Miller v. Rokita
| Docket Number | 3:22-CV-883 JD |
| Decision Date | 12 July 2023 |
| Parties | MARLA ROSE MILLER, Plaintiff, v. TODD ROKITA, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana |
Defendants Todd Rokita, Terry C. Shewmaker, and Vicki Elaine Becker (“State Defendants”) have filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). (DE 30). The motion will be granted for the following reasons.
The plaintiff, Marla Miller, proceeding pro se, initiated this litigation with a 25-page complaint.[1](DE 1.) This document describes many hardships Ms. Miller has endured in her life, and requests this Court to restore her custody of her children and award her $10,000,000 in damages for the allegedly unlawful deprivation of custody. (DE 1 at 3).
As relevant background to this motion, Ms. Miller alleges she had a difficult upbringing which involved alleged sexual harassment by her brother-in-law, disbelief of her claims by her family, involvement of her church in her claims, and intermittent stays at mental health care centers or treatment facilities at the direction of her family and church. (DE 1 at 7-8.) Ms. Miller indicates she became pregnant with her first child when she was seventeen years old “to get off all the pills they were drugging [her] with” and then got married six months later. (DE 1 at 8). Ms. Miller then left an abusive marriage and got a job. Id. During this time, she asked her sister, Defendant Lori Zimmerman to babysit for her. Id. Ms. Zimmerman convinced Ms. Miller that it would be best to leave the children with her for temporary stability. Id. at 9.
Thereafter, Ms. Zimmerman and her husband Trenton Zimmerman began to ask for legal guardianship of the children. Id. The Zimmermans explained to Ms. Miller that they believed her children needed stability and a mom and dad. Id. Ms. Miller alleges she was being intimidated and bullied by the Zimmermans into supporting the adoption, with actions such as threatening to return the children to the custody of Ms. Miller's ex-husband. Id.
Ms. Miller decided to go through with the adoption to give legal guardianship of her children to the Zimmermans. Id. at 9. Ms. Miller alleges she did not have counsel during the adoption and did not understand the legal consequences of the action. Id. She indicates that she believed it would be an open adoption and she would continue to have a relationship with her children. Id. She alleges that the adoption was approved on October 25, 2013. Id. at 11. Further, that following the adoption the Zimmermans prevented her from having a relationship with her children despite her efforts to do so. Id. at 10. Ms. Miller alleges that she was bullied and manipulated into relinquishing the custody of her children and generally asserts that her rights were violated because her children were adopted. Id.[2]
In seeking redress for these alleged wrongs Ms. Miller filed this lawsuit naming several defendants, three of whom have filed the instant motion to dismiss. These defendants are Indiana Attorney General Todd Rokita, Elkhart County Prosecuting Attorney Vicki Becker, and Terry Shewmaker who is a former Judge of the Elkhart County Circuit Court. From Ms. Miller's complaint it appears that Judge Shewmaker was the judicial officer who approved the adoption of her children by Lori and Trenton Zimmerman on October 25, 2013. (DE 1 at 10-11.) Attorney General Rokita's involvement in this situation is unclear, besides Ms. Miller's assertion that he has “Command Responsibility” over state agencies such as the “Department of Child and Family Services.” DE 1 at 14. It is even less clear what role Prosecuting Attorney Becker played in these events as Ms. Miller makes no factual allegations about her role or otherwise describes her theory of liability against Becker.
In reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court construes the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accepts the factual allegations as true, and draws all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Reynolds v. CB Sports Bar, Inc., 623 F.3d 1143, 1146 (7th Cir. 2010). A complaint must contain only a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). That statement must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), and raise a right to relief above the speculative level. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). However, a plaintiff's claim need only be plausible, not probable. Indep. Trust Corp. v. Stewart Info. Servs. Corp., 665 F.3d 930, 935 (7th Cir. 2012). Evaluating whether a plaintiff's claim is sufficiently plausible to survive a motion to dismiss is “‘a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.'” McCauley v. City of Chicago, 671 F.3d 611, 616 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
Abstention arguments under Rooker-Feldman implicate a court's jurisdiction. See DePuy Synthes Sales, Inc. v. OrthoLA, Inc., 953 F.3d 469, 475 (7th Cir. 2020); Salem v. Larkin, 2022 WL 17176496, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 23, 2022). Arguments for abstention “do not fit neatly into Rule 12(b)(1) or Rule 12(b)(6).” Whole Woman's Health All. v. Hill, 377 F.Supp.3d 924, 930 (S.D. Ind. 2019). “Such arguments do not deny the existence of subject-matter jurisdiction; they presuppose it.” Id. However, “when such a motion “asks the Court to decline jurisdiction, as defendants' motion does, it fits more comfortably under Rule 12(b)(1).” Nadzhafaliyev v. Hardy, 403 F.Supp.3d 663, 667 (N.D. Ill. 2019).
“When ruling on a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), the district court must accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations, and draw reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Ezekiel v. Michel, 66 F.3d 894, 897 (7th Cir. 1995). Because this case challenges the factual circumstances of jurisdiction rather than solely the pleading of jurisdiction, “the district court may properly look beyond the jurisdictional allegations of the complaint and view whatever evidence has been submitted on the issue to determine whether in fact subject matter jurisdiction exists.” Apex Digital, Inc. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 572 F.3d 440, 444 (7th Cir. 2009).
The State Defendants argue the claims against them should be dismissed based on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, based on Plaintiff's failure to state claims against Mr. Rokita and Ms. Becker and because Mr. Shewmaker is not a proper defendant under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act.[3]
(1) It is unclear at this stage if Rooker-Feldman abstention applies
The State Defendants argue that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes the Court from exercising jurisdiction over this case. However, due to gaps in their briefing and ambiguities in the factual allegations of the complaint, the Court cannot conclude at this time that Rooker-Feldman applies.
Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal courts do not have jurisdiction to review or reverse orders issued in state court or state administrative proceedings. Gilbert v. Ill. State Bd. of Educ., 591 F.3d 869, 900 (7th Cir. 2010). This doctrine prevents a person who lost in state court from bringing suit in federal court in order to set aside the state court judgment. Id. A plaintiff cannot evade this bar by “casting [her] complaint in the form of a civil rights action.” Ritter v. Ross, 992 F.2d 750, 754 (7th Cir. 1993). Relevant to this case, when “the [party's] injury is executed through a court order, there is no conceivable way to redress the wrong without overturning the order of a state court” and “Rooker-Feldman does not permit such an outcome.” Sykes v. Cook Cty. Circuit Court Probate Div., 837 F.3d 736, 743 (7th Cir. 2016).
However, Rooker-Feldman does not apply when plaintiffs seek damages for injuries caused by the fraudulent conduct of state court opponents, nor does it bar federal suits seeking damages for fraud or other unlawful conduct that misled the state court into issuing a judgment adverse to a federal plaintiff. Hadzi-Tanovic, 62 F.4th at 406-07. So, while the doctrine might bar elements of a lawsuit seeking to overturn a state court judgment, claims seeking damages based on fraudulent conduct by opponents in the proceedings leading up to that judgment may nonetheless be viable.[4]
To determine whether Rooker-Feldman applies to Ms. Millers' claims against the remaining State Defendants, requires applying a two-step analysis. Andrade v. City of Hammond, 9 F.4th 947, 950 (7th Cir. 2021). The first step is for the court to determine whether a plaintiff's federal claims are “independent” of a state court action, or whether they directly challenge a state court action or are “inextricably intertwined with one.” Id. (quoting Swartz v. Heartland Equine Rescue, 940 F.3d 387, 391 (7th Cir. 2019)). If the plaintiff's claims are a direct challenge or inextricably intertwined with state court proceedings, then the federal court advances to step two of the Rooker-Feldman analysis. Id. At the second step, the court determines whether the plaintiff had the reasonable opportunity to raise the issue in state court proceedings. Id. (citing Jakupovic v. Curran, 850 F.3d 898, 902 (7th Cir. 2017)). If the plaintiff had such an opportunity, then Rooker-Feldman strips the federal court of jurisdiction.
Ms....
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