Miller v. Talbott

• Decision Date: 30 June 1965
• Docket Number: No. 323,323
• Citation: 239 Md. 382,211 A.2d 741
• Parties: William C. MILLER et ux. v. William B. TALBOTT et ux. William B. TALBOTT et ux. v. William C. MILLER et ux.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 382

239 Md. 382

211 A.2d 741

William C. MILLER et ux. v. William B. TALBOTT et ux.

William B. TALBOTT et ux. v. William C. MILLER et ux.

No. 323.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

June 30, 1965.

Eugene G. Ricks, Towson, for appellants.

Leonard S. Jacobson, Baltimore (Preston A. Pairo, Jr., Baltimore, on the brief), for appellees.

Before PRESCOTT, C. J., and HORNEY, MARBURY, OPPENHEIMER and BARNES, JJ.

BARNES, Judge.

On December 3, 1963 the Talbotts, appellees and cross-appellants, filed suit in the Circuit Court for Carroll County against the Millers, appellants and cross-appellees, for specific performance of a contract for the sale of the Millers' country residence known as Foxhill, in Carroll County, Maryland. The Millers have appealed from the final decree of specific performance dated August 29, 1964. The Talbotts have appealed from that decree insofar as it denies to them money damages (in addition to specific relief) for certain losses and expenses allegedly caused by the failure of the Millers to convey their property on the date called for in the parties' contract.

The Talbotts' bill of complaint was filed on December 3, 1963; attached to it was an order directing the defendants to show cause on or before December 27, 1963 why the relief prayed in the bill should not be granted. The Millers answered the show cause order on December 23, 1963, and the bill of complaint, on January 23, 1964. The defendants assigned as reasons for their failure to convey the land in question that there was no legally binding contract between the parties; that the defendants had not refused to comply with the terms of 'the alleged original contract'; that the description of the property in the contract was inadequate; and that the written contract was not the complete agreement of the parties, because of subsequent alterations and other 'verbal arrangements.'

On January 11, 1964 the plaintiffs filed interrogatories inquiring into the factual basis for each of the defenses asserted in the defendants' answers. The interrogatories were not answered within the time allowed by the Maryland Rules of Procedure; and on March 17, 1964 plaintiffs moved for a decree pro confesso against the defendants. The court did not grant the motion as such, but, instead, ordered the defendants to show cause before April 3, 1964 why such a decree should not be entered against them. The defendants filed no reply, and on April 21, 1964, a decree pro confesso was entered, and the case set down for hearing 'to determine to what relief the plaintiffs are entitled.'

Preceding the hearing of May 15, 1964 defendants retained new counsel, Lewis F. Fleury; on May 15th this counsel filed 'Answers to Interrogatories of Plaintiffs' and a 'Motion to Set Aside Decree Pro Confesso.' In these papers the defendants asserted: 1) that William C. Miller was mentally incapable of making a contract at the time of the alleged agreement (thereby making that agreement a nullity), and 2) that the time for performance of the contract was orally extended, by Mrs. Talbott, from November, 1963 to January, 1964 (thereby making the suit brought on December 3, 1963 premature).

At the hearing held on May 15th defendants' counsel asked leave 'to file answers to interrogatories which have been in default and which are now answered'; he stated: '* * * I have set forth in my motion the reason for not having answered the interrogatories prior to this time. I would like to file those at this time, if I may.' The court replied: 'You may file them.' Counsel then offered to prove that the defenses (set out above) were meritorious. He produced letters from two physicians as to Mr. Miller's mental condition at the time of the execution of the written contract; and stated that 'I will present and intend to present medical testimony of his incompetency.' Continuing, he said:

'He (Miller) had been hospitalized shortly before this contract was signed for a mental condition, but at the time it was signed he threatened to take his own life if he was not able to get away from this place. His mental condition is a very, very poor one. All of which we can prove at the time of the hearing on the merits of this matter.'

Mr. Fleury also requested the court to consider the fact that the failure to respond to interrogatories was not because of lack of diligence by Mr. and Mrs. Miller but rather 'perhaps, of laxity of counsel.' (We were informed at the argument that the Millers' prior counsel had been completely absorbed during this period with his active campaign for a seat in the U. S. House of Representatives).

At the conclusion of argument of counsel, the following colloquy ensued:

'The court: Well, in this case the court will be required to set aside the motion (sic) to set aside the decree and will leave the decree stand.

'Mr. Pairo: Does your honor wish us to proceed on our damages?

The court: Yes, proceed.'

Thereupon, four witnesses were called; they included Mr. and Mrs. Talbott, Mrs. Miller, and a Mr. Myron Almony. A fair reading of the record convinces us that all of this testimony relates solely to the issue of the plaintiffs' damages (discussed infra) and that the merit or lack of merit of either of the defendants' defenses was not at issue, in view of the court's ruling quoted above.

We will treat the issue before us in three parts, for convenience, as we did in Guerriero v. Friendly Finance Corporation, 230 Md. 217, 186 A.2d 881 (1962): 1) Did the lower court abuse its discretion in entering a decree pro confesso against the defendants because of their failure to answer plaintiffs' interrogatories within the time allowed by the Maryland Rules? 2) Did the court abuse its discretion in extending the decree pro confesso into a final decree for specific performance in view of the matters of defense proffered by the defendants? 3) Did the court err in subsequently refusing to vacate that decree?

I.

Turning to question No. 1, we have already traced the history of this suit from inception to final decree. Under our Rules the trial court has considerable latitude in dealing with a failure to respond to interrogatories; Maryland Rule 417 d provides 'If, after proper service of interrogatories upon a party, he fails to serve answers to them within the time allowed, the court on motion and notice may strike out all or any part of any pleading of that party, or dismiss the action or any part thereof, or enter a judgment by default or decree pro confesso against that party.'

Instead of taking action under that Rule, the trial court may issue an order directing the defendant to answer. Baltimore Transit Company v. Mezzanotti, 227 Md. 8, 174 A.2d 768 (1961). In the latter event a failure to comply will bring the sanctions of Rule 422 into play; to paraphrase, these include a) an order taking the matters inquired into as established in accordance with the claims of the inquiring party; b) an order prohibiting the 'disobedient party to support or oppose designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting him from introducing in evidence designated documents or things or items of testimony * * *'; c) an order striking out pleadings or staying the proceedings until interrogatories are answered, or dismissing the action, or rendering a default judgment or decree pro confesso; d) an order adjudging the disobedient party in contempt and prescribing the punishment therefor.

Under either Rule the court, in its discretion, may enter a decree pro confesso against the defaulting party (though it is not compelled to do so, Guerriero v. Friendly Finance Corporation, supra, at page 221 of 230 Md., 186 A.2d 881). Entry of a decree by the court sua sponte may even be permissible in a proper case (Guerriero, at 220, 186 A.2d 881). Under the circumstances here, where defendants or counsel for the defendants had every opportunity to answer the five interrogatories propounded to them; where the court granted an additional period of time in which to show cause why the motion for a decree pro confesso should not be granted, rather than summarily entering such a decree,--we can only conclude--assuming abuse of discretion to be the applicable test--that no abuse of discretion was shown in entering the decree pro confesso of April 21, 1964.

II.

We next turn to question No. 2 which raises the propriety of the entry of the final decree for specific performance of August 29, 1964 in view of the matters of defense to the bill which the defendants offered to prove. We have already decided that the hearing of May 15, 1964 was not a hearing on the merits of the defendants' defenses. In spite of argument of defendants' new counsel with respect to those defenses, the only testimony introduced was that respecting the plaintiffs' damages. In fact, the motion to set aside the interlocutory decree had already been denied before the testimony was taken. In the absence of any other hearing held by Chief Judge Boylan, we take it as established that the defendants have never had their day in court with regard to the meritorious defenses they assert. But this is not necessarily fatal. Maryland Rule 675 a 1 provides:

'Where a bill is taken pro confesso, a final decree may be entered at any time after the expiration of thirty days from the entry of the order of pro confesso, if an answer or other defense is not interposed, and the allegations of the bill or petition present a proper case for relief.'

Maryland Rule 675 a 3 provides:

'At any time after a decree pro confesso shall have been entered, and before final decree, upon motion or upon its own initiative, the court may set aside the decree, and permit the filing of an answer or the interposing of other defense.'

There is some ambiguity as to whether the party against whom the interlocutory decree has been entered may file an answer as a matter of right, or only with leave of court. The ambiguity was resolved in favor of the latter construction in Guerriero v....