Miller v. State

Decision Date16 September 2021
Docket NumberS-21-0008
PartiesANTOINE DOMONE MILLER, Appellant (Defendant), v. THE STATE OF WYOMING, Appellee (Plaintiff).
CourtWyoming Supreme Court

Appeal from the District Court of Natrona County The Honorable Kerri M. Johnson, Judge

Representing Appellant:

Office of the State Public Defender: Diane Lozano, State Public Defender; Kirk A. Morgan, Chief Appellate Counsel; Francis H McVay, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel. Argument by Mr McVay.

Representing Appellee:

Bridget Hill, Wyoming Attorney General; Jenny L. Craig, Deputy Attorney General; Joshua C. Eames, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Catherine M. Mercer, Assistant Attorney General. Argument by Ms. Mercer.

Before FOX, C.J., and DAVIS [*] , KAUTZ, BOOMGAARDEN, and GRAY, JJ.

KAUTZ JUSTICE

[¶1] Antoine Domone Miller was convicted by a jury of one count of felony strangulation of a household member and one count of misdemeanor domestic battery. Mr. Miller claims the district court violated his right to due process when it refused to allow him to plead guilty to domestic battery. The State argues there was no due process violation and the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to accept Mr. Miller's guilty plea. We affirm.

ISSUES

[¶2] The issues on appeal are:

1. Did the district court violate Mr. Miller's due process rights by refusing to allow him to plead guilty to misdemeanor domestic battery?
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion by refusing to accept Mr. Miller's guilty plea?
FACTS

[¶3] Mr. Miller, Patricia Martinez, and her twelve-year-old daughter lived together in Casper, Wyoming. On January 30, 2020, Mr. Miller woke up while Ms. Martinez was getting ready for work and looked at her in an "irritated" manner. She asked, "What?" He grabbed her by the throat, pushed her head up against a door, and said, "Don't you ever say 'what' to me, you b***h." Mr. Miller squeezed her throat, which hindered her breathing and made her dizzy. When he let go of her, Ms. Martinez fell against the door and grabbed a nearby counter, gasping for air. A short while later, Mr. Miller drove her to work.

[¶4] At the end of her shift, Mr. Miller picked Ms. Martinez up from work and drove to her daughter's school. They argued while waiting for her daughter to come out of the school, and Ms. Martinez told him she wanted to end their relationship. Mr. Miller said, "I'll show you, b***h, if you don't want to be with me." He removed a pen from the vehicle's console and stabbed her in the leg with it. Ms. Martinez started crying and put her hand on the wound to control the bleeding. After the daughter got into the vehicle, Mr. Miller drove to Ms. Martinez's sister's apartment. When her sister asked her what had happened to her leg, Ms. Martinez did not answer.

[¶5] Mr. Miller left the apartment, and Ms. Martinez told her sister and daughter about the stabbing and called 911. Upon the advice of emergency personnel, Ms. Martinez went to the emergency room (ER) to have the stab wound treated. While at the ER, Ms. Martinez described the stabbing incident to law enforcement and reported Mr. Miller had choked her that morning. She also said he had slapped her. Law enforcement took photos of her leg injury and discolorations and bruising on her neck.

[¶6] The State charged Mr. Miller with one count of felony strangulation of a household member and two counts of misdemeanor domestic battery for slapping and stabbing Ms. Martinez. Later, the State amended the information to add an enhancement to the strangulation charge, asserting Mr. Miller was a habitual criminal because he had previously been convicted of three felonies arising out of separate occurrences. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-10-201(a) and (b)(ii) (LexisNexis 2021). Mr. Miller was arraigned on March 17, 2020, and pleaded not guilty to the charges.

[¶7] The district court entered a criminal case management order the day of the arraignment. See Wyoming Rule of Criminal Procedure (W.R.Cr.P.) 12(d) ("Unless otherwise provided by local rule, the court may, at the time of the arraignment or as soon thereafter as practicable, set a time for the making of pretrial motions or requests and, if required, a later date of hearing."). Relevant here, the court ordered the State to "provide notice of its intent to use [Wyoming Rule of Evidence (W.R.E.)] 404(b) evidence no later than 45 days from the date of arraignment." The criminal case management order also stated: "In the event the Defendant changes his . . . plea to guilty, the Defendant and counsel for both parties shall use their best efforts to see that the Court is advised of the change of plea not less than three days before the scheduled trial date." (Emphasis in original). Trial was set to commence on August 24, 2020.

[¶8] On July 13, 2020, Mr. Miller requested a hearing to change his plea on the two misdemeanor domestic battery counts, leaving only the strangulation count for trial. The district court set the change of plea hearing for August 11, 2020. At the hearing, defense counsel stated Mr. Miller wanted to plead guilty to the two domestic battery misdemeanors but there was no plea agreement with the State. The district court asked: "Don't you think that changing a plea to [the domestic battery counts] causes significant 404(b) issues if the [c]ourt allows you to do that?" Defense counsel acknowledged the change of plea would "cause some 404(b) issues" but stated he was not going to challenge the State's late notice of proposed 404(b) evidence. Although he intended to object to introduction of photos relevant to the battery counts, he realized the incidents leading to all three charges were "probably 404(b) to each other" and the stabbing count would have "to be brought up because that is the reason that officers were contacted in the first place[.]" At the conclusion of the hearing, the court denied Mr. Miller's request to change his pleas on the domestic battery counts because it would require continuing the trial on the strangulation count to determine the admissibility of the battery evidence.

[¶9] The State subsequently dismissed the domestic battery count involving the slapping. After a trial, the jury found Mr. Miller guilty of strangling Ms. Martinez and domestic battery for stabbing her. It also found he was a habitual criminal with three prior felony convictions. See § 6-10-201(a), (b)(ii). Because he was a habitual criminal, the district court sentenced Mr. Miller to life in prison for the strangulation. See id. It sentenced him to a concurrent term of 180 days for the battery. Mr. Miller appealed.

DISCUSSION

A. Due Process

[¶10] Mr. Miller claims the district court violated his right to due process when it refused to allow him to plead guilty to the domestic battery charges. We review de novo the question of whether Mr. Miller's due process rights were violated. Bush v. State, 2008 WY 108, ¶ 72, 193 P.3d 203, 221 (Wyo. 2008) (citing Humphrey v. State, 2008 WY 67, ¶ 32, 185 P.3d 1236, 1246 (Wyo. 2008)). "'The party claiming an infringement of his right to due process has the burden of demonstrating both that he has a protected interest and that such interest has been affected in an impermissible way. The question is whether there has been a denial of fundamental fairness.'" Hardman v. State, 2020 WY 11, ¶ 35, 456 P.3d 1223, 1232 (Wyo. 2020) (quoting KC v. State, 2015 WY 73, ¶ 16, 351 P.3d 236, 241 (Wyo. 2015)) (other citations omitted). A violation of a constitutional right "is not automatically reversible; prejudice must be demonstrated before reversal will be required." West v State, 2013 WY 128, ¶ 12, 311 P.3d 157, 160 (Wyo. 2013) (citing State v. Spears, 76 Wyo. 82, 98, 300 P.2d 551, 557 (Wyo. 1956)). "An error which violates a constitutional right is presumed prejudicial unless the reviewing court is convinced it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. See also, Harlow v. State, 2003 WY 47, ¶ 43, 70 P.3d 179, 194 (Wyo. 2003) (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23-24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 827, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967)).

[¶11] The United States Supreme Court has consistently ruled that a criminal defendant does not have an absolute right to plead guilty. See Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 148, 132 S.Ct. 1399, 1410, 182 L.Ed.2d 379 (2012) (a defendant does not have a federal right to have the judge accept a guilty plea); Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262, 92 S.Ct. 495, 498, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971) (there is no absolute right to have a guilty plea accepted by the court); Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 719, 82 S.Ct. 1063, 1072, 8 L.Ed.2d 211 (1962) (same). See also, United States v. Moran, 452 F.3d 1167, 1171 (10th Cir. 2006) ("It is well-established that a criminal defendant does not have the absolute right to plead guilty." (citations and some quotation marks omitted)). Mr. Miller recognizes this precedent but claims the criminal case management order and W.R.Cr.P. 11 gave him a protected interest in pleading guilty.[1]

1. Case Management Order

[¶12] The criminal case management order instructed the parties to use their "best efforts" to notify the district court "not less than three days before the scheduled trial date" of a guilty plea. (Emphasis omitted). Mr Miller cites State v. Dieringer, 708 P.2d 1, 8 (Wyo. 1985), and Ford Motor Co. v. Kuhbacher, 518 P.2d 1255, 1260 (Wyo. 1974), as authority for his argument the case management order created a protected due process interest in pleading guilty. In Dieringer, 708 P.2d at 8, and Ford Motor, 518 P.2d at 1260, we remarked on the authority of courts to enforce pretrial orders. However, those cases do not stand for the proposition that a criminal defendant has a due process right to plead guilty simply because the case management order...

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