Miller v. Stewart

• Decision Date: 01 February 1824
• Parties: MILLER v. STEWART and others
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

22 U.S. 680

6 L.Ed. 189

9 Wheat. 680

MILLER v. STEWART and others.

February Term, 1824

THIS was a case certified from the Circuit Court for the District of New-Jersey, upon a certificate of a division of opinion of the Judges of that Court. It was an action of debt upon bond, and the material facts disclosed in the pleadings were, that the plaintiff, Ephraim Miner, being Collector of the direct taxes and internal duties for the fifth Collection District of New-Jersey, by an instrument of appointment, under seal, and pursuant to law, appointed Stephen C. Ustick his Deputy Collector, for eight townships within his

district. Upon that occasion, the defendant, Thomas Stewart, and certain other persons, as sureties, executed a writing obligatory, with Ustick, to Miller, in the penalty of 14,000 dollars, upon the following condition, viz. 'The condition of the foregoing obligation is such, whereas Ephraim Miller, Esquire, Collector, as aforesaid, hath, by authority vested in him by the laws of the United States, appointed the said Stephen B. Ustick, Deputy Collector of direct taxes and internal duties, in the fifth Collection District of New-Jersey, for the townships of Nottingham, Chesterfleld, Mansfield, Springfield, New-Hanover, Washington, Little Egg Harbour, and Burlington, in the county of Burlington; now, therefore, if the said Stephen C. Ustick, has truly and faithfully discharged, and shall continue truly and faithfully to discharge, the duties of the said appointment, according to law, and shall particularly faithfully collect and pay, according to law, all money assessed upon said townships, then the above obligation to be void, and otherwise, shall abide and remain in full force and virtue.' After the execution of this bond, and before Ustick had, in any manner, acted under this appointment, or collected or received any moneys under the same, Miller, with the assent of Ustick, but without the assent or knowledge of the defendant, Stewart, altered the same instrument of appointment, by interlining in it another township, called, 'Willingborough,' thereby making it an appointment for nine instead of sight townships; and under the appointment, so altered, Ustick received, within the original

eight townships, certain moneys, as taxes, which he omitted to account for, and this omission was the breach stated in the declaration. The question for the opinion of the Court, upon the special pleadings and demurrer, was, whether the alteration so made, without the consent of Stewart, discharged him from any responsibility for the moneys so subsequently collected by Ustick.

Mr. Wood, for the plaintiff, admitted the general doctrine, that where the contract is annulled without the assent of the surety, there is an end of the guaranty. So, if the contract is, in any material respect, changed by the contracting parties, (whether advantageously for the surety or not,) in respect to that part of it to which he guaranty extends, the surety is discharged for he may, then, well say, non haec in faedera veni. But, if a change is made in the original contract, by the contracting parties, in a part of the contract to which the guaranty does not extend, such change will not discharge the surety, unless it disadvantageously affected the other part of the contract to which the guaranty does extend. Thus, where the defendant was surety to the plaintiffs, for the performance of duties by a clerk in their banking house, a change of partners was held not to discharge the surety, because, though such change had an important bearing upon the establishment, it did not come within the scope of the guaranty.^a A mere diminution of that part of

the contract to which the guaranty extends, as a release of part, would not discharge the surety from the part remaining, it being a part of the thing guarantied, though not the whole. Omne majus in se continet minus: the surety, in such a case, could not say that he might be prejudiced by the diminution, for it is settled law, that a part payment of the debt is for the benefit of the obligor, and prejudicial to the obligee, and, therefore, it cannot be pleaded as an accord and satisfaction.^b

1. There was no surrender by Ustick of his appointment as Deputy Collector, over the first eight townships. If there was a surrender, it must have been either in fact, or in law, that is, implied in the alteration of the instrument. There was no such surrender in fact; and the alteration of an instrument with consent of parties, does not, in law, imply such a surrender. There are no authorities to warrant the position, that such an alteration implies a surrender. On the contrary, they all say, an alteration of an instrument, with consent, does not vitiate it.^c In Pagot v. Pagot,^d when blanks in a deed were filled up after execution, the deed was held good, though not read again, nor re-executed. In Markham v. Gonaston,^e and Wooly v. Constant,^f the Court went on the ground not only

that an altered deed or instrument was good, but that there was no surrender and redelivery implied in the alteration, to devest the property.

There is nothing in principle to warrant the idea, that an alteration of an instrument implies a surrender and redelivery. A surrender is an executed contract. To constitute a surrender of an instrument by a vendee or obligee, to a vendor or obligor, two things are necessary: 1. An actual delivery of possession to the latter; and, 2. An understanding or agreement to part with the property in the instrument. The act and the intent must concur. A mere delivery of possession by the vendee of the deed, for a special purpose, to the vendor, or any other person, as to keep for him, or to do any other particular act in relation to it, is not a surrender. The vendee still has the property in the deed himself. The vendor, in such case, is only his bailee. Admit, for the sake of argument, that the alteration of a deed required a new delivery, in respect to the part altered, the vendee might then deliver possession of the deed to the vendor, for that particular purpose, viz. to enable the vendee to deliver it anew, to give effect to the altered part; but not surrender his property in the deed in respect to the parts not altered. Such an absolute surrender of the whole deed, is not essential; and if not essential, it should not, by a fiction of law, be required. Suppose the vendee should hand the deed to the vendor, to subjoin on a blank under it a new and distinct deed for another tract of land, which is done, does such a delivery of the deed, for such a purpose,

amount to a surrender of the old deed? If not, is there any difference, in reason and common sense, whether the conveyance of the second tract is contained in a distinct and separate deed subjoined on the same paper, or whether it is effected by an interlineation, with consent of parties, in the old deed? Fictions and subtilties should never be introduced into the law, which is a practical science, unless to subserve the purposes of justice. In fictione juris semper subsistit equitas. This fiction of a surrender is unnecessary; it may be injurious. A., pursuant to contract, conveys a tract of land to B.; they afterwards discover, that by mistake, a lot was omitted, and, by consent, it is interlined. Upon this doctrine of surrender, the deed and property, upon the interlineation, reverted to the vendor, and continued in him until the new delivery; and, of course, it is subjected to the intermediate judgments of other liens of the vendor. The rule of law may, and ought to correspond, in such cases, with the real fact; considering the lands originally contained in the deed us passing at the date, and the land inserted by interlineation, as passing at the time of the interlining.

2. There was no cancellation of the original instrument of appointment. An Alteration affects an instrument in part; a cancellation destroys it altogether. When cancelled, a deed must be resealed and redelivered, to revive it.^g It is nowhere

said, that a redelivery is necessary, in case of an alteration by consent.

3. The alterations did not cause a revocation of the old appointment. It is admitted, that the appointment to, and acceptance of, a new office, incompatible with the old, is a revocation of the latter, as, if a Coroner accepts the office of a Sheriff. So, if there had been an intermediate office, between the Collector and his Deputy, incompatible with the latter, its acceptance, by Ustick, might have been a revocation of his office of Deputy. In the present case, the alteration created no office. It continued the same office, only extended over an additional territory. Ustick had the same office and same power over the first eight townships after, as before the alteration. It is said, his sphere of action was enlarged. Be it so: it was enlarged only in respect to territory; his sphere of action over the first eight townships continued the same. It is said, that after the alteration, the nine townships constituted but one offi e, and that there was a new appointment consequently. The interlineation, as before shown, did not destroy or cause a surrender of the first appointment, with respect to the eight original townships. If, then, there was a new appointment of an office, it extended only to the ninth township, and that is a distinct office from the other eight. If there were not a new appointment, but simply an enlargement of the old office, and still constituting one office, it is an office consisting of different parts in respect to territory, which parts are easily distinguished, and were created at different times; the

former part, composing the first eight townships, being in no wise impaired by the latter, and of course, the guaranty is in no wise impaired by it. It is said, that it is impossible to distinguish the moneys paid in from the ninth township, from those collected in the other eight. The same objection might have been...