Miller v. Walker
| Decision Date | 22 November 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 48A05-9403-CV-115,48A05-9403-CV-115 |
| Citation | 642 N.E.2d 1000 |
| Parties | Charles B. MILLER, Superintendent, State of Indiana Department of Corrections, Appellants-Respondents, v. Breland D. WALKER, Appellee-Petitioner. STATE of Indiana, Appellant-Respondent, v. William C. MASON, Appellee-Petitioner. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
In this expedited appeal, we are called upon to determine whether the credit awarded inmates who successfully complete education programs should be deducted from the term of their sentence or from their projected release date. The statute at issue is Ind.Code 35-50-6-3.3. It reads:
Sec. 3.3. (a) In addition to any credit time a person earns under section 3 of this chapter and in addition to any reduction of sentence a person receives under IC 35-38-1-23, a person earns credit time if:
(1) the person is in credit Class I; and
(2) the person successfully completes requirements to obtain one (1) of the following under IC 20-10.1-12.1-1(b)(1) or from an approved institution of higher learning (as defined under IC 20-12-21-3):
(A) A general equivalency degree.
(B) A high school diploma.
(C) An associates's degree.
(D) A bachelor's degree.
(b) The amount of credit time a person may earn under this section is the following:
(1) Six (6) months for completion of a general equivalency degree.
(2) One (1) year for graduation from high school.
(3) One (1) year for completion of an associate's degree.
(4) Two (2) years for completion of a bachelor's degree.
(c) A person does not earn credit time under subsection (a) unless the person completes at least a portion of the degree requirements after June 30, 1993.
(d) Notwithstanding IC 35-50-6-5, a person may not be deprived of credit time earned under this section.
(e) The maximum amount of credit time a person may earn under this section is the lesser of:
(1) four (4) years; or
(2) one-third ( 1/3) of the person's total applicable credit time.
Before us are two appeals brought by the State of Indiana in response to the court ordered releases of Breland D. Walker and William C. Mason. Both Walker and Mason completed education programs entitling them to receive credit under I.C. 35-50-6-3.3. Walker earned a general equivalency degree, entitling him to six months credit under I.C. 35-50-6-3.3(a)(2)(A) and (b)(1). Mason earned a Bachelor of Science degree, entitling him to two years credit under I.C. 35-50-6-3.3(a)(2)(D) and (b)(4). The Department of Correction deducted the education credit each earned from their fixed terms and calculated a projected release date for each after the deduction. Its position is as follows:
Pursuant to the Department of Correction's calculations, Walker would be released on May 4, 1994, and Mason would be released on January 20, 1995. Both Walker and Mason challenged the Department of Correction projected release dates, contending that the education credit should instead be deducted from their earliest possible release date to gain the full benefit from the statute.
Walker filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Madison County Circuit Court, contending that his correct release date was February 4, 1994. Mason filed a Petition for Post Conviction Relief in the Marion County Superior Court, Criminal Division, Room No. 2, contending that his correct release date was January 20, 1994. Both courts ruled in favor of the prisoners, holding that the Department of Correction erroneously calculated the release dates, that the education credit should have been deducted from the earliest possible release date, and that Walker and Mason were entitled to release. The application of the education credit, as calculated by the prisoners and adopted by the trial courts, is as follows:
The State appeals, asking this court to find that the interpretation given I.C. 35-50-6-3.3 by the lower courts is erroneous.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A question of statutory interpretation is a matter of law to be determined by this court. Joseph v. Lake Ridge School Corp. (1991), Ind.App., 580 N.E.2d 316, 319, reh'g denied, trans. denied. We are not bound by a trial court's legal interpretation of a statute and need not give it deference. One 1968 Buick, 4 Door v. State (1994), Ind.App., 638 N.E.2d 1313. Rather, we must independently determine the statute's meaning and apply it to the facts before us. Id.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
When construing a statute, this court is guided by several rules of statutory construction. First, it must be noted that when a statute is clear and unambiguous on its face, this court need not, and indeed may not, interpret the statute. Whitacre v. State (1993), Ind.App., 619 N.E.2d 605, opinion adopted by Whitacre v. State (1994), Ind., 629 N.E.2d 1236. Instead, we hold the statute to its clear and plain meaning. Scheub v. Town of Schererville (1993), Ind.App., 617 N.E.2d 585. When a statute is ambiguous, we must ascertain the intent of the legislature and interpret the statute to effectuate that intent. Id. When so doing, we read the statutes of an act as a whole and attempt to give effect to all provisions. Whitacre, 619 N.E.2d at 606.
AMBIGUOUS?
Is I.C 35-50-6-3.3 ambiguous? We think not. It provides that if a prisoner completes certain educational milestones, he will earn a certain amount of credit time. The language employed by the legislature is simple and clear, and not susceptible to more than one meaning. In Walker's case he earned six months credit for completing his general equivalency degree and in Mason's case he earned two years for completing his Bachelor of Science degree. The educational credit time is earned "[i]n addition to any credit time a person earns under section 3 of this chapter and in addition to any reduction of sentence a person receives under IC 35-38-1-23."
Thus, looking at Walker's situation, there is no dispute that he earned six months credit for his general equivalency degree. In addition, he earned good time credit at a rate of one day for each day of imprisonment served. I.C. 35-50-6-3. He did not receive any reduction of sentence under IC 35-38-1-23.
Walker received a five year sentence with two years suspended, leaving a three year executed sentence remaining. The education credit is deducted from that sentence. In applying the education credit, it makes no difference whether the education credit is deducted prior to figuring good time credit earned to that point, or deducted after subtracting the good time credit earned to that point.
For illustrative purposes, assume Walker had served one year of a three year sentence at the time he earned his general equivalency degree. If the education credit time is deducted from the fixed term, his sentence would in effect be reduced to thirty months. Assuming he earned all the good time credit he could, he would have to serve fifteen months of his three year sentence. Thus, he would remain in jail three additional months after he received his credit.
Education credit deducted from fixed term
Sentenced to 3 years executed 3.00 years
Subtract education credit (6 months) - .50 year
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2.50 years
Figure maximum good time credit - 1.25 years
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Total time which must be served 1.25 years
Time already served when education credit awarded - 1.00 year
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Additional time which must be served .25 year
Using the same illustration, if the education credit time is deducted after figuring good time credit, the one year Walker had served could have earned him an additional one year good time credit. Thus two years could be subtracted from his three year sentence, leaving one year to serve. Then the six month education credit would be subtracted, leaving six months to serve. Assuming Walker would...
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