Miller v. Tennessee Gas Transmission Co., Civ. A. No. 3475.

• Decision Date: 27 August 1953
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 3475.
• Citation: 114 F. Supp. 23
• Parties: MILLER v. TENNESSEE GAS TRANSMISSION CO.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Louisiana

114 F. Supp. 23

MILLER v. TENNESSEE GAS TRANSMISSION CO.

Civ. A. No. 3475.

United States District Court W. D. Louisiana, Lake Charles Division.

August 27, 1953.

Oliver P. Stockwell, Plauche & Stockwell, Lake Charles, La., Jennings B. Jones, Jr., Cameron, La., P. M. Flanagan, New Orleans, La., for plaintiff.

Clyde R. Brown, Shotwell & Brown, Monroe, La., William M. Hall, Jr., Liskow & Lewis, Lake Charles, La., for defendant.

DAWKINS, District Judge.

Plaintiff granted to defendant a right-of-way over certain marshlands to be used in laying a pipeline for the transmission of natural gas a long distance to market. The terms of the grant were specific as to restoration of conditions of the terrain after the pipe had been laid, as well as other details. This suit was to recover $200,000 alleged damages in the destruction of property in the laying of the pipeline, building and use of the driveway, damages to trees, timber of the adjoining lands, etc., and the failure to restore the property to its former condition according to the contracts.

The case was tried at length to a jury which returned a general verdict for defendant.

Plaintiff has moved for a new trial, on the ground that the verdict was a miscarriage of justice and contrary to the great weight of the evidence, in that it disregarded all of that in plaintiff's favor as well as concessions made by the defendant and its experts.

Under Rule No. 59(a) Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A., in a situation of this kind the Court may allow the verdict to stand as to issues which it thinks have been properly or fairly decided, but may grant a new trial as to those remaining.

On due consideration of plaintiff's motion for a new trial generally and a review of the evidence which has been transcribed, the Court is of the view that all of the claims for damages, other than the failure to restore the right-of-way and roadway covered by two separate agreements, were peculiarly such as the jury was fitted to determine, including conflicts in the statements of witnesses and so forth, and that the motion as to those should be denied, with judgment for the defendant. However, as to the claim for restoration of the property as required by those contracts, not only did the defendant in the statement of the issues to the jury by counsel in the opening of the case, concede that defendant had not complied with the contract, but gave as the reason therefor weather conditions and other circumstances which...