Miller v. Smith
| Decision Date | 29 October 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 95-7521,95-7521 |
| Citation | 99 F.3d 120 |
| Parties | Bernard Eric MILLER, Petitioner-Appellant, v. William SMITH; Attorney General of the state of Maryland, Respondents-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit |
ARGUED: Laurack Doyle Bray, Washington, D.C., for Petitioner-Appellant. Evelyn Omega Cannon, Assistant Attorney General, Baltimore, MD, for Respondents-Appellees. ON BRIEF: J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General of Maryland, Kathleen S. Hoke, Assistant Attorney General, Baltimore, MD, for Respondents-Appellees.
Before MURNAGHAN and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges, and LAY, Senior Circuit Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation.
Reversed and remanded with instructions by published opinion. Judge MURNAGHAN wrote the majority opinion, in which Senior Judge LAY joined. Judge HAMILTON wrote a dissenting opinion.
Bernard Eric Miller appeals from the district court's denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In the petition, Miller challenged the State of Maryland's procedure for providing transcripts to indigents for appeal purposes and alleged that he was denied a free trial transcript in violation of his federal constitutional rights. Because the application of Maryland Rules deprives Miller of the protections guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution, we reverse the district court's judgment and remand for action consistent with this opinion.
Following his conviction for felony murder in Maryland state court, Miller attempted to obtain a transcript of his trial in order to perfect a direct appeal. 1 As an indigent, Miller sought the transcript at state expense. Because he received legal representation from an attorney working on a pro bono publico basis instead of a Maryland public defender, however, a state judge denied the request. 2 Acknowledging Miller's right as an indigent to transcripts necessary for appeal purposes, the court nevertheless ruled that Maryland Rules 1-325(b) and 8-505 required an indigent to be represented by the state public defender's office in order to receive those transcripts at state expense. 3 The court then found that Miller failed to satisfy that criterion because he refused to accept public defender representation and because his attorney refused to seek designation as an assigned public defender so that he could represent Miller under the supervision of the public defender's office.
Miller appealed to the Maryland Court of Special Appeals, arguing that the transcript denial violated the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection and due process guarantees, as well as his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The appellate court reversed the trial court, but on purely statutory grounds. See Miller v. Maryland, 98 Md.App. 634, 635 A.2d 1, 6 (1993). The court interpreted Maryland Rule 1-325(b) to permit an indigent defendant represented by pro bono counsel to receive at state expense the transcripts necessary for appeal and ordered the state public defender's office to accommodate Miller.
The Maryland Court of Appeals granted certiorari and reversed, holding that the Maryland Rules neither required the provision of a free transcript to Miller nor violated his constitutional rights. See Maryland v. Miller, 337 Md. 71, 651 A.2d 845, 846, 851-52 (1994). The court read Rule 1-325(b) as requiring an indigent to "apply to the Public Defender and be represented by, or refused representation by, that office before he can receive a free transcript." Id. 651 A.2d at 849. The court explained that the rule uses the public defender as a "gatekeeper" to protect against the waste or abuse of state resources set aside for indigent defendants.
Acknowledging that the rule treats indigents and non-indigents differently, the court of appeals determined that Miller's federal constitutional rights had not been violated because he had not been "completely denied the appellate process." Id. at 851. The court found that the requirement of application to the public defender's office is a "reasonable restriction" on an indigent appellant's constitutional right to a free transcript. Id. at 852. Furthermore, the court concluded that the procedure does not discriminate on the basis of wealth:
[T]he kind of appeal Miller will get does not depend on the amount of money he has; it depends on his willingness to cooperate and follow the reasonable procedures set forth in [Md. Ann.Code] Art. 27A and the Maryland Rules. But for his intransigence, this system would work, and Miller would receive a free transcript.
Finally, the state court of appeals rejected Miller's Sixth Amendment challenge. The court reasoned that a criminal appellant has no absolute or automatic right to choice of counsel, so requiring Miller to "avail himself of the [public defender's services] in order to obtain a free transcript" is permissible. Id. at 853.
Miller sought reconsideration of the ruling, arguing that a conflict of interest on the part of the public defender's office prevented him from accepting its services on appeal. He maintained that in the course of representing his co-defendant in the underlying murder case, the office had accused Miller of being the driver of the car and thus, the murderer. Forcing him to accept public defender services on appeal, Miller argued, would therefore violate his constitutional protection against conflict-free legal representation. The court of appeals denied the motion.
Miller next filed his federal habeas corpus petition. Following the recommendation of a federal magistrate who had adopted the findings and conclusions of the Maryland Court of Appeals, the district court denied the petition. Meanwhile, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals dismissed Miller's direct appeal because he failed to provide the relevant trial transcript. Miller asked the district court to stay or enjoin the state court's dismissal of his appeal, but the court refused.
Miller presents three claims on appeal: (1) that the district court should have held an evidentiary hearing and rendered its own findings of fact and conclusions of law; (2) that the State's denial of a free transcript violated his constitutional rights; and (3) that the district court should have stayed the state court order dismissing his appeal. After careful consideration, we find that the first and third challenges are without merit. See Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 313, 318, 83 S.Ct. 745, 757, 759-60, 9 L.Ed.2d 770 (1963) (); Pruett v. Thompson, 996 F.2d 1560, 1577 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 984, 114 S.Ct. 487, 126 L.Ed.2d 437 (1993); see also Levine v. Torvik, 986 F.2d 1506, 1518-19 (6th Cir.) (in considering a habeas petitioner's request for a stay, the court generally looks at the substantiality of the claims, the likelihood of success and the existence of extraordinary circumstances), cert. denied, 509 U.S. 907, 113 S.Ct. 3001, 125 L.Ed.2d 694 (1993). We do, however, agree that the denial of a free transcript to Miller is unconstitutional as impermissibly infringing upon his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, and turn now to that claim.
The U.S. Constitution does not obligate states to provide an opportunity to appeal in criminal cases. McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687, 14 S.Ct. 913, 914-15, 38 L.Ed. 867 (1894). If a state chooses to create such a right to review, however, it must employ procedures that satisfy due process and equal protection. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 393, 105 S.Ct. 830, 834, 83 L.Ed.2d 821 (1985); Nelson v. Peyton, 415 F.2d 1154, 1157 (4th Cir.1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1007, 90 S.Ct. 1235, 25 L.Ed.2d 420 (1970). In the criminal context, due process is violated by state procedures that "offend[ ] some principle so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental." Billotti v. Legursky, 975 F.2d 113, 115 (4th Cir.1992) (quoting Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 445, 112 S.Ct. 2572, 2577, 120 L.Ed.2d 353 (1992)), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 984, 113 S.Ct. 1578, 123 L.Ed.2d 146 (1993). Equal protection requires that, once created, a state's appellate procedures "must be kept free of unreasoned distinctions." Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 310, 86 S.Ct. 1497, 1500, 16 L.Ed.2d 577 (1966). "[I]n defining a class subject to legislation, the distinctions that are drawn [must] have some relation to the purpose for which the classification is made." Id. at 309, 86 S.Ct., at 1499-1500.
"The Assistance of Counsel for his [the defendant's] defense" guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution may be provided insofar as selection of a public defender to represent an indigent is concerned. It does not, however, force such representation by a defendant who prefers to decline public defender representation and to select a qualified attorney who agrees to represent him pro bono publico. Where that occurs, as it has here, for the State of Maryland to refuse a transcript (which would be supplied to a public defender) amounts clearly and simply to partial yet substantial denial of the assistance which is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. It signifies a denial of fairness and equality.
Drawing on these notions of fairness and equality, the Supreme Court has held that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees "meaningful access to justice" in criminal cases. 4 Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 77, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 1093, 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985). All criminal defendants are entitled to "an adequate opportunity to present their claims fairly within the adversary system." Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 612, 94 S.Ct. 2437, 2444-45, 41 L.Ed.2d 341 (1974). "[J]ustice," the Court has explained, "cannot be equal...
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