Miller v. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, 92-2210

• Decision Date: 17 December 1993
• Docket Number: No. 92-2210,92-2210
• Citation: 13 F.3d 260
• Parties: Eugene MILLER, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE; Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service; James W. Glosser, Administrator, Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Page 260

13 F.3d 260

Eugene MILLER, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE; Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service; James W. Glosser Administrator, Appellees.

No. 92-2210.

United States Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit.

Submitted Dec. 16, 1992.

Decided Dec. 17, 1993.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Dakota. Hon. Donald J. Porter, U.S.D.C., Judge.

Ronald A. Wager, Aberdeen, SD, argued (Kennith L. Gosch, on the brief), for appellant.

Bonnie P. Ulrich, Sioux Falls, SD, argued (Kevin V. Schieffer and Bonnie P. Ulrich, on the brief), for appellee.

Before McMILLIAN, BOWMAN, and LOKEN, Circuit Judges.

BOWMAN, Circuit Judge.

Eugene Miller filed a complaint against the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552 (1988), seeking disclosure of certain documents. The USDA claimed the documents Miller sought were exempt from disclosure under 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552(b)(7)(A) as having been compiled for law enforcement purposes. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the agency, and Miller appeals. We reverse and remand.

Miller, a Nebraska rancher, was involved in the purchase of cattle shipped from New Mexico to Nebraska in April 1987. Inspection of the cattle revealed alleged violations of the federal brucellosis control program. 21 U.S.C. Secs. 111, 120 (1988); 9 C.F.R. pt. 78. Miller contends he had no knowledge that any of the cattle he bought were infected with brucellosis, and that he was duped by the sellers. Walter Waddell, Area Investigator, Veterinary Services (VS), Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), provided an investigative report (the Waddell report) to APHIS on October 27, 1987, concerning the cattle transfer.

On November 25, 1987, Gustavo Rivera, acting for Arthur J. Wilson, Director, Compliance and Enforcement Program, VS, APHIS, USDA, transmitted a memorandum (the Wilson memorandum) with a copy of the Waddell report to Ronald J. Cipolla, Assistant General Counsel, Regulatory Division, Office of the General Counsel, USDA. (The Wilson memorandum is a summary of the Waddell report.) The Office of the General Counsel to the USDA determines whether an investigative report details sufficient evidence of a violation to necessitate preparing and filing a civil complaint. If the evidence supports criminal prosecution, the case is forwarded to the United States Department of Justice.

On February 15, 1988, pursuant to the FOIA, Miller sent APHIS a letter requesting "all information," including "a complete copy of Mr. Waddell's file," held by the USDA concerning the cattle transfer. APHIS denied Miller's request on March 14, 1988, and Miller did not appeal the denial. On November 28, 1989, Miller repeated his request for certain documents from APHIS regarding the cattle transfer. Again APHIS denied the request, and Miller appealed the denial to the Administrator of APHIS. The appeal was denied, and on September 11, 1990, Miller filed this suit in the District Court to compel disclosure of the requested documents under the FOIA.

In the meantime, Jaru Ruley, staff attorney with the Regulatory Division, Office of the General Counsel, USDA, had been assigned the investigative report since December 17, 1987, but he did not review the report until August 15, 1990, and he did not draft a complaint until September 14, 1990--three days after Miller filed this action in the District Court. Based on the complaint drafted by Ruley, the Administrator for APHIS filed an administrative civil complaint against Miller and the other parties to the 1987 cattle transaction, seeking a civil penalty of $1,800 against Miller.

The administrative law judge to whom the administrative complaint was assigned denied Miller's request for the production of the documents in question. Insofar as we are informed, the administrative complaint remains unresolved. Miller's counsel stated at oral argument that Miller has a case pending in state court against the persons who were involved in selling him the infected cattle, and that the state court is holding the case in abeyance until the administrative proceedings are completed.

In the present action, the District Court ordered the government to file a copy of the documents requested by Miller for in camera review, after which the court denied both parties' motions for summary judgment. The government filed a renewed motion for summary judgment with supporting affidavits, and the District Court granted this renewed motion.

On appeal, Miller argues that the District Court erred in granting summary judgment because genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether: 1) the Waddell report and the Wilson memorandum were compiled for law enforcement purposes, 2) the disclosure of the Waddell report and the Wilson memorandum would interfere with the administrative enforcement proceedings, and 3) the administrative enforcement proceedings were initiated against Miller in bad faith.

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. United States ex rel. Glass v. Medtronic, Inc., 957 F.2d 605, 607 (8th Cir.1992). The standard of review is the same for us as it was for the trial court: whether the record shows there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). "Summary judgment is available to the defendant in a FOIA case when the agency proves that it has fully discharged its obligations under FOIA, after the underlying facts and the inferences to be drawn from them are construed in the light most favorable to the FOIA requester." Miller v. United States Dep't of State, 779 F.2d 1378, 1382 (8th Cir.1985). To defeat a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party "need only present evidence from which a jury might return a verdict in his favor." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2514, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

The purpose of the FOIA is to provide wide-ranging public access to government documents. "Without question, the Act is broadly conceived. It seeks to permit access to official information long shielded unnecessarily from public view and attempts to create a judicially enforceable public right to secure such information from possibly unwilling official hands." EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 80, 93 S.Ct. 827, 832, 35 L.Ed.2d 119 (1973). The FOIA sets out specific statutory exemptions from disclosure, "[b]ut these limited exemptions do not obscure the basic policy that disclosure, not secrecy, is the dominant objective of the Act." Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361, 96 S.Ct. 1592, 1599, 48 L.Ed.2d 11 (1976). Therefore the exemptions "must be narrowly construed." Id. Furthermore, the statute states that, once the complaint reaches the district court, "the burden is on the agency to sustain its action." 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552(a)(4)(B).

Under the FOIA, a governmental agency is not required to disclose "records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information ... could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings." Id. Sec. 552(b)(7)(A). Under this exemption, the government must conquer two hurdles before requested documents may be withheld: first, the government must establish that the requested documents were "compiled for law enforcement purposes" and, second, the government must demonstrate that disclosure "could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings." Id.

Miller argues that the District Court erred in determining there was no genuine...