Miller v. Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist.
Decision Date | 14 October 2021 |
Docket Number | 2:21-cv-0757-JAM-CKD PS |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
Parties | SONIA MAREE MILLER, Plaintiff, v. SACRAMENTO CITY UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., Defendants. |
ORDER AND FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS ON MOTIONS TO DISMISS (ECF NOS. 12, 18, 21)
Presently before the court are three motions to dismiss, brought by each of the three defendants in this action: Sacramento City Unified School District (“SCUSD” or “School District”), Sacramento City Teachers Association (“SCTA” or “Union”), and Mr. Norman Hernandez.[1] (ECF Nos. 12, 18, 21.)[2] Plaintiff filed a single-paragraph opposition to all three motions [3] and the School District and defendant Hernandez filed replies. (ECF Nos. 25-27.) The motions were heard remotely on October 13, 2021. (ECF No 28.) For the following reasons, the undersigned recommends GRANTING all three motions, dismissing all claims against defendants Hernandez and the Union without leave to amend, and dismissing all claims against the School District with leave to amend.
Plaintiff, who is a certificated special education teacher, filed this action on April 27, 2021 against her employer, SCUSD; her union, SCTA; and two administrators at a charter school where she was assigned to work for several years.[4] (ECF No. 1 at 2, 7-9.) The caption of the complaint references at least five anti-discrimination laws: “Complaint of Discrimination (Civil Rights Act of 1964) - Title VII, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, or the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and Equal Pay Act.” (Id. at 7.) On the attached form complaint, plaintiff checked boxes indicating that four of these provisions formed the basis for the court's jurisdiction: (1) Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; (2) the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.; (3) the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12112 et seq.; and (4) the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206 et seq. (ECF No. 1 at 3.) In the body of the complaint, however, plaintiff asserts just two labeled causes of action under Title VII and the Equal Pay Act. (Id. at 23-24.)
Plaintiff's complaint contains a 14-page disjointed statement of facts regarding a host of issues she has had with the School District and the Union over her two decades of teaching in the district. (Id. at 9-23.) She also attaches over 200 pages of exhibits related to these various issues. (Id. at 27-254.)
Plaintiff alleges that she has worked for the School District since 2003 as a certificated special education teacher. (Id. at 3, 7-8, 22, 25.) Although she was continuously employed by the School District (id. at 3, 16), for the school years from 2016 to 2019 she was assigned to work at two charter schools, one being Sol Aureus College Preparatory School (id. at 9, 18). Defendant Hernandez is an “Administrator” at Sol Aureus, [5] and the SCTA is a labor organization that “represents certificated and classified employees of SCUSD, ” like plaintiff. (Id. at 2, 8.)
Plaintiff describes an overwhelming number of issues in her complaint, alleging as follows:
On the form complaint, plaintiff checked boxes asserting discrimination in the form of failure to promote, failure to accommodate a disability, unequal terms and conditions of employment, and retaliation, along with other acts that she listed as “public defamation, privacy violations, financial fraud, nondisclosure.” (Id. at 4.) On the form, plaintiff further indicated that this discrimination occurred from December 8, 2003 (her original date of hire) through the present. (Id. at 4, 8.) In the fields for bases of discrimination, plaintiff indicated that the discrimination was based on race (“Mixed Race: Japanese/White”); gender (“Female”); religion (“Catholic”); age (born 1972); and disability or perceived disability (“ADHD”). (Id. at 4.)
Regarding exhaustion of administrative remedies, plaintiff stated that she filed an EEOC charge online on October 23, 2020 and was issued a Notice of Right to Sue letter on January 27, 2021. (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff attaches a copy of the Right to Sue Letter, under an exhibit cover page listing and The Right to Sue Letter shows that a copy was sent to one charged party: the School District. (Id.)
The School District and the Union were granted extensions of time to respond to the complaint (ECF Nos. 7-9), and on August 5 2021, defendant Hernandez filed the instant motion to dismiss (ECF No. 10) which he promptly re-noticed for hearing before the undersigned (ECF No. 12). Nevertheless, on August 6, 2021, plaintiff moved for default judgment against all defendants. (ECF No. 13.) On August 11, 2021, the undersigned recommended denying plaintiff's motion because no default had been entered and no defendant had yet failed to timely respond to the complaint. (ECF No. 14.) Plaintiff filed timely objections to those findings and recommendations, which remain pending before the assigned district judge. (ECF No. 15.) Plaintiff's objections also (improperly) contained two paragraphs of arguments in opposition to defendant Hernandez's motion to dismiss. (Id. at 7-8.) In response to plaintiff's objections, the undersigned permitted plaintiff to file a separate, more complete opposition. (ECF No. 16.) On August 31, 2021, the School District and the Union filed their instant motions to dismiss, with the Union's noticed for hearing two weeks after the School District's. (ECF Nos. 17, 18.) The next day, the School District filed a corrected motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 21.) In order to simultaneously hear all motions to dismiss, the court...
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