Miller v. Upper Iowa Univ.
| Decision Date | 21 February 2020 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL DOCKET NO. 1:19-CV-00039 |
| Parties | JANICE MILLER, ET AL., Plaintiffs v. UPPER IOWA UNIVERSITY, ET AL., Defendants |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Louisiana |
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Defendants Upper Iowa University ("UIU"), Cynthia Bentley ("Bentley"), Tiffany Adams [Johansen] ("Adams"), Kathy Franken ("Franken"), and Dr. William Duffy ("Duffy") filed a Motion to Partially Dismiss (ECF No. 18) and a Motion to Partially Dismiss Whistleblower Claims against UIU (ECF No. 27).
Because Plaintiffs failed to adequately plead some of their claims, Defendants' Motion to Partially Dismiss (ECF No. 18) is GRANTED. And because the Louisiana Employment Discrimination Law ("LEDL") is inapplicable to Plaintiffs' whistleblower claims, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Whistleblower Claims against UIU (ECF No. 27) is DENIED.
Plaintiffs Janice Miller ("Miller") and Lauri Picard ("Picard") were adjunct professors at UIU working at the Alexandria, Louisiana campus. They filed a petition against Defendants in state court in 2018.
UIU is a private university. Bentley, Adams, Franken, and Duffy are all employees or contract agents of UIU. Bentley is the South Central Regional Director of UIU (ECF No. 1-4); Adams was the Director of Human Resources for UIU (ECF Nos 1-3); Duffy is the President of UIU (ECF No. 1-5); and Franken is the Vice-President of Enrollment for Enrollment Management for UIU (ECF No. 1-6).
Plaintiffs allege that, from 2016 through 2018, students, faculty, and staff at the UIU Alexandria campus were "bullied and intimidated by other students with a pervasive atmosphere of racial discrimination, intimidation, harassment, and violence in the workplace." (ECF No. 9-1). Plaintiffs contend the bullies were a group of African-American students who were hostile and threatening toward both African-American and Caucasian faculty. (ECF No. 9-1). Plaintiffs further allege that, when they brought the problem to the attention of UIU and the individual Defendants, they were ignored, retaliated against, then constructively terminated. (ECF No. 1-1). Plaintiffs further contend Defendant Bentley, the Regional Director for the UIU Alexandria campus, caused Plaintiffs to be assaulted, intimidated, bullied, and in reasonable fear of imminent harm for their safety. (ECF No. 1-1).
Plaintiffs allege employment discrimination, retaliation, failure to maintain a safe work environment, failure to maintain whistle-blowing policies, whistle-blowing retaliation, assault, defamation of character, negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy, unjust enrichment, and breach of contract. (ECF Nos. 1-1, 9-1). Plaintiff allege violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.; UIU's workplace violence procedures; UIU's whistle-blower procedures; and whistle-blower law. (ECF No. 1-1). Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief, back pay, special and general damages, attorney's fees, and costs. (ECF No. 1-1).
Defendants removed and allege federal question jurisdiction under Title VII and supplemental jurisdiction. In the alternative, Defendants allege diversity jurisdiction, contending Defendant Bentley was improperly joined.1
Defendants filed an answer (ECF No. 17) and a Motion to Partially Dismiss claims against all Defendants. (ECF No. 18). Plaintiffs responded to that motion (ECF Nos. 26, 28), and Defendants replied (ECF No. 31).
Defendants also filed a Motion to Partially Dismiss Whistleblower Claims Against UIU. (ECF No. 27). Plaintiffs responded to the motion (ECF No. 38) and Defendants replied (ECF No. 41).
A court may grant a motion to dismiss for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted" under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). "[A] complaint will survive dismissal for failure to state a claim if it contains 'sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Legate v. Livingston, 822 F.3d 207, 210 (5th Cir. 2016), cert. den., 137 S. Ct. 489 (U.S. 2016) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)) (internal citation and quotation omitted)."A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The court must view all well-pleaded facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Yumilicious Franchise, L.L.C. v. Barrie, 819 F.3d 170, 174 (5th Cir. 2016).
Title VII makes it unlawful "for an employer ... to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). See St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 513 (1993). In a Title VII claim, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case that the defendant made an employment decision motivated by a protected factor. See Mayberry v. Vought Aircraft Co., 55 F.3d 1086, 1089 (5th Cir. 1995). The defendant bears the burden of producing evidence that its employment decision was based on a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason. See Mayberry, 55 F.3d at 1089. The burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that the defendant's proffered reasons were a pretext for discrimination. See Mayberry, 55 F.3d at 1089.
The district court must decide which party's explanation of the employer's motivation it believes. See St. Mary's Honor Center, 509 U.S. at 511. It is not enough to disbelieve the employer; the factfinder must believe the plaintiff's explanation of intentional discrimination. See id.
Defendants contend the whistleblower allegations; invasion of privacy claim; IIED claim; discrimination, retaliation and breach of contract claims; and assault claim against the individual Defendants-Bentley, Adams, Franken, and Duffy-should be dismissed.
Defendants contend that Plaintiffs' claims of discrimination, retaliation, breach of contract, and whistleblowing claims should be dismissed due to lack of an employer/employee relationship between the individual defendants and Plaintiffs.
The term "employer" means a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a person. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(b). The purpose of the "agent" provision in § 2000e(b) is to incorporate respondeat superior liability into Title VII. See Grant v. Lone Star Co., 21 F.3d 649, 652 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. den., 513 U.S. 1015 (1994) (citing Miller v. Maxwell's International, Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 584 (9th Cir. 1993), cert den., 510 U.S. 1109 (1994)). Title VII does not impose liability on individuals unless they are "employers." See Provensal v. Gaspard, 524 Fed. Appx. 974, 977 (5th Cir. 2013) (citing Grant, 21 F.3d at 653).
UIU was both Plaintiffs' employer and Bentley, Adams, Franken, and Duffy's employer. Bentley, Adams, Franken, and Duffy were not Plaintiffs' employer, andtherefore could not be sued in their individual capacities under Title VII. Moreover, Plaintiffs Miller and Picard contend the whistleblower and breach of contract claims are against UIU only. (ECF Nos. 26, 28). Plaintiffs concede the whistleblower claims against Bentley, Adams, Franken, and Duffy should be dismissed.
Therefore, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' claims for discrimination, retaliation, whistleblowing, and breach of contract against Bentley, Adams, Franken and Duffy is granted.
Plaintiffs seek damages from UIU for unjust enrichment for their work that, over the years, contributed to the financial success and reputation of UIU. Plaintiffs contend Defendant UIU deprived them of normal tenured employment and its benefits.2 Plaintiffs ask for damages equal to the pay of long-term tenured professors at traditional universities.
Plaintiffs have employment contracts that stipulate their rates of pay as adjunct faculty members. (ECF No. 1-2, pp. 8, 10). Plaintiffs were not tenured, and their employment contracts do not discuss tenure or pay as a tenured professor. UIU contends that, because Plaintiffs have employment contracts, their compensation claims can be resolved pursuant to contract law. Therefore, Plaintiffs are precluded from resorting to application of the unjust enrichment theory. See Morphy, Makofsky & Masson, Inc. v. Canal Place 2000, 538 So.2d 569, 575 (La. 1989).
City of New Orleans v. BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc., 690 F.3d 312, 326 (5th Cir. 2012) (); see also Threadgill v. City of New Orleans, 2013 WL 5538701, at *4 (E.D. La. 2013).
As Defendants contend, the fact that Plaintiffs have employment contracts with UIU, and were employed and paid pursuant to the terms of those contracts, precludes their cause of action for compensation from UIU under a theory...
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