Miller v. State
| Decision Date | 18 December 1889 |
| Docket Number | 15,135 |
| Parties | Miller v. The State |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
From the Morgan Circuit Court.
The judgment is reversed.
J. H Jordan, C. G. Renner, J. V. Mitchell and O. Matthews, for appellant.
L. T Michener, Attorney General, W. R. Asher, Prosecuting Attorney, W. R. Harrison, G. A. Adams, J. S. Newby, N. A. Whitaker, A. M. Cunning, E. M. McCord and J. H. Gillett, for the State.
The appellant was tried and found guilty, as charged in an indictment predicated upon section 1993, R. S. 1881, which reads as follows: "Whoever entices or takes away any female of previous chaste character from wherever she may be to a house of ill-fame, or elsewhere, for the purpose of prostitution, shall be imprisoned," etc.
It was charged in the indictment, substantially, that the appellant and two other men, who are jointly indicted with him, did unlawfully and feloniously entice and take away, etc., a certain female named, 16 years of age, of previous chaste character, to a certain room in the house of an individual named, which was occupied by one of the defendants, "for the purpose of unlawfully and feloniously prostituting her," the female named. In one of the counts the charge was that the female was enticed and taken, as above mentioned, for the purpose of prostituting her, and of having carnal intercourse with her.
It will be observed that the act prohibited by the statute is the enticing or taking any female of previous chaste character to a house of ill-fame, or elsewhere, for the purpose of prostitution. The purpose of this statute, doubtless, was to punish debased persons, whether male or female, who should engage in the baneful and pernicious practice of inducing chaste females to become inmates, or frequenters, of houses of ill-fame, assignation, or other places for purposes of prostitution. It is not aimed at the person, however despicable or infamous his offence, who entices, allures, or solicits a chaste female, from wherever she may be, to accompany him to any convenient or opportune place, for the sole purpose of having illicit intercourse. The offence consists in the alluring, enticing, or taking a female of chaste character to a house of ill-fame, or other place of like character, for the purpose of prostitution that is, for the purpose of having common, indiscriminate meretricious commerce with men, and not merely for the purpose of having sexual intercourse with the party who enticed, or took her away. Fahnestock v. State, 102 Ind. 156, 1 N.E. 372; Osborn v. State, 52 Ind. 526; Commonwealth v. Cook, 12 Metc. 93; State v. Stoyell, 54 Me. 24; Carpenter v. People, 8 Barb. 603; State v. Ruhl, 8 Iowa 447; People v. Plath, 100 N.Y. 590, 3 N.E. 790.
It was essential, therefore, that it should have been charged in the indictment that the female was enticed or taken to a house of ill-fame, or other place of like character, for the purpose of prostitution. In respect to the place to which the female was enticed, the charge is that she was taken to a room in the house of an individual named, which room was occupied by one of the defendants. In the absence of any further characterization of the place, the inference arises that the room to which the female was taken was the private apartment of one of the defendants, in the house of a third person. The character of the place into which the female is enticed or inveigled is one of the essential elements of the crime, and a charge that a female was enticed to the apartment or room of the defendant, without some further characterization of the present or prospective use to which it is, or is to be, put, does not bring the offence within the prohibition of the statute. The place into which the female has been enticed must have been a house of ill-fame, or elsewhere, that is, some other place of like character, where prostitution of the character practiced at houses of ill-fame or assignation was, or was intended to be, carried on. Carpenter v. People, supra.
This is according to the rule which declares that where words of particular description in a statute are followed by general words that are not so specific and limited unless there be a clear manifestation of a contrary purpose, the general word or words are to be construed as applicable to persons or things, or cases of like kind, as are designated by the particular word or words. Bishop Statutory Crimes, ...
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