Miller v. Ratner

• Decision Date: 01 September 1996
• Docket Number: No. 821,821
• Citation: 114 Md.App. 18,688 A.2d 976
• Parties: Lonnie MILLER v. Warren RATNER et al. ,
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

Page 18

114 Md.App. 18

688 A.2d 976

Lonnie MILLER v. Warren RATNER et al.

No. 821, Sept. Term, 1996.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

Feb. 7, 1997.

Hubert M. Schlosberg (John B. Mesirow, on the brief), Washington, DC, for appellant

Albert D. Brault (Regina A. Casey, Joan F. Brault, and Brault, Graham, Scott & Brault, on the brief), Rockville, for appellee, Warren Ratner.

Mary Elizabeth McCormick (Gleason, Flynn, McCormick & Emig, on the brief), Rockville, for appellee, Dennis Ratner.

Argued before MURPHY, C.J., and MOYLAN, CATHELL, JJ.

CATHELL, Judge.

In 1945, the Legislature abolished the cause of action for breach of promise to marry. In the fifty-one years since, there has been no Maryland reported case in which the abolishment of that cause of action has been at issue. This, then, shall be the first.

In the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Judge Martha G. Kavanaugh granted Warren Ratner's and Dennis Ratner's, ¹ appellees', motions for summary judgment against Lonnie Miller, appellant. In the posture of this case, we must presume the accuracy of all factual allegations made by appellant, the party against whom the motion was granted. Accordingly, we shall recount some of the factual matters presented to the trial judge as if true, with the realization that their truthfulness has not been litigated. Our discussion may, therefore, include some of appellant's allegations of atrocious conduct on the part of appellees. While, as we have said, for the purpose of this appeal, we shall presume them to be true, we will be relying on just that presumption, not proven facts.

Ms. Miller and appellee, Warren Ratner, began to live together, apparently at his request. Appellant, at his request, substantially altered her lifestyle. After living with appellee for approximately three years, appellant became seriously ill with breast cancer. He initially supported her, but later rejected her and ordered her to leave his house. She refused.

She alleges that Warren, and his brother Dennis, then conspired to inflict emotional distress upon her in order to cause her to vacate Warren Ratner's house (and his life).

She alleges that, while she was ill from undergoing radiation treatments, Warren repeatedly woke her up in the middle of the night admonishing her to leave. She alleges that Warren's brother Dennis, also an appellee, telephoned her during the same period, calling her "bitch," "whore," and a "one-breasted woman." He told her that his brother "deserves a whole woman, not a one breasted woman." He told Ms. Miller on at least one occasion, "fuck you." She further alleges that Warren repeatedly told her she was a financial burden and that she was going to die. She proffered that Warren threatened her with bodily harm if she did not leave his house and told her that if she did not voluntarily vacate his house, he would have her put out by the "Woodridge boys."

Eventually, she moved out. Thereafter, she obtained a job with Universal Debit Credit. She alleges, even then, that appellees "continued to torment her" by causing her not to get the business of The Hair Cuttery, an entity owned by appellees or by a corporation evidently controlled by them. She also alleges that Warren filed a false claim in the bankruptcy proceedings she ultimately was forced to file.

Appellant presents twelve questions:

1. Was the contract Plaintiff and Defendant Warren Ratner entered into a contract to marry?

2. Was illicit sexual intercourse consideration for the contract the Plaintiff and Defendant Warren Ratner entered into?

3. Was Defendant Warren Ratner acting adversely to Creative Hairdressers, Inc. or within the scope of his authority when he interfered with the Plaintiff's prospective advantage?

4. Was Defendant Warren Ratner's conduct toward the Plaintiff intentional or reckless?

5. Was Defendant Warren Ratner's conduct toward the Plaintiff extreme and outrageous?

6. Was there a causal connection between Defendant Warren Ratner's wrongful conduct and the Plaintiff's emotional distress?

7. Did the Plaintiff suffer severe emotional distress due to Defendant Warren Ratner's conduct?

8. Did Defendant Warren Ratner conspire with Defendant Dennis Ratner to commit an unlawful act?

9. Was Defendant Dennis Ratner's conduct toward the Plaintiff intentional or reckless?

10. Was Defendant Dennis Ratner's conduct toward the Plaintiff extreme and outrageous?

11. Was there a causal connection between Defendant Dennis Ratner's wrongful conduct and the Plaintiff's emotional distress?

12. Did the Plaintiff suffer severe emotional distress due to Defendant Dennis Ratner's conduct?

We shall respond only to those questions necessary to our resolution of the main issues.

We begin by examining appellant's Complaint and amended complaints. The original complaint provided in paragraph four that Warren Ratner asked her to move in with him. In paragraphs five and six, appellant asserted that:

5. ... There was a mutual understanding that the defendant and the plaintiff were making a permanent commitment that would be followed by marriage.

6. The plaintiff relied upon the defendant's promises and moved into what the defendant referred to as "our home...." In anticipation of their marriage, the defendant told [her] that he had "plenty of money" and that he would take care of her. [Emphasis added.]

In Count I of the original complaint, Breach of Contract, the a foregoing provisions were incorporated "as if they were fully repeated and set forth again" therein. They were also, likewise, incorporated in Count II, Tortious Interference with Prospective Advantage, and Count III, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress. Thereafter, appellant filed a Scheduling Subsequently, an Amended Complaint was filed. In that amended complaint appellant reiterated:

Conference Statement, in which she alleged, in part, that she and appellee Warren Ratner "were engaged to be married."

5. ... There was a mutual understanding that the defendant and the plaintiff were making a permanent commitment that would be followed by marriage.

6. The plaintiff relied upon the defendant's promises and moved.... In anticipation of their marriage, the defendant told the plaintiff ... that he would take care of her. [Emphasis added.]

Again, appellant incorporated those statements into each of her counts, stating, as she did in the original complaint, that the allegations were incorporated "as if they were fully repeated and set forth again herein."

Thereafter, appellant filed a Second Amended Complaint. That complaint added an Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress count, in which appellant incorporated, "as if fully set forth herein, the entire Amended Complaint," thereby adding the above statements about marriage promises to that new count. (Emphasis added.) Subsequently, appellant filed a Third Amended Complaint that added a civil conspiracy count. In it, she again incorporated "as if fully set forth herein, the entire amended complaint and Second Amended Complaint," thereby incorporating into the civil conspiracy count the marriage promises we have above quoted. (Emphasis added.)

Warren Ratner filed a Motion for Summary Judgment as to Counts I, II, III, and IV of the Third Amended Complaint. Count I was the Breach of Contract count against Warren, Count II was the Tortious Interference with Prospective Advantage count against Warren, and Count III was the Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress count against Warren. Count IV alleged a civil conspiracy by both Warren and Dennis Ratner to "inflict" severe emotional distress on Ms. Miller.

In Warren Ratner's motion, his counsel argued that appellant's "claims" were, in substance, claims for breach of promise Dennis Ratner also filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on his behalf as to the counts against him. He incorporated Warren's position and arguments and further expounded upon them as deemed necessary.

to marry and that these were barred under the law of Maryland; that her breach of contract claim was not actionable "because it [was] based on consideration for illicit sexual intercourse;" and that appellant was precluded from maintaining a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress because she had not suffered a severely disabling injury from appellees' conduct. Warren Ratner also disclaimed[688 A.2d 980] liability for tortious interference with prospective advantage as a matter of law.

Ultimately, the trial judge granted both motions for summary judgments. She opined:

Although I have sympathy for Ms. Miller [appellant], I fail to see how the Court would uphold this contract as enforceable when we do have a statutory scheme that is outlined in detail for married partners upon the dissolution of marriage, why this plaintiff would be able to come into court as an unmarried person and enforce this contract when it was never considered by the legislature to be valid.

As far as the intentional infliction of mental distress, I have reviewed the cases. I have looked at all the labor dispute ones, and I would agree with Mr. Brault [counsel for Warren Ratner] that every relationship that breaks up has emotional distress, but I do not believe that our Court of Appeals at this time is willing to, under these facts, uphold a cause of action for intentional infliction of mental distress.

I think allowing this lawsuit to go forward would open the floodgates, and I am not willing at this point to make this public policy.

So, for that reason, I am going to grant summary judgment motions on all counts. [Emphasis added.]

While the trial court's comment can be construed to be a comment on the "palimony" issue, its comments, especially the comment as to an unmarried person enforcing a contract We shall affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of appellees.

"never considered by the legislature to be valid" can be equally construed to be applicable to the law enacted

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