Miller v. Rosier

• Decision Date: 20 April 1875
• Citation: 31 Mich. 475
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: George W. Miller v. Marion Rosier

31 Mich. 475

George W. Miller v. Marion Rosier

Supreme Court of Michigan

April 20, 1875

Heard April 14, 1875

Error to Kalamazoo Circuit.

Judgment reversed, with costs, and a new trial ordered.

Arthur Brown, for plaintiff in error.

May Buck & Powers, for defendant in error.

Cooley J. Graves, Ch. J., and Campbell, J., concurred.

OPINION

Cooley, J.:

The defendant in an action for breach of promise to marry has brought the case here for review on exceptions after judgment against him in the court below. He also relies upon certain errors which are supposed to appear in the record preceding the trial.

The suit was commenced by capias ad respondendum, upon which the defendant was arrested and held to bail. It was insisted that this arrest was erroneous, and reliance is had on section 33 of article 6 of the constitution, which provides that "no person shall be imprisoned for debt arising out of or founded on a contract, express or implied, except in cases of fraud or breach of trust, or of moneys collected by public officers, or in any professional employment." ^[4] The return of the proceedings in the court below shows that a motion was made to set aside the proceedings on this ground, but the court denied it, and the defendant subsequently pleaded to the action. The first error relied upon in this court is the action of the court below in denying this motion.

If error was committed in this denial, the defendant has mistaken his remedy. The proceedings on such a motion constitute no part of the record proper, and are therefore not subject to review on writ of error after final judgment. Conceding the arrest to be illegal, the court obtained full jurisdiction of the defendant when he pleaded to the merits, and the process then became immaterial. It was competent for the defendant to test the legality of his arrest on habeas corpus before pleading, and before further costs had accrued; and with this speedy and effectual remedy open to him,-to say nothing of any other,--it would be extremely undesirable, if it were admissible, that any error in the first process should be left for correction after final judgment, and after the parties had been put to the expense of what might then appear to have been a fruitless litigation; especially as any error in the proceedings on habeas corpus would be subject to prompt review in this court. But for the reason already given, we think the question of the legality of the arrest is not raised by the record.

Several questions are made on the evidence offered in the case by the defendant to rebut the prima facie case which the plaintiff had made out. Without giving the offers in detail, it will suffice to state that they consisted in propositions to show the statements of the plaintiff to third persons, made within a few days after the defendant's final refusal to marry her, that she cared nothing about him; that all she wanted was his money; that she only proposed to marry him to spite his family; that she had refused to live at his house, and did not propose to marry him to live in any residence he had or place where he was living; and the like. All these offers were rejected on the ground that they were made after the engagement had been broken.

The court appears to have regarded the proposed evidence as designed to bring out only the feelings and sentiments of the plaintiff after the wrong had been done, and at a time when she might justly be excused for harboring and expressing feelings of resentment, and perhaps of dislike. But the scope of these offers was much wider. They proposed to show feelings on the part of the plaintiff while the engagement was in force, inconsistent with any purpose to fulfill the engagement in a spirit befitting the relation contemplated by it, and such as must have rendered a breach of the contract by defendant of little of no injury to her. A woman engaged to a man she does not like, can seldom suffer much damage from a breach of the engagement, and if she proposes to refuse to accompany the husband to his home when marriage shall have taken place, her complaint, if he withdraws his offer, cannot be entitled to very serious consideration. And feelings and purposes of this nature may as well be shown by admissions made after a breach of the engagement as before. The material question would not be as to the time they were made, but what they tended to prove.- Hook v. George, 108 Mass. 324.

It is also alleged for error, that the plaintiff was allowed to show the value of the farm belonging to the defendant's father, as something the jury might consider in estimating damages. The only ground on which it is claimed this evidence was admissible was, that from other evidence it had been shown defendant had made statements to plaintiff that his property was invested in this farm. How much was thus invested he did not state, nor was there any evidence tending to show that he then had any legal interest whatever in the farm, or if he had, that it was any thing more than nominal. We think the court correctly held that evidence of defendant's pecuniary circumstances might be put in by the plaintiff, but this evidence only went to show the father's circumstances, which were wholly immaterial to the case on trial.

The charge of the court (given in full below) is complained of, but in the main we think it just and right. One instruction given at the request of the plaintiff, that "if the jury find for the plaintiff they should award her such damages as would place her in as good a condition pecuniarily as she would have been if the contract had been fulfilled," is one the elements of which are altogether too complicated and conjectural to be of service as a guide to the jury, and we think it should not have been given. ^[*]

The judgment must be reversed, with costs, and a new trial ordered.

Graves, Ch. J., and Campbell, J., concurred.

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Notes:

^[4] A defendant in an action for breach of promise to marry is liable to arrest on a capias where the affidavit for the writ avers a promise to marry and that by means thereof the defendant succeeded in seducing the plaintiff, as such a case is to be regarded as one of fraud and, therefore, is excepted from this constitutional inhibition: In the matter of Sheahan, 25 Mich. 145; see, also, Perry v. Orr, 35 N.J.L. 295. But a cause of action based simply upon a breach of promise to marry without any charge involving fraud, is within this constitutional inhibition: In the Matter of Tyson, 32 Mich. 262.

^[*]Gentlemen of the Jury: This is an action brought by the plaintiff, against the defendant, to recover damages which she claims resulted to her, by reason of a breach of promise of marriage by the defendant.

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