Miller v. United States
| Decision Date | 08 January 2015 |
| Docket Number | Case No.: 3:08-cr-411-J-34PDB,Case No.: 3:12-cv-1044-J-34PDB |
| Parties | WILLIAM RAYMOND MILLER, II, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
This case is before the Court on Petitioner William Raymond Miller, II's Motion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence (Doc. 1, Motion to Vacate)1 and Memorandum of Law and Points of Authorities (Doc. 3, Memorandum), both filed on September 21, 2012. The United States filed a Response in Opposition on June 3, 2013. (Doc. 25, Response). Miller filed a Reply to the Government's Response on July 17, 2013. (Doc. 31, Petitioner's Reply).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and Rule 8(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings2, the Court has considered the need for an evidentiary hearing anddetermines that an evidentiary hearing is not necessary to resolve the merits of this action. See Aron v. United States, 291 F.3d 708, 714-15 (11th Cir. 2002) (); Holmes v. United States, 876 F.2d 1545, 1553 (11th Cir. 1989) (); Dickson v. Wainwright, 683 F.2d 348, 351 (11th Cir. 1982) (); Patel v. United States, 252 F. App'x 970, 975 (11th Cir. 2007).3
For the reasons set forth below, Miller's Motion to Vacate, Correct, or Set Aside his sentence is due to be denied.
Between 2005 and 2008, Miller issued fake surety bonds with a total face value of more than $530 million. (Crim. Doc. 13, Plea Agreement at 23). In the process, Miller defrauded businesses out of $22.5 million in premiums and other charges that hedemanded in exchange for the fraudulent bonds. Id. In order to deceive and induce his victims into buying the fake bonds, Miller would sometimes misrepresent that the bonds were authorized and written by surety bond companies who are registered with the United States Treasury Department ("T-listed"), including such companies as Fidelity National Casualty and Property Insurance Company ("Fidelity National") and American Re-Insurance Company. Id. at 20. In other instances, Miller issued surety bonds through two other companies, First Florida Captive Holdings Corporation or AMS Capital Holdings Corporation, without claiming that the companies were "T-listed" entities. Miller's scheme began to unravel when some of his victims attempted to make claims on the bond coverage they thought they had purchased, only to learn that the bonds Miller had issued them were worthless.
On November 20, 2008, the United States charged Miller by Information with one count of wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 and 2, and one count of mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 2. (Crim. Doc. 1, Information). Miller waived indictment (Crim. Doc. 6, Crim. Doc. 11, Waivers of Indictment), and on December 11, 2008, pled guilty to both charges pursuant to a written plea agreement. (Crim. Doc. 13, Plea Agreement).
As part of the Plea Agreement, Miller affirmed that he voluntarily pled guilty, free from coercion and without reliance on any promises or benefits other than those set forth in the Plea Agreement itself. Id. at 15. The Plea Agreement advised Miller that each offense charged was punishable by a maximum sentence of up to 20 years in prison, afine of $250,000, or both, and that the Court could also order Miller to pay restitution to his victims. Id. at 2, 11-12. Additionally, the Plea Agreement laid out in detail the assets Miller would forfeit to the government, including his ill-gotten gains of $22.5 million, several pieces of real property, four cars, and funds located in various bank accounts. Id. at 6-9. The Plea Agreement specified, however, that the assets subject to forfeiture were not limited to those listed, and that the government could pursue substitute assets if the government could not locate the listed assets. Id. at 6, 10. The forfeiture of assets provision contained a hand-written modification, initialed by all parties, stating "[t]he Government (USA) agree[d] to allow [Miller's] wife to remain in family home (Timber Creek Ct., Clarksville, MD) and will not force a sale; and will negotiate for her to buy out [the government's] interest." Id. at 6.
In exchange for Miller's guilty plea, the United States Attorney's Office agreed to recommend a sentence at the low end of whatever the Court calculated Miller's advisory sentencing range to be under the United States Sentencing Guidelines ("Guidelines"). Id. at 5. The government also agreed to recommend a two level downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a), and to move for a third level adjustment if Miller qualified under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b). Plea Agreement at 4. The government further agreed not to charge Miller with any other offenses of which it was then aware, and to consider whether any cooperation Miller provided would warrant further downward departures under either U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 or 18 U.S.C. § 3553 ifcompleted prior to sentencing, or under Fed. R. Crim. P. 35 if completed after sentencing. Plea Agreement at 5-6.
Miller agreed that the Plea Agreement would bind only the United States Attorney's Office for the Middle District of Florida, and not "other federal, state, or local prosecuting authorities." Id. at 14-15. He further agreed that the Plea Agreement would not bind the Court, that the Court alone would determine his sentence, and that if the Court rejected any part of the Plea Agreement, Miller could not withdraw his guilty plea. Id. at 13. Miller also waived the right to directly appeal or collaterally attack his sentence, unless (1) the sentence exceeded the applicable Guidelines range as determined by the Court, (2) the sentence exceeded the statutory maximum, (3) the sentence violated the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution, or (4) the government first appealed. Id. at 14. In the Plea Agreement, Miller acknowledged that he understood the nature of the offenses to which he was pleading guilty, and that he pled guilty because he was in fact guilty. Id. at 15, 16. Finally, Miller agreed that the Plea Agreement "constitutes the entire agreement between the government and the defendant with respect to the aforementioned guilty pleas and no other promises, agreements, or representations exist or have been made to the defendant or defendant's attorney with regard to such guilty plea." Id. at 16. Miller initialed each page of the Plea Agreement, including each page of the factual basis attached to it, indicating his understanding and assent. See id., generally.
Miller appeared before a United States Magistrate Judge to enter his guilty plea. (Crim. Doc. 24, Plea Tr.). During the plea colloquy, Miller, who was under oath, assuredthe Court that he understood the charges and the provisions of his Plea Agreement. Miller and his attorney each told the Court that they had reviewed the Information filed by the government and discussed it at length. Id. at 17. The Court itself reviewed the Information and explained the charges, which alleged that Miller violated federal law by using interstate wire and mail communications to carry out his fraudulent bond scheme, during which he impersonated T-listed insurance companies, see id. at 19-27, and Miller assured the Court that he understood, see id. at 27. The government advised that Miller's maximum potential sentence was 40 years in prison, a fine of up to $500,000, or both, plus the possibility of up to $500 million in restitution. Id. at 29-30. Miller confirmed that he understood this as well. Id. at 30-31. The Court also reviewed with Miller each of the 23 specific assets listed in the Information's forfeiture provision, which mirrored those listed in the Plea Agreement. See Plea Tr. at 31-33; compare Information at 8-10 with Plea Agreement at 6-9, and Miller stated that he understood the forfeiture provision as well, see Plea Tr. at 34.
During the plea colloquy, the Court explained to Miller the rights that he would give up by pleading guilty, including any defenses to his conduct, and Miller stated that he understood that waiver. Id. at 58-64. The Court then discussed with him the provision of the Plea Agreement by which he waived the right to directly appeal or collaterally challenge his sentence. Id. at 64. After Miller expressed some concern about being unable to appeal if he received the maximum potential sentence, the Court assured Miller that he was free to take additional time to consider the waiver if he needed it. Id. at 64-66, 70. However, Miller assured the Court that he was prepared to proceed. The Court also reviewed the appeal waiver, explaining that pursuant to the Plea Agreement, Miller waived the right to directly appeal or collaterally attack his sentence, subject to the limited exceptions listed in the agreement. Id. at 71. In doing so, the Court explained what it meant to collaterally attack a sentence under § 2255. Id. at 73-74. Miller stated that he understood his rights to directly appeal or collaterally attack his sentence, and that he knowingly and voluntarily waived them. Id. at 71-75.
Before completing the plea colloquy, Miller assured the Court that he had been given plenty of time to review the charges against him, to talk to his lawyers (of which he had four), and that he was satisfied with his legal...
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