Miller v. State

• Court: Supreme Court of Delaware
• Writing for the Court: MOORE
• Citation: Miller v. State, 633 A.2d 370 (Del. 1993)
• Decision Date: 30 September 1993
• Docket Number: No. 471,1992,471,1992
• Parties: Leonard J. MILLER, Jr., Defendant-Below, Appellant. v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff-Below, Appellee. . Submitted:

Page 370

633 A.2d 370

Leonard J. MILLER, Jr., Defendant-Below, Appellant. v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff-Below, Appellee.

No. 471,1992.

Supreme Court of Delaware.

Submitted: Sept. 30, 1993.

Decided: Nov. 1, 1993.

Superior Court, New Castle County.

AFFIRMED.

Before MOORE, WALSH and HOLLAND, JJ.

ORDER

MOORE, Justice.

This 1st day of November, 1993, it appearing that:

1) Leonard J. Miller, Jr. ("Miller") appeals his convictions for two counts of Unlawful Sexual Intercourse First Degree. Following a jury trial in the New Castle County Superior Court, Miller was convicted of both charges.

2) According to the evidence, Miller and the victim's boyfriend, Eric White ("White"), are cousins. On the night in question, the victim and Miller were both staying at the house of White and White's mother. The victim went upstairs to sleep while her boyfriend, White, remained downstairs. After White left, the victim, as is her custom, observed the spot she and White left on the bed sheet where they had engaged in intercourse.

3) The victim then put on her underpants and went to sleep. Later, White's brother entered the room, turned on the light and asked White for a blanket. At that moment, the victim realized that White had joined her in bed and was sleeping next to her. The victim went back to sleep. White then left the bed and slept on a couch in the bedroom.

4) The victim was again awakened when she felt someone pulling down her underpants. Assuming that White was still in bed with her, the victim cooperated and allowed the person next to her to begin sexual intercourse. Suddenly, the victim thought she heard a third person in the room, so she pushed the man away from her. The man then forced the victim's mouth onto his penis. The victim pushed the man away from her a second time. In doing so, the victim felt the man's hair, and finally realized that the man was not her boyfriend, White. The victim moved closer to the man in order to identify him, and determined that he was Miller.

5) The victim testified that she called out for White, to which Miller replied, "Tony, oh, I didn't, I didn't know you was in here," and then left the room. The victim then woke up White. The victim identified the spot on the bed where Miller had ejaculated. The bed sheet was preserved as evidence, and eventually was sent to the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"), along with blood samples from the victim, White and Miller, for deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing. ¹ FBI Special Agent Linda Harrison ("Harrison") testified that she isolated and tested four spots on the filthy sheet where she found semen present. Two spots on the bed produced a profile--one matched Miller and the other matched White.

6) The defendant also testified at trial, although to a decidedly different set of facts. Miller told the jury that he had not engaged in intercourse with the victim on the night in question. He testified that he had engaged in sexual intercourse frequently using the same bed the victim had slept in on the night in question. Miller presented evidence that the sheets on the bed were not frequently changed and that he and White did not get along. During her testimony, the victim admitted that she did not care too much for Miller. Miller suggested that the attack was fabricated.

7) Miller raises one issue on appeal. He contests the admission of the DNA match evidence. Miller claims that the trial judge erred as a matter of law in admitting evidence of the DNA test results because such results are based upon an expert's personal observations, not scientific analysis, and are therefore highly prejudicial. Miller argues that even though DNA testing may be scientifically performed and that the testing methods may be acceptable, the human interpretation of the results by an expert witness is suspect.

8) When the admissibility of evidence is determined by the trial court as a matter of law, this Court's review is de novo. See City of Wilmington v. Parcel of Land Known as Tax Parcel No. 26,067,00,004, Del.Supr., 607 A.2d 1163, 1170 (1992).

9) In this case we consider for the second time the admissibility of evidence arising from the scientific technique of DNA typing in criminal prosecutions. Again, as in Nelson v. State, Del.Supr., No. 152, 1991, Horsey, J., slip op. (July 29, 1993) (holding that DNA evidence is only admissible when both the evidence of a match and the statistical significance of the match are admissible), we face an atypical case in that Miller did not present a DNA expert to challenge the findings of the State's FBI expert. On appeal, Miller merely contests the expert witness' interpretation of the results of the DNA typing, not the testing methods or the results themselves. Therefore, we need not consider any other issues relating to the admissibility of DNA evidence, such as whether the FBI's matching procedures and methodology are admissible under the Delaware Rules of Evidence. Consideration of these issues would only be appropriate in a case where two or more experts gave conflicting testimony as to the accuracy of the FBI's scientific analysis.

10) As we recognized in Nelson, in Delaware, scientific evidence must satisfy the pertinent Delaware Rules of Evidence concerning the admission of such evidence. Nelson, supra, at 13; See Fensterer v. State, Del.Supr., 493 A.2d 959, 962 n. 3 (1985), rev'd on other grounds, 474 U.S. 15, 106 S.Ct. 292 (1985); Whalen v. State, Del.Supr., 434 A.2d 1346, 1354 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 910, 102 S.Ct. 1258 (1982). According to the test articulated in State v. Pennell, Del.Super., 584 A.2d 513, 515 (1989), prior to admitting the State's DNA expert testimony as evidence, the trial court must determine: 1) that the expert was qualified under D.R.E. 702; 2) that the evidence offered was otherwise admissible, relevant and reliable pursuant to D.R.E. 401 & 402; 3) that the bases for the expert opinion are "reasonably relied upon by experts in the field" under D.R.E. 703; 4) that the specialized knowledge being offered will assist the trier of fact in comprehending the evidence or in determining a fact in issue according to D.R.E. 702; and 5) whether such evidence...