Miller v. Schmitz
| Decision Date | 18 February 2014 |
| Docket Number | 1:12-CV-00137-LJO-SAB |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
| Parties | ISAAC MILLER, Plaintiff, v. STEVEN JOHN SCHMITZ, et al, Defendants. |
ORDER ON MOTION FOR
ATTORNEYS FEES
(Doc. 135)
After a jury trial in this matter, Plaintiff Isaac Miller ("Plaintiff") moves this Court for an award of attorney's fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). For the reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS in part Plaintiff's motion for fees.
On January 29, 2012, Plaintiff brought this action for civil rights violations and expungement of his arrest record against Defendants Officer Steven John Schmitz ("Schmitz"), Ronald Silva ("Silva") and the City of Hanford ("the City") based on Plaintiff's arrest and prosecution following an altercation that occurred on February 17, 2010. This Court construed Plaintiff's complaint to allege claims for malicious prosecution against Schmitz under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, expungement of Plaintiff's arrest record by the City pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201, and malicious prosecution against Silva under California law.
On April 15, 2013, Plaintiff and Silva reached a settlement agreement.
On August 6, 2013, this Court denied Schmitz and the City's (collectively "Defendants'")motion for summary judgment of Plaintiff's claims against them.
The parties then participated in a jury trial on the two claims against Defendants. On November 27, 2013, the jury returned a favorable verdict for Plaintiff as to both claims and awarded Plaintiff $500,000.00 in damages.
On December 30, 2013, Plaintiff filed the instant motion for attorney's fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1988(b). Defendants did not file an opposition, and Plaintiff did not file a reply.
The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b), authorizes district courts to award "a reasonable attorney's fee" to prevailing civil rights litigants. "The purpose of § 1988 is to ensure effective access to the judicial process for persons with civil rights grievances." Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983) (internal quotation omitted). "[T]he district court has discretion in determining the amount of a fee award." Id. at 437.
In the Ninth Circuit, the proper method for determining reasonable attorney's fees is to use the "lodestar method." Id. at 433; Jordan v. Multnomah Cnty., 815 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1987). In calculating the lodestar, the court must determine both a reasonable number of hours and a reasonable hourly rate for each attorney. Chalmers v. City of Los Angeles, 796 F.2d 1205, 1211 (9th Cir. 1986). "Determination of a reasonable hourly rate is not made by reference to rates actually charged the prevailing party." Id. at 1210 (citing White v. City of Richmond, 713 F.2d 458, 461 (9th Cir. 1983)). The established standard for determining a reasonable hourly rate is the "rate prevailing in the community for similar work performed by attorneys of comparable skill, experience, and reputation." Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin. Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 979 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). "In determining reasonable hours, counsel bears the burden of submitting detailed time records justifying the hours claimed to have been expended." Chalmers, 796 F.2d at 1211 (citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 429). "Those hours may be reduced by the court where documentation of the hours is inadequate; if the case was overstaffed and hours are duplicated; if the hours expended are deemed excessive or otherwise unnecessary." Id. (citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433-34).
The Ninth Circuit "requires that courts reach attorney's fee decisions by considering some orall of twelve relevant criteria set forth in Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67 (9th Cir. 1975)." Quesada v. Thomason, 850 F.2d 537, 539 (9th Cir. 1988). The Kerr factors are: (1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved; (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the "undesirability" of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases. 526 F.2d at 70.
"The district court is in the best position to determine in the first instance the number of hours reasonably expended in furtherance of the successful aspects of a litigation and the amount which would reasonably compensate the attorney." Chalmers, 796 F.2d at 1211 (citing Harmon v. San Diego County, 736 F.2d 1329, 1331 (9th Cir. 1984); Pate v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit District, 697 F.2d 870, 872-73 (9th Cir. 1983)). "Although the district court's calculation of an award need not be done with precision, some indication of how it arrived at its figures and the amount of the award is necessary." Id. (citing Domingo v. New England Fish Co., 742 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1984); Masalosalo v. Stonewall Insurance Co., 718 F.2d 955, 957 (9th Cir. 1983)). The district court should provide "a concise but clear explanation of its reasons for the fee award." Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437.
The hourly rates charged by Plaintiff's attorneys and staff in this case are as follows:
Attorney/Staff
Requested Rate
Skill, Experience, and Reputation
Little is a civil rights attorney with over twenty
years of experience and has tried fifty cases to
verdict. He graduated from Harvard Law School
and practiced with O'Melveny & Meyers and
Frampton, Williams & Little before becoming a
solo practitioner.
Tostenrude had been licensed to practice law for
seven months at the time she began billing in
this case. She graduated from San Joaquin
College of Law.
Chechelnik had been licensed to practice law for
nine months at the time he began billing in this
case. He graduated from Thomas Jefferson
School of Law.
Little's requested rate of $350 per hour is reasonable in light of his skill, experience, and reputation and the prevailing rate in Fresno, California for similar work performed by attorneys of comparable skill, experience, and reputation. Camacho, 523 F.3d at 979. He supports his requested rate with declarations from other attorneys that an hourly rate in the range of $350 to $400 is reasonable for experienced attorneys. (Doc. 135, Exh. 3). The Court agrees. Cf., Bond v. Gerguson Enters., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70390, at *29-31 (E.D. Cal. June 30, 2011) ().
However, Plaintiff's counsel fails to offer persuasive evidence to show that the requested rates for Tostenrude and Chechelnik are justified. In fact, Plaintiff's counsel offers no evidence at all to justify their requested rates. Therefore, in the absence such evidence, the Court will reduce these rates in accordance with the Court's own experience and knowledge of the market rate in Fresno. See, Ingram v. Oroudijian, 647 F.3d 925, 928 (9th Cir. 2011) ().
The record of Tostenrude's billed time demonstrates that she did not engage in the practice of law with regard to this case. The only tasks billed by Tostenrude were preparation and revision of the bill of costs. (Doc. 135, Exh. 4). These tasks are clerical in nature and do not involve the practice of law. Nadarajah v. Holder, 569 F.3d 906, 921 (9th Cir. 2009) () Tasks that are "clerical in nature should have been subsumed in firm overhead costs[.]" Id. (citing Davis v. City & County of San Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536, 1543 (9th Cir.1992); Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 288 n. 10 (1989)). "When clerical tasks are billed at hourly rates, the court should reduce the hoursrequested to account for the billing errors." Id. () (internal citations omitted). Therefore, the clerical tasks for which Tostenrude billed as attorney's fees are not recoverable as such.
Chechelnik had no demonstrable legal experience at the time he began billing in this matter. Plaintiff's counsel submitted no evidence to show that Chechelnik's requested rate of $175 per hour is reasonable. This Court recently awarded attorney's fees at a rate $150 per hour to a new attorney at a well-reputed law firm who worked on a complicated patent dispute. Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Rehrig Pac. Co., 2013 WL 6491517 at *11 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2013). By contrast, the instant case is a typical 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights matter that involved no complex or novel legal issues. The Court accordingly reduces Chechelnick's hourly rate to $125 per hour for his work on this case.
While Plaintiff's counsel provides no support to show that the requested hourly rate of $100 for Garcia is reasonable for a law clerk in the relevant community, the Court finds that the rate is indeed reasonable. Cf. Franco v. Ruiz Food Products, Inc., 2012 WL 5941801 (E.D.Cal. Nov. 27, 2012) (); Bond, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70390, at *31 (same).
Finally, Plaintiff's counsel hired Vazquez for "secretarial and...
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