Miller v. Stevens
| Decision Date | 26 October 1923 |
| Docket Number | No 61.,61. |
| Parties | MILLER v. STEVENS. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Error to Circuit Court, Kent County; Willis B. Perkins, Judge.
Action by Alexander W. Miller against George F. Stevens. Judgment for plaintiff on appeal from a justice court, and defendant brings error. Affirmed. Roland J. Cleland, of Grand Rapids, for appellant.
Colin P. Campbell, of Grand Rapids, for appellee.
Argued before WIEST, C. J., and FELLOWS, McDONALD, CLARK, BIRD, SHARPE, MOORE, and STEERE, JJ.
This case was commenced in justice court, and appealed from there by defendant to the circuit court of Kent county, where on retrial plaintiff recovered a judgment for $300 for his services in procuring for defendant a purchaser of a business called the Parisian Dye House located on South Division avenue in the city of Grand Rapids. Upon the trial defendant's counsel timely moved and requested the court for a directed verdict in his behalf, on the ground that the testimony showed plaintiff assumed to act during the transaction in the capacity of a ‘business chance broker,’ which brought him within the provisions of Act No. 306, Pub. Acts 1919, entitled ‘An act to define, regulate, and license real estate brokers, real estate salesmen and business chance brokers and to provide a penalty for a violation of the provisions thereof.’
Section 1 and 2 of that act provide as follows:
‘It shall be unlawful for any person, firm, partnership association, copartnership or corporation, whether operating under an assumed name or otherwise, from and after January first, nineteen hundred twenty, to engage in the business or capacity, either directly or indirectly, of a business chance broker, a real estate broker or real estate salesman within this state without first obtaining a license under the provisions of this act.’
Section 2 (as amended 1921):
‘* * * A business chance broker within the meaning of this act is any person, firm, partnership association, copartnership or corporation, who for a compensation or valuable consideration sells or offers for sale, buys or offers to buy, leases or offers to lease, or negotiates the purchase or sale or exchange of a business, business opportunity, or the good will of an existing business for others as a whole or partial vocation.’ Pub. Acts 1921, No. 387.
At the time of the events involved here, Miller's business was selling coal, mostly in carload lots, though sometimes less, and prior to engaging in that business he had been for many years a produce dealer. In the winter of 1920-21 he and Stevens boarded at the same hotel in Grand Rapids, where they became what Miller termed ‘hotel acquaintances.’ During their casual talks together in the lobby Miller learned that Stevens, who was employed in the Wolverine Brass Works, owned a dyeing business known as the Parisian Dye House, which he was disposed to sell because he could not give it proper personal attention.
The next summer, on July 3. 1921, Miller learned in conversation with a tailor named Deebs, to whom he was trying to sell some coal, that he contemplated starting a cleaning and dyeing plant. Recalling what Stevens had said about his dye house the previous winter Miller called him by phone the next day, inquired if he still wanted to sell his dye house, and if he should send a man out to see him. Stevens expressed his willingness to sell, and through plaintiff's instrumentality the parties were brought together. Negotiations followed which ultimately resulted in Stevens selling the Parisian Dye House to Deebs for $6,000.
Plaintiff testified, and was not disputed, that up to this time he had never taken part as an agent, or broker, in buying or selling or exchanging or offering for sale, any business, business property, or good will of a business for others, nor ever advertised or held himself out as engaged in such business. He did, however, admit that on one occasion since then he had at the request of an acquaintance named Kelly taken him around in his automobile to see prospective customers for some kind of a watch and clock dial business which Kelly sold to a young fellow, offering to pay him for his services and he told him he did not want anything; that Kelly later came to him again and wanted to pay him something, and he accepted $50. Kelly confirmed this, stating that after he made the sale he asked Miller how much he owed him, ‘and he said not a cent,’ and about two weeks later he spoke to him about it again to which Miller replied, ‘if it would make me feel better I could give him something,’ but would not name any amount, and later Kelly gave him $50. Whatever the significance of the latter service and acceptance of compensation might be before, contemporaneous with, or in any way related to the instant transaction, the question of plaintiff's violation of said act 306 must be tested by acts done and conditions existing at or before the time of the alleged offense.
The proofs are that plaintiff had never directly or indirectly offered or rendered services for others of the kind covered by the act prior to the occasion involved here. The question of his guilt turns on the one transaction. If his services on that occasion class him as a ‘business chance broker,’ it may be conceded he could not recover, under prevailing authorities--
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Ross v. Consumers Power Co.
...or accepts the beneficial services of another for which compensation is customarily made and actually anticipated. Miller v. Stevens, 224 Mich. 626, 632, 195 N.W. 481 (1923). Where compensation has been neither requested, agreed to, nor provided for services to be rendered by the government......
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...made to determine the intent of the parties. W.J. Howard & Sons, Inc. v. Meyer, 367 Mich. 300, 116 N.W.2d 752 (1962); Miller v. Stevens, 224 Mich. 626, 195 N.W. 481 (1923). This is especially true in oral contracts where the parol evidence rule does not impair consideration of extrinsic fac......
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Cloverdale Equip. Co. v. Manitowoc Engineering Co.
...of the parties language used, or things done by them, or other pertinent circumstances attending the transaction." Miller v. Stevens, 224 Mich. 626, 632, 195 N.W. 481 (1923). 10. The court applied New York law, but held that New York and Michigan law were identical with respect to the issue......
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Rowe v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc.
...implied in fact, we look to all the facts and circumstances to evaluate the intent of the parties. As stated in Miller v. Stevens, 224 Mich. 626, 632, 195 N.W. 481 (1923): "A contract is implied where the intention as to it is not manifested by direct or explicit words between the parties, ......