Miller v. State

CourtArkansas Court of Appeals
Writing for the CourtOlly Neal
CitationMiller v. State, 102 S.W.3d 896, 81 Ark. App. 401 (Ark. App. 2003)
Decision Date16 April 2003
Docket NumberNo. CA CR 02-698.,CA CR 02-698.
PartiesWilliam Patrick MILLER, and Loretta Anita Jackson v. STATE of Arkansas.

J. Martin Honeycutt, Van Buren, for appellant.

Mark Pryor, Att'y Gen., by: David R. Raupp, Ass't Att'y Gen., KaTina Hodge, Law Student, and Darnisa Evans Johnson, Deputy Att'y Gen., for appellee.

OLLY NEAL, Judge.

This is an appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress in the Crawford County Circuit Court, after which appellants entered conditional pleas of nolo contendere for possession of marijuana with the intent to deliver and reserved their right to appeal the suppression denial. Each appellant was fined $3,500 plus costs and sentenced to ten years' imprisonment in the Regional Punishment Facility with nine years suspended. On appeal, appellants argue that the trial court erred in denying their motions to suppress. We affirm.

On October 15, 2001, Trooper Raymond Triplett stopped appellants' vehicle on Interstate 40 for following too closely. Triplett advised the driver, appellant Loretta Jackson, and her passenger, appellant William Miller, of the reason for the stop and requested identification; both complied with the officer's request. The officer issued Jackson a citation for driving on a suspended license and gave her a written warning.

During the course of events, Trooper Triplett learned that Miller had rented the car and that he and Jackson were traveling from California to Georgia for a couple of days to see some friends. Triplett looked inside the vehicle, noticing "not too many clothes or any kind of luggage in the back seat," just "a jacket, perhaps small food items." Triplett then asked Jackson and Miller about their clothing and luggage, and they both informed Triplett that everything they had was in the back seat of the vehicle. Both Jackson and Miller advised Triplett that they did not have any knowledge as to what was in the trunk.

Finding this suspicious, Trooper Triplett asked Jackson if she would object to a search of the vehicle, to which she responded that she could not give consent because she had not rented the vehicle. Triplett advised Jackson that "because she was driving the vehicle that she was in control, and had authority to grant consent." Triplett also noticed that "Mr. Miller lost all eye contact with me. He sunk down in his seat and looked straight ahead. He appeared to be highly nervous at that point." The officer stated that Jackson did not give him consent; therefore, he advised her that he was going to "run [his] K-9 around the vehicle for a quick K-9 scan." Trooper Triplett went to his car and retrieved his canine.

When Trooper Triplett walked the canine around the car, the dog gave an alert or indication by stopping and jumping up at the trunk and scratching several times with its paws. The trooper then informed Jackson and Miller that he was going to search the trunk. When he opened the trunk, Trooper Triplett found three black suitcases filled with wrapped packages of marijuana. Trooper Triplett placed appellants under arrest. Both were charged with possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver.

Appellants moved to suppress the evidence seized during the traffic stop, arguing that the evidence was obtained in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Article II, Sections 8 and 10, of the Arkansas Constitution. The motions were denied. Thereafter, appellants entered conditional pleas of nolo contendere, and the trial court sentenced them accordingly. This appeal followed.

Appellants do not challenge the legality of the initial stop or their arrest. On appeal, appellants argue, pursuant to Ark. R.Crim. P. 24.3, that the trial court erred in denying their motion to suppress evidence. In response, the State first argues that appellants have not demonstrated that they are entitled to a conditional-plea appeal and that we are without jurisdiction to hear the case. We will address this issue first.

Conditional Plea

Rule 24.3 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure states in pertinent part that:

(b) With the approval of the court and the consent of the prosecuting attorney, a defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty or nolo contendere, reserving in writing the right, on appeal from the judgment, to review of an adverse determination of a pretrial motion to suppress evidence. If the defendant prevails on appeal, he shall be allowed to withdraw his plea.

* * *

(d) No plea of guilty or nolo contendere shall be accepted by any court unless the prosecuting attorney of the governmental unit in which the offense occurred is given opportunity to be heard at the time the plea is tendered. In any criminal cause in which trial by jury is a right, a court shall not accept a plea of guilty or nolo contendere unless the prosecuting attorney has assented to the waiver of trial by jury.

Ark. R.Crim. P. 24.3 (2002). The rule requires both the consent of the prosecuting attorney and the approval of the trial court; additionally, the intent to reserve the right to appeal must be entered contemporaneously with the plea. See Barnett v. State, 336 Ark. 165, 984 S.W.2d 444 (1999). The supreme court has interpreted Ark. R.Crim. P. 24.3(b) to require strict compliance with the writing requirement in order for the appellate court to obtain jurisdiction; this includes a requirement that the conditional plea be reserved in writing by the defendants. McMullen v. State, 79 Ark.App. 15, 82 S.W.3d 827 (2002). Absent compliance with the express terms of Rule 24.3(b), the appellate court acquires no jurisdiction to hear an appeal, even when there has been an attempt at trial to enter a conditional plea. Id.

In its argument, the State argues:

Concerning their apparent attempted conditional guilty pleas, appellants' addendum contains only their amended judgment and commitment orders entered on May 8, 2002, and documents entitled "Additional Terms/Conditions of Disposition." Appellants' abstract fails to provide any other basis upon which to determine if Rule 24.3 was complied with, although it recited that they entered conditional pleas. While the judge signed the judgment and commitment orders, neither the judge, the prosecuting attorney, nor Appellants also signed the attached Additional Terms/Conditions of Disposition, although they recite that theirs [sic] pleas are conditional. Thus, appellants have not demonstrated strict compliance with Rule 24.3(b) and this Court's jurisdiction to hear the merits of their appeal.

In McCormick v. State, 74 Ark.App. 349, 354-55, 48 S.W.3d 549, 552 (2001), we stated that

Rule 24.3 does not specify the manner in which the State is to manifest its consent to the conditional guilty plea, so being present, contesting the objectionable aspects of the disposition of the case, and allowing the plea to be entered as a "negotiated plea of guilty" should be sufficient to preserve the suppression issue for appeal. Obviously, for a "negotiated" plea to exist it requires negotiation, and the only other interested party is the State. In contract law, manifestation of assent may be made by spoken words or by conduct.

There, we held that the prosecutor manifested assent by showing up in court and acquiescing to the entry of the negotiated plea agreement. We stated that "No hold otherwise would be to give the State the benefit of the bargain while simultaneously relieving it of its obligation to consent." Id. at 355, 48 S.W.3d at 552.

In the instant case, the record reflects that a suppression hearing was held on April 22, 2002, and the trial court denied appellants' motions. The record indicates that prosecuting attorneys Marc McCune and Will Jones; Miller's defense attorneys, Marvin Honeycutt and Charles Waldman; and Jackson's defense attorney, Ernie Witt, were present at the hearing. Following the court's ruling, Jackson's defense attorney, Witt, informed the trial court that "[w]e're going to do a conditional plea, Judge, so hopefully we may do that this morning." Thereafter, the record reflects that appellants entered conditional pleas.

Immediately following appellants entrance of conditional pleas, a "Conditional Plea Proceeding," was had, and the following colloquy took place:

COURT: Are we going to have some conditional pleas or not? All right, the State alleges here that on or about the 16th day of October of 2001, that you unlawfully and feloniously possessed marijuana with intent to deliver, a schedule VI controlled substance, weight being greater than 100 pounds. Do each of you understand the nature of the charge?

DEFENDANT JACKSON: Yes.

DEFENDANT MILLER: Yes.

COURT: Do you understand that you have a right if you believe you're innocent to a trial by jury, do each of you understand that?

DEFENDANT JACKSON: Yes.

DEFENDANT MILLER: Yes.

COURT: The fact that you're here this morning, indicates to the Court that you're about to enter pleas in the case, give up your right to a trial by jury, give up your right to confrontation and simply plead to the charge, am I correct about that?

MR. WITT: Yes sir, it's a conditional plea, Judge.

MR. HONEYCUTT: That's correct, that's on both of them, a conditional.

COURT: Are you entering your pleas here based on the belief that you are in fact in violation, subject to the decisions by any appellant [sic] court on the legal issues involved.

DEFENDANT JACKSON: Yes.

DEFENDANT MILLER: Yes.

COURT: All right, tell me about it.

MR. JONES: Your Honor, on the date alleged in the information officers stopped the 2001 Nissan Maxima that these defendants were traveling. in for following too closely; officers then ran a K-9 around the vehicle, and the K-9 alerted to the trunk area of the vehicle. Officers then searched the trunk area and found three black suitcases which contained bundles of marijuana, which weighed approximately 100 pounds, and the marijuana did test...

Get this document and AI-powered insights with a free trial of vLex and Vincent AI

Get Started for Free

Start Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant

  • Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database

  • Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength

  • Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities

  • Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting

vLex

Start Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant

  • Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database

  • Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength

  • Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities

  • Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting

vLex

Start Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant

  • Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database

  • Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength

  • Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities

  • Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting

vLex

Start Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant

  • Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database

  • Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength

  • Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities

  • Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting

vLex

Start Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant

  • Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database

  • Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength

  • Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities

  • Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting

vLex

Start Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant

  • Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database

  • Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength

  • Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities

  • Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting

vLex
11 cases
  • Fitzgerald v. State
    • United States
    • Maryland Supreme Court
    • 10 Diciembre 2004
    ...v. Weinstein, 190 Ariz. 306, 947 P.2d 880, 884 (Ct.App.1997); Arkansas, Sims v. State, 2004 WL 652418 (Ark.2004); Miller v. State, 81 Ark.App. 401, 102 S.W.3d 896, 902 (2003); Willoughby v. State, 76 Ark.App. 329, 65 S.W.3d 453, 456 (2002); Vega v. State, 56 Ark.App. 145, 939 S.W.2d 322, 32......
  • Dowty v. State
    • United States
    • Arkansas Supreme Court
    • 23 Junio 2005
    ...has similarly held that a dog sniff of the exterior of a vehicle does not amount to a Fourth Amendment search. See Miller v. State, 81 Ark.App. 401, 102 S.W.3d 896 (2003); Willoughby v. State, 76 Ark.App. 329, 65 S.W.3d 453 (2002); Vega v. State, 56 Ark.App. 145, 939 S.W.2d 322 2. This stat......
  • Sims v. State
    • United States
    • Arkansas Supreme Court
    • 1 Abril 2004
    ...has determined that a canine sniff of the exterior of a vehicle does not amount to a Fourth Amendment search. See Miller v. State, 81 Ark.App. 401, 102 S.W.3d 896 (2003); Willoughby v. State, 76 Ark.App. 329, 65 S.W.3d 453 (2002); Vega v. State, 56 Ark.App. 145, 939 S.W.2d 322 (1997). Howev......
  • Dumond v. State
    • United States
    • Arkansas Court of Appeals
    • 1 Junio 2022
    ...and deploying the dogs. In the former cases the traffic stops are not prolonged; in the latter, they are.Citing Miller v. State , 81 Ark. App. 401, 102 S.W.3d 896 (2003), and Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.1, the dissent would hold that reasonable suspicion was unnecessary and affirm......
  • Get Started for Free
1 books & journal articles