Miller v. United States

• Decision Date: 19 November 2004
• Docket Number: No. 20030054.,20030054.
• Citation: Miller v. United States, 2004 UT 96, 104 P.3d 1202 (Utah 2004)
• Parties: John Miller and Joan Miller, Plaintiffs and Appellees, v. United States of America, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: Utah Supreme Court

2004 UT 96

104 P.3d 1202

John Miller and Joan Miller, Plaintiffs and Appellees, v. United States of America, Defendant and Appellant.

No. 20030054.

Supreme Court of Utah.

FILED November 19, 2004.

This opinion is subject to revision before final publication in the Pacific Reporter.

G. Scott Ray, Edward P. Moriarity, Jeffrey D. Gooch, Justin T. Ashworth, Salt Lake City, and Shandor S. Badaruddin, Missoula, Montana, for plaintiffs.

Paul M. Warner, United States Att'y, Jeffrey E. Nelson, Asst. United States Att'y, for defendant.

NEHRING, Justice:

¶1 This case comes to us from United States District Court. We are asked to determine: "Whether a federal government employee, who ordinarily would be immune from suit in cases of strict liability, may be liable under Utah's Dramshop Act if the Plaintiffs establish negligence."

¶2 We first comment on the scope of the question certified to us. As framed, the question invites us to stray beyond the scope of our authority. A federal government employee acquires immunity from suit through the operation of the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) and the cases interpreting its provision. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1997); Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797, 803 (1972); Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 44-45 (1953). The task of applying the FTCA to a claim is a federal question outside the bounds of our statutory jurisdiction "to answer all questions of state law certified by a court of the United States." Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(1) (2002). Whether a federal government employee who enjoys FTCA protection "may be liable" based on our assessment of the nature of characteristics of Utah dramshop liability is an inquiry that impliedly invites us to apply the FTCA to state law. Were we to accept this invitation we would overstep our authority. We therefore expressly limit our holding to the nature and essence of state dramshop liability. Our references to the FTCA are intended to provide context for our discussion and analysis of the state law component of the certified question.

¶3 We hold that Utah's Dramshop Act is a strict liability statute. We further hold that Utah does not recognize a common law cause of action in negligence for the sale of alcohol to persons who cause injury to third parties while under the influence of alcohol.

BACKGROUND

¶4 John and Joan Miller were injured by Arthur Valle, an employee of the United States Air Force, who had been drinking liquor at the Noncommissioned Officers Club at Hill Air Force Base, located in Utah. An intoxicated Mr. Valle left the club in his car, driving at high speeds, and crashed into the Millers' car, seriously injuring them. The Millers filed suit alleging that Mr. Valle had been "negligently and carelessly" served alcohol at the club in violation of the Utah Dramshop Act and that the federal government, as the dramshop, was liable for the resulting injuries to the Millers. The federal court concluded that the Millers' claims did not appear to be "clearly answered under Utah statutory law and controlling precedent" and certified its question to us.

JURISDICTION

¶5 This court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of state law certified by a court of the United States. Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(1) (2002);¹ see also Utah R. App. P. 41(a).²

ANALYSIS

¶6 The Millers concede that the Utah Dramshop Act is a strict liability statute. This concession reflects a candid recognition that our cases have clearly enunciated our view that the Act "prescribes a form of strict liability rather than traditional negligence." Red Flame, Inc. v. Martinez, 2000 UT 22, ¶ 10, 996 P.2d 540. We have repeatedly stated that the purpose of the Act "was to compensate innocent third parties by making dramshop owners strictly liable without regard to the finding of fault, wrongful intent, or negligent conduct on their part." Adkins v. Uncle Bart's Inc., 2000 UT 14, ¶ 16, 1 P.3d 528 (citing Reeves v. Gentile, 813 P.2d 111, 116 (Utah 1991)). The Millers' concession would appear to fully answer the state law component of the certified question: Utah's Dramshop Act is a strict liability statute.³

¶7 The Millers have, however, recast the certified question in a manner that asks us to answer two subsidiary questions: (1) whether Utah recognizes a common law negligence claim for the commercial sale of liquor to an intoxicated person, and if so (2) whether the Act preempts this claim of common law negligence. Were we to answer these questions, as the Millers urge, and recognize that common law negligence liability could extend to the United States under the factual scenario of this case, free of preemption by the Act, the Millers contend that the FTCA's strict liability impediment would be swept away.

¶8 Justice Durrant would have us decline the invitation to take up these subsidiary questions. He correctly admonishes us that sound policy reasons underlie our practice of addressing only those issues properly presented to us. He also does well to remind us of the perils of relaxing our parsimonious approach to decision making. We believe, however, that the subsidiary questions are fairly included constituents of the certified question. Our answer to the certified question exposed the subsidiary questions of whether our common law recognizes a cause of action in negligence for the federal government's conduct independent from, and not preempted by, the Act. The parties acknowledged that the subsidiary questions were inextricably tied to the certified question by devoting the majority of their briefs to them. We should be mindful that the federal court certified its question to us because it sought our direction on an uncertain issue of state law in a lawsuit pending before it. We would not be promoting efficiency, or otherwise serving the objectives of the question certification process, by returning an answer to the federal court which all concerned know has spawned additional state law questions and upon which we elect to remain silent.

¶9 We should not be tied to an unduly narrow and literal reading of a certified question posed by a federal court. Our decision to sidestep a literal reading of the certified question to avoid overstepping our jurisdiction aptly illustrates the flaw in such an approach. Having reinterpreted the certified question to escape the prospect of improperly answering a question of federal law, we would hardly be faulted for interpreting the certified question in a manner that actually confronts and answers the questions embedded in it.

¶10 The question certification procedure represents a unique exercise of our original jurisdiction. Unlike our traditional appellate review, we are not presented with a decision to affirm or reverse. Instead, we are being approached for guidance. We should respond to these requests guided by a desire to provide meaningful and comprehensive assistance which, under certain circumstances, may require a more expansive answer than a literal reading of the certified question may warrant. We therefore take up the subsidiary questions posed by the parties.

I. COMMON LAW DRAMSHOP LIABILITY

¶11 This court has consistently voiced our allegiance to the general rule that our common law does not recognize a right of action against a seller of alcoholic beverages by a third party injured by the buyer of the beverage. Mackay v. 7-Eleven Sales Corp., 2000 UT 15, ¶ 7, 995 P.2d 1233; Adkins, 2000 UT 14 at ¶¶ 13, 15. Explained in the traditional tort law nomenclature, the general rule instructs that when a third party is injured by an intoxicated person, it is the consumption of the alcohol, and not the furnishing of it, which proximately causes the injury. Adkins, 2000 UT 14 at ¶ 13 (citing Yost v. State, 640 P.2d 1044, 1046 n.2 (Utah 1981)).

¶12 We have honored the general rule even while endorsing exceptions to it. Mackay, 2000 UT 15 at ¶ 7. For example, we have permitted the allocation of a liquor provider's liability to an injured third party, contribution from a commercial provider to an intoxicated minor tortfeasor, and a claim against a commercial provider of alcohol to a minor in quantities greater than could be consumed by the minor himself when the minor's intoxicated friend injured a third party. Rees v. Albertson's, 587 P.2d 130, 133 (Utah 1978); Yost, 640 P.2d at 1046; Mackay, 2000 UT 15 at ¶ 10. As Chief Justice Durham has ably pointed out, only the application of highly leveraged logic allows us to both reject common law dramshop liability generally and defend our choices of exceptions to the general rule. Gilger v. Hernandez, 2000 UT 23, ¶ 27, 997 P.2d 305 (Durham, Assoc. C.J., dissenting). While conceding that logical imperfections may blemish the body of our dramshop jurisprudence, we nevertheless stand by the view that, subject to the exceptions created in our case law, Utah categorically rejects a common law right by injured third parties to maintain an action against a dramshop.

¶13 The Millers build their case for the existence of common law dramshop liability around language in Gilger, which suggests that, our expressions of loyalty to the general rule notwithstanding, the claim may be viable. Id. ¶ 13. Specifically, the Millers point to our statement that "[t]he legislature assured those who were subjected to dramshop liability that they would not be subject to common law negligence liability and that this statutory liability would be limited, something that exposure to common law negligence liability would not have provided." Id. We noted that it therefore followed "that the common law of negligence is preempted insofar as it may impose liability for acts that the Dramshop Act reaches." Id. We disagree with the Millers' contention that an endorsement of common law dramshop liability can be extracted from these comments. The legislature may decide to include, among the reasons for enacting a strict liability dramshop statute, the desire to assure dramshop owners that they would be...