Miller v. State

Decision Date30 June 1987
Docket Number6 Div. 778
Citation518 So.2d 801
PartiesJimmy Dean MILLER v. STATE.
CourtAlabama Court of Criminal Appeals

Martha E. Williams, Cullman, for appellant.

Charles A. Graddick, Atty. Gen., and Jean Alexandra Webb, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

McMILLAN, Judge.

The appellant, Jimmy Dean Miller, was found guilty of murder and sentenced to 18 years in the state penitentiary, pursuant to the Habitual Felony Offender Act. The appellant's case was consolidated for trial with the actions against three co-defendants.

Deputy Jim Taylor was shot in the chest when two men, Coy Patrick Crowe and Billy Don Hass, attempted to break Crowe's brother out of jail. Deputy Taylor died as a result of the gunshot wound. Both men were charged with capital murder; Hass testified for the State during Crowe's trial.

The testimony presented at trial was conflicting as to the appellant's role in planning the jailbreak. The State presented evidence that the "getaway" car was seen at the appellant's house on the night in question, and, that after the car was recovered following the offense, fingerprints which were removed from the car were identified as matching those of the appellant. However, the fingerprint examiner testified that there was no way to determine the age of the fingerprints.

The key witness for the State was Bobby Lee Miller, who was no relation to the appellant, Jimmy Dean Miller (hereinafter referred to only as "the appellant"). Miller testified that he was asked by the appellant if he would go to Morgan County and post bail for Billy Don Hass, which Miller did. Miller further testified that he drove Hass back to the appellant's trailer, where they "sat around for a little while that afternoon" and "broke into a conversation about going up to the Winston County Jail." Miller testified that Billy Crowe, the appellant's nephew and brother of Coy Patrick Crowe and Jonathan Crowe, was in prison in the Winston County Jail. Miller testified that previously, on the Fourth of July, Miller had declined Crowe's request to help him break Billy Crowe out of jail. Miller testified that a second conversation concerning the jailbreak took place at the appellant's trailer after Miller has posted bail for Billy Don Hass. Miller testified that the appellant, Jonathan Crowe, Billy Don Hass, and Coy Patrick Crowe were all present when he again declined a request to help in the jailbreak. Thereafter, the group walked into a bedroom at the appellant's trailer, where Coy Patrick Crowe pulled out a diagram of the Winston County Jail. Miller testified that the appellant was showing Billy Don Hass and Coy Patrick Crowe the details of the diagram and indicating the different locations of the jail. Miller further testified that the appellant told Coy Patrick Crowe "that if something wasn't done, that if [Billy Crowe] wasn't helped, that they were going to fry him in Winston County for the capital murder charge that they was [sic] holding him on." Miller explained that Coy Patrick Crowe and Billy Don Hass were to drive to the jail and break out Billy Crowe, while the appellant and Jonathan Crowe were to clean out the chicken house in order to hide the getaway car following the jail break. Miller testified that the appellant suggested cleaning out the chicken house for that purpose. Miller testified that, on the day in question, at approximately 1:30 in the morning, Coy Patrick Crowe and Billy Don Hass were leaving the appellant's trailer to attempt the jailbreak. Miller stated that he observed Coy Patrick Crowe with a hand gun and Hass with a sawed-off shotgun. He stated that the appellant and Jonathan Crowe were also outside with them and wished Hass and Coy Patrick Crowe good luck.

The State also presented testimony of Janette Hames, who was present at the trailer when Coy Patrick Crowe and Billy Don Hass left to attempt the jailbreak. She testified that after they left, the appellant and Jonathan Crowe were discussing some information concerning the jail which was being transmitted over a Bearcat scanner located in the trailer. She further testified that although she could not remember the specifics of the conversation, she believed that, in talking to the appellant, Jonathan Crowe stated, "They got in."

Billy Don Hass testified for the defense. Hass testified that on the afternoon prior to the jailbreak, the appellant, Coy Patrick Crowe, and he drove to a service station and purchased some Stop Leak for his tires. They then drove to the junk yard and purchased a spare tire. Hass testified that there was no discussion about the jailbreak while they were in the car. He further testified that every conversation concerning the jailbreak that took place occurred only between Coy Patrick Crowe and himself, with no one else present. He testified that Coy Patrick Crowe drew and explained the diagram of the jail to him. He testified that at approximately 1:30 or 2:00 a.m., Coy Patrick Crowe and he left to attempt the jailbreak. Hass testified that he was charged with capital murder for the offense and testified for the State in the case against Coy Patrick Crowe.

The appellant's case was consolidated with the cases against his wife, Jonathan Crowe, and Dorothy Herron, Jonathan Crowe's girlfriend.

I

The appellant alleges that his testimony from his bond hearing should have been suppressed because he was not read his Miranda rights and his testimony was "not intented to be a matter of public record." The record indicates that the following transpired at trial:

"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: First of all, I'd like to ask for a ruling on our written motion to suppress that I filed Tuesday, if I could get one, suppressing the evidence on the bond hearing. Has the Court made a ruling yet?

"THE COURT: I don't remember, I don't recall.

"[PROSECUTOR]: Judge, the State never did offer anything on the bond hearing in this case.

"THE COURT: I don't think its gotten to be an issue yet. So--

"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I just want to be on record that there is no ruling.

"THE COURT: All right."

Subsequently, the following occurred:

"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: For the record, I would move for the Court to rule on my written motion to suppress I filed Tuesday, I believe, relative to the bond hearing.

"THE COURT: Overruled.

"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Are you overruling the motion to suppress?

"THE COURT: But I'm not ruling that the evidence is admissible.

"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Well, that ain't hardly possible, is it, Judge? I mean--

"THE COURT: Sure it is, because the conditions will dictate. If the right conditions are met, then it comes in in the proper form--

"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Oh. Okay. I'm sorry.

"THE COURT: --And it could come in. But it could be--it could not be admitted simply because its not shown to be relevant."

The record indicates that the State never introduced any evidence of the testimony from the bond hearing; therefore, the appellant suffered no prejudice. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967).

Furthermore, we note that the appellant's claim that he should have been read his Miranda rights prior to testifying at his bond hearing is without merit. The United States Supreme Court held, in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), that a person must be adequately and effectively apprised of his rights before he is subjected to custodial interrogation. Miranda applied to extrajudicial confessions obtained by the police or other such authorities during interrogation and while the appellant is held in custody. Such is not the case where the appellant testifies at a bond hearing. Furthermore, the record indicates that the appellant was represented by counsel at the bond hearing.

The testimony at the bond hearing clearly indicates that the appellant never confessed to the crime, nor was the crime even discussed. While testimony was introduced that he was related to or familiar with some of the other perpetrators, the Judge noted that such was proper inquiry as pertaining to the appellant's social and personal background. Moreover, the appellant's prior convictions were properly considered in determining whether or not the appellant was "a menace to society." Ex parte Carlisle, 57 Ala.App. 216, 326 So.2d 775, 776 (Ala.Cr.App.1975), cert. denied, Carlisle v. State, 295 Ala. 396, 326 So.2d 776 (1976).

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the appellant's motion to suppress.

II

The appellant argues that fingerprint cards which were not introduced into evidence were improperly considered by the jury in reaching a verdict. The record indicates that the jury had retired when these exhibits were made part of the record; however, all five of the fingerprints cards had been testified to by the fingerprint expert. The following transpired, at trial, after the jury retired to deliberate:

"THE COURT: All right. Let the record show that about two or three minutes ago the bailiff informed me that the jury had inquired as to the five fingerprint cards that were marked for identification and were testified to by John Vaughn, the fingerprint expert, and they were wondering why they had not been submitted along with the other documents. And in checking, we have determined that they had been marked for identification, that they had not been ever offered nor accepted or received into evidence. And I propose at this time--I've looked at them and I don't find any extraneous material on them. I don't know what purpose the jury wants them, but I'm of the opinion that they're entitled to look at them. But I want to let the attorneys for the defense object to it in the record if they so desire.

"First, it will be Mr. Griffith on behalf of the defendant Jimmy Dean Miller.

"MR. GRIFFITH: I object to them adamantly, because I didn't address myself to them in the closing argument because they were not part of the...

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13 cases
  • Reynolds v. State Of Ala.
    • United States
    • Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
    • October 1, 2010
    ...The defendant bears the burden of showing that the witness was an accomplice before § 12-22-222 can be invoked. Miller v. State, 518 So. 2d 801 (Ala. Cr. App. 1987), cert, denied, 518 So. 2d 801 (Ala. 1988)."An accomplice is defined as 'an associate in crime; a partner or partaker in guilt.......
  • Reynolds v. State
    • United States
    • Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
    • December 14, 2012
    ...The defendant bears the burden of showing that the witness was an accomplice before § 12–22–222 can be invoked. Miller v. State, 518 So.2d 801 (Ala.Cr.App.1987), cert. denied, 518 So.2d 801 (Ala.1988). “An accomplice is defined as ‘an associate in crime; a partner or partaker in guilt.’ Dar......
  • Taylor v. State
    • United States
    • Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
    • February 4, 2000
    ...in the case-in-chief or on rebuttal, at any time before the case is submitted to the jury. § 15-14-4, Ala.Code 1975; Miller v. State, 518 So.2d 801 (Ala.Cr.App.1987); see also Nichols v. State, 276 Ala. 209, 160 So.2d 619 (1964) (prosecution allowed to reopen case to present testimony to re......
  • Hagood v. State
    • United States
    • Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
    • April 26, 1991
    ...is an accomplice for the purposes of invoking the rule of § 12-21-222 is on the defendant." (citation omitted).' " Miller v. State, 518 So.2d 801, 807 (Ala.Cr.App.1987). No error occurred Martin next contends that the trial court erred in failing to give his requested charges one, four, and......
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