direct appeals of a conviction or sentence end. Although not free of doubt, the court believes that the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals treated Petitioner's subsequent appeal as essentially a direct appeal from the April 2009 resentencing. There is no question but that petitioner sought review of the reimposed LWOP sentence; he filed a motion to alter or amend the sentence and then appealed the denial of the motion. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals considered his arguments on the merits, concluding in July 2010 that "the circuit court properly sentenced Miller to life imprisonment without possibility of parole." (Doc. 6-6, at 10). Furthermore in a subsequent opinion arising from a subsequent Rule 32 petition, the state appellate court seems to have taken the position that the only thing that was appealable was the resentencing itself, separate and apart from any Rule 32 petition then pending. As quoted above andexplained more fully in footnote 2 of the Court of Criminal Appeals' April 19, 2013 opinion,1 the state appellate court believed the resentencing was a separate matter from the Rule 32 petition. Indeed, the appellate court expressly stated that the trial court had lost jurisdiction in the Rule 32 matter, yet it properly resentenced Petitioner on February 19, 2009. For this reason, the court determines that the "finality date" for triggering the one-year limitation period under § 2244(d) was ninety days after October 8, 2010 (the date the Alabama Supreme Court denied certiorari), or January 6, 2011, when the time for seeking review in the United States Supreme Court expired.
Despite this conclusion and the obvious fact that more than one calendar year elapsed between January 6, 2011, and the filing of this petition on June 16, 2012, statutory tolling ofthe time limit saves the timeliness of the petition. Section 2244(d)(2) provides that the time during which a "properly filed" state post-conviction petition is pending is excluded from the calculation of the one-year limitation. Thus, from the date of the filing of a "properly filed" state post-conviction petition to the date it is finally resolved in state court, the one-year limitation for filing a federal habeas petition is tolled.
Petitioner filed his first Rule 32 petition expressly attacking the resentencing on December 22, 2010, at which time direct appeal of Petitioner's resentencing was still pending, the finality date had not yet arrived. Although that petition was subsequently dismissed on appeal in July 2011, Petioner filed yet another Rule 32 petition on May 17, 2011, which the state courts plainly regarded as "properly filed," even though relief was denied on procedural grounds.2 See Doc. 23-1. Thus, even if the December 2010 petition was not "properly filed," the one-year limitation had not expired at the time the May 2011 petition was filed. The May 2011 petition and appeal remained...
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