Miller v. State

• Decision Date: 14 June 1984
• Citation: 478 N.Y.S.2d 829,62 N.Y.2d 506,467 N.E.2d 493
• Parties: , 467 N.E.2d 493, 19 Ed. Law Rep. 618 Madelyn MILLER, Appellant, v. STATE of New York, Respondent.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 829

478 N.Y.S.2d 829

62 N.Y.2d 506, 467 N.E.2d 493, 19 Ed.

Law Rep. 618

Madelyn MILLER, Appellant, v. STATE of New York, Respondent.

Court of Appeals of New York.

June 14, 1984.

Joseph Kelner and Martin Rubenstein, New York City, for appellant

Robert Abrams, Atty. Gen. (Julie S. Mereson and Peter H. Schiff, Asst. Attys. Gen., of counsel), for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

COOKE, Chief Judge.

When the State operates housing, it is held to the same duty as private landlords in the maintenance of physical security devices in the building itself. Thus, a student who is injured in a criminal assault in a State-operated college dormitory may recover damages against the State in its capacity as a landlord upon a showing that there was a reasonably foreseeable likelihood of criminal intrusion into the building, that the State negligently failed to keep the outer doors locked, and that the failure was a proximate cause of the injury.

The claimant, Madelyn Miller, a 19-year-old junior at the State University of New York (SUNY) at Stony Brook, was confronted in the laundry room of her dormitory at approximately 6:00 a.m. on March 9, 1975, by a man wielding a large butcher knife. She was blindfolded and prodded out of the room, through an unlocked outer door from the basement, back in another unlocked entrance to the dormitory, up some stairs to the third floor and into a dormitory room, where she was raped twice at knifepoint and threatened with mutilation or death if she made any noise. Finally, her assailant led her out to the parking lot, where he abandoned her. The assailant was never identified, and the trial court found that he was an intruder in the dormitory with no right or privilege to be present there. Strangers were not uncommon in the hallways, and there had been reports to campus security of men being present in the women's bathroom. Claimant herself had complained twice to the Assistant Quad Manager of her dormitory area about nonresidents loitering in the dormitory lounges and hallways when they were not accompanied by resident students. The school newspaper had published accounts of numerous crimes in the dormitories such as armed robbery, burglaries, criminal trespass, and a rape by a nonstudent. Notwithstanding these reports, the doors at all of the approximately 10 entrances to the dormitory building were concededly kept unlocked at all hours, although the doors each contained a locking mechanism.

Claimant sued the State for her damages. The Court of Claims construed the claim as asserting two theories of liability for negligence. One, based upon defendant's negligent failure to provide adequate police protection, was held to be a governmental activity subject to sovereign immunity under the circumstances of this case because the plaintiff had not established any special relationship with defendant. Liability was imposed upon the State, however, upon the other theory that it was acting in a proprietary capacity as a landlord. The court found that by failing to lock the outer doors of the dormitory, the State had breached its duty to protect its tenants from reasonably foreseeable criminal assaults by outsiders. In particular, the failure to lock the outer doors was found to be a proximate cause of the rape. Claimant was found not to be contributorily negligent for being in the laundry room after sunrise on a Sunday morning (see CPLR 1411 ). Claimant's evidence as to her extensive emotional injuries was credited by the trial court, which awarded her $25,000 in damages.

Claimant appealed on the ground of inadequacy of damages and the State cross-appealed on the question of liability. The Appellate Division, 96 A.D.2d 1031, 466 N.Y.S.2d 436, reversed, on the law, and dismissed the claim, reasoning that although claimant sought to recover based upon the State's liability as a landlord, "in actuality, the claim was based upon the State's failure to provide adequate police protection." Because claimant never established a special relationship between the State and herself, the court found that the State owed no duty to claimant in particular and, thus, could not be responsible for any failure of campus police security measures. This court now reverses.

Public entities remain immune from negligence claims arising out of the performance of their governmental functions including police protection, unless the injured person establishes a special relationship with the entity, which would create a specific duty to protect that individual, and the individual relied on the performance of that duty (see De Long v. County of Erie, 60 N.Y.2d 296, 304, 469 N.Y.S.2d 611, 457 N.E.2d 717; Florence v. Goldberg, 44 N.Y.2d 189, 195, 404 N.Y.S.2d 583, 375 N.E.2d 763; Riss v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579, 583, 293 N.Y.S.2d 897, 240 N.E.2d 860; Motyka v. City of Amsterdam, 15 N.Y.2d 134, 139, 256 N.Y.S.2d 595, 204 N.E.2d 635; Bass v. City of New York, 38 A.D.2d 407, 413, 330 N.Y.S.2d 569, affd. no opn. 32 N.Y.2d 894, 346 N.Y.S.2d 814, 300 N.E.2d 154). Claimant does not now urge recovery on this theory. Rather, claimant contends that she presented an enforceable claim under her other pleaded theory, that the State failed as a landlord to properly maintain the dormitory, specifically, by failing to lock the outer entrances.

In addition to allegations of inadequate police protection, the claim also embraced a charge against the State in its capacity as a landlord, alleging that the State was "vested by such law with the ownership, care, custody, control and maintenance of * * * school properties of SUNY at Stony Brook, with their buildings * * * and in particular dormitory," and that the injuries suffered were caused by the State's negligence in its "failure to maintain reasonable security * * * in particular in the dormitory known as Horace Greeley College." The bill of particulars alleged specific acts of negligence by the State in its landlord capacity, averring that defendant was "careless, reckless and negligent in failing to provide adequate security devices; * * * in failing to provide locks on the outer doors of the dormitories". Thus, the Appellate Division erred in characterizing the claim as sounding solely in inadequate police protection.

Defendant asserts that there was insufficient evidence as a matter of law to support a finding of liability against the State for negligence in its landlord capacity. It reasons that the decision whether to keep the outer doors locked was made by defendant in its police capacity and, as such, constituted part of an executive decision as to how security resources for the entire campus were to be allocated in general, which is a governmental function for which the State is immune from liability.

It is not disputed that when the State acts in a proprietary capacity as a landlord, it is subject to the same principles of tort law as is a private landlord (see Court of Claims Act, § 8; Preston v. State of New York, 59 N.Y.2d 997, 998, 466 N.Y.S.2d 952, 453 N.E.2d 1251; Bass v. City of New York, 38 A.D.2d 407, 411, 330 N.Y.S.2d 569, affd. no opn. 32 N.Y.2d 894, 346 N.Y.S.2d 814, 300 N.E.2d 154, supra; Duren v. City of Binghamton, 172 Misc. 580, 15 N.Y.S.2d 518, affd. 258 App.Div. 694, 18 N.Y.S.2d 518, affd. 283 N.Y. 467, 28 N.E.2d 918). The difficulty here arises from defendant's dual role, where it has acted in a proprietary capacity as a landlord by its ownership and control of the SUNY campus, and also in a governmental capacity by providing police protection through the appointment of campus security officers "to preserve law and order on the campus" (see Education Law, § 355, subd. 2,...