Miller v. State

• Decision Date: 16 February 1922
• Docket Number: No. 11319.,11319.
• Citation: Miller v. State , 77 Ind.App. 611, 134 N.E. 209 (Ind. App. 1922)
• Parties: MILLER v. STATE.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

77 Ind.App. 611

134 N.E. 209

MILLER

v.STATE.

No. 11319.

Appellate Court of Indiana, Division No. 1.

Feb. 16, 1922.

Appeal from Juvenile Court, Lagrange County; Thomas A. Davis, Special Judge.

William Miller was convicted of a violation of the School Attendance Act, and appeals. Affirmed.

Joseph C. Herron and Joseph Cripe, both of Kokomo, for appellant.

U. S. Lesh, Atty. Gen., and Edward M. White, Deputy Atty. Gen., for the state.

BATMAN, P. J.

[1] Appellant, the father of Amanda Miller, a child over 7 and under 16 years of age, was tried and convicted in the Lagrange juvenile court under section 17 of the School Attendance Act of 1921, based on a violation of section 5 thereof, which provides:

“Unless otherwise provided herein, every child between the ages of seven and sixteen years shall attend public school, or other school taught in the English language which is open to the inspection of local and state attendance and school officers; and such child shall attend such school each year during the entire time the public schools are in session in the school district in which such child resides.” Acts 1921, p. 340.

This appeal followed, based on an assignment of error, that the decision of the trial court is contrary to law The principal questionin this appeal may be stated thus: Is the parent of a child under the age of 16 years, who has been graduated from an elementary school in the township where she resided, after having completed the eighth grade thereof to the satisfaction of the school authorities, required to send such child to the public high school of such township? After a careful consideration of the School Attendance Act of 1921, in connection with other statutes governing the public schools of the state, we are of the opinion that such duty rests on the parent, where no facts exist which would prevent an application of that part of the School Attendance Act quoted above. Where such facts exist the burden is on a defendant to avail himself thereof as a matter of affirmative defense. State v. O'Dell (1917) 187 Ind. 84, 118 N. E. 529.

The record contains a special finding of facts, made by the trial court pursuant to section 1635, Burns' 1914. Appellant does not contend that the facts are not correctly or fully found, but insists that they are not sufficient to sustain the judgment against him. We will therefore confine our attention to a consideration of the specific contentions, based on such facts. It appears that the public high school of the township in which appellant and his child reside is not located in the elementary school district of their residence. Based on this fact, appellant claims to be exempt from the application of that part of said section 5 quoted above, in so far as the attendance of his said child at said high school is concerned. The law does not sustain this claim. Township trustees, under certain conditions, are authorized to establish and maintain high schools, and when so established and maintained they are a part of the public school system. Sections 6584a, 6584b, 6584c, and 6585 Burns' 1914. From a consideration of the sections of the statute cited, it is clear that when such a high school is established, the entire township becomes the school district which it is to serve. It is therefore coextensive with all the elementary school districts of such township. We are of the opinion, therefore, that when section 5 of the School Attendance Act of...