Miller v. Public Storage Management, Inc.

• Decision Date: 09 September 1997
• Docket Number: No. 96-10670,96-10670
• Citation: 121 F.3d 215
• Parties: 71 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 44,956, 134 Lab.Cas. P 10,086, 7 A.D. Cases 416, 24 A.D.D. 105, 10 NDLR P 307 Janice Sue MILLER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PUBLIC STORAGE MANAGEMENT, INC., Storage Equities, Inc. and Public Storage, Inc., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 215

121 F.3d 215

71 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 44,956, 134 Lab.Cas. P 10,086,

7 A.D. Cases 416, 24 A.D.D. 105, 10

NDLR P 307

Janice Sue MILLER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PUBLIC STORAGE MANAGEMENT, INC., Storage Equities, Inc. and Public Storage, Inc., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 96-10670.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Sept. 9, 1997.

Ben A. Goff, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Jay C. Counts, Julie S. Brunett, Littler Mendelson, Dallas, TX, for Defendants-Appellees.

Robert John Gregory, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Washington, DC, for Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Amicus Curiae.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas.

Before DAVIS, SMITH and DUHE, Circuit Judges.

DUHE, Circuit Judge:

Appellant Janice Sue Miller appeals the district court's Order dismissing her case and compelling arbitration of her claims against Appellee Public Storage, Inc. We find the arbitration provision in Appellant's employment contract should be enforced under the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14, and affirm the district court.

BACKGROUND

Janice Sue Miller worked for Public Storage as a property manager. In August 1993, at a performance review, Public Storage presented Miller with an employment contract containing an arbitration clause providing any dispute arising over employment termination would be resolved by binding arbitration. ¹ Although she now claims she was In February 1995, Miller injured her arm at work and eventually took a medical leave of absence. However, after eight months of leave, she was still unable to return to work and was fired. Miller filed a charge of disability discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") and received a Notice of Right to Sue. She then sued Public Storage alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213, and retaliation under the Texas Labor Code, §§ 451.001-.003.

given insufficient time to read the contract, she initialed each page of the document and signed the entire agreement.

Public Storage successfully moved to dismiss the suit and compel arbitration. The district court found that under the FAA, the arbitration agreement in Miller's employment contract was valid and enforceable. Miller appeals.

DISCUSSION

Miller claims the district court erred in ordering arbitration as her employment contract was outside the scope of the FAA. She argues that the trial court misread the exclusion clause in 9 U.S.C. § 1 of the FAA by narrowly construing the effect of that clause.

9 U.S.C. § 2 of the FAA makes arbitration agreements in certain contracts enforceable: "A written provision in ... a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction ... shall be valid, irrevocable and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." Section 1 defines contractual relationships excluded from the reach of the FAA. That section states in part: "[N]othing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seaman, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce."

Miller argues that, despite this Court's decision in Rojas v. TK Communications, Inc., 87 F.3d 745 (5th Cir.1996), arbitration clauses in employment contracts for workers generally engaged in interstate commerce are excluded from the scope of the FAA. Both Miller and the EEOC ² claim Rojas conflicts with Lincoln Mills v. Textile Workers Union, 230 F.2d 81 (5th Cir.1956), rev'd on other grounds, 353 U.S. 448, 77 S.Ct. 912, 1 L.Ed.2d 972 (1957).

In Rojas, an employee sued alleging sexual harassment and retaliation under Title VII. Her employer sought to dismiss her claims on the ground they were subject to mandatory arbitration pursuant to an arbitration clause in her employment contract. The employee, a radio disc jockey, argued for a broad reading of the exclusion clause of the FAA, and maintained her claims were exempt from arbitration as she was a worker "engaged in interstate commerce." 87 F.3d at 747.

This Court disagreed, and specifically found the exclusion clause does not release all employment contracts from the constraints of the FAA. We found the exclusion applies only to employees "actually engaged in the movement of goods in interstate commerce in the same way that seamen and railroad workers are." Id. at 748 (quoting Asplundh Tree Expert Co. v. Bates, 71 F.3d 592, 601 (6th Cir.1995)). Noting that the majority of courts addressing this issue "have determined that the exclusionary language present in § 1 is to be narrowly construed," we stated Congress's failure to broaden the exclusion through statutory language persuaded us to read the § 1 exclusion narrowly. Id. Any broader interpretation of that clause would undermine its significance.

In Lincoln Mills, an earlier case than Rojas, an employer and a union entered into a collective bargaining agreement that provided for arbitration to resolve disagreements between the parties. The union subsequently filed several grievances with the employer, which the employer rejected after the collective bargaining agreement expired. The employer then refused to grant the union's request that the grievances be submitted to arbitration; the union sued to enforce the arbitration clause.

This Court held the collective bargaining agreement was a contract of employment within the meaning of the FAA, and excluded from the FAA's application. Lincoln Mills, 230 F.2d at 86. We went on to state the FAA "does not authorize the judicial enforcement of a contractual undertaking to submit to arbitration grievances arising under a collective bargaining agreement." Id.

Rojas did not cite the holding in Lincoln Mills. However, Lincoln Mills did not specifically address the issue raised in Rojas and in this case: whether the § 1 exclusion exemption for contracts of employment of "any other class of workers engaged in ... interstate commerce" should exclude all employment contracts from the FAA's reach, or only those employment contracts of workers directly engaged in transportation of goods in commerce (such as railroad employees and seaman, the two classes of workers the FAA mentions by name). Lincoln Mills instead focused on the enforceability of an arbitration clause in a collective bargaining agreement, a completely different situation than that presented here.

The facts of Lincoln Mills demonstrate the differences between that case and Rojas. Lincoln Mills raised concerns about how labor unions and large corporations, functioning pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement, could best resolve disputes about working conditions. Whether the FAA applies in that situation presents quite different issues from those raised by the FAA's application in a conflict between an employer and an individual employee, when that employee signed a contract agreeing to settle disputes through arbitration. For these reasons, the holding in Lincoln Mills that the FAA does not authorize arbitration in disputes arising under collective bargaining agreements does not conflict with the Rojas holding that workers not directly involved in the transport of goods in interstate commerce are subject to the requirements of the FAA. We therefore find that, under Rojas, Miller is bound by the arbitration clause in her employment contract.

Miller also contends the FAA does not apply to a claim brought under the ADA. Miller claims the legislative history of the ADA shows Congress did not intend for arbitration clauses to prevent...