Millers National Insurance Co. v. American State Bank of East Chicago
| Decision Date | 24 May 1934 |
| Docket Number | 25,581 |
| Citation | 190 N.E. 433,206 Ind. 511 |
| Parties | Millers National Insurance Company v. American State Bank of East Chicago |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
From Lake Circuit Court; E. Miles Norton, Judge.
Action by the American State Bank of East Chicago against Millers National Insurance Company. From a judgment for plaintiff after a trial de novo on appeal from the city court defendant appealed.
Reversed with instructions.
Patterson & Thiel, for appellant.
Abe Ottenheimer and Ibach, Gavit Stinson & Grant, for appellee.
This is an action by appellee against appellant to recover upon an automobile insurance policy.
Appellee filed its complaint in the City Court of East Chicago asking for damages in the sum of $ 600.00. The record shows that the cause was put at issue in the City Court by the filing of an answer in four paragraphs. It does not appear from the record how the issue was decided, or that there was any trial or judgment in the City Court of East Chicago. From the recitals in the record, it is apparent that there was an appeal to the Lake Circuit Court, a trial de novo by the court without a jury, and a finding and judgment against appellant in the sum of $ 500.00, from which judgment this appeal is taken.
The only errors presented involve the jurisdiction of the court and the overruling of appellant's motion for a new trial.
Appellant asserts that the City Court of East Chicago had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, and that, therefore, the Lake Circuit Court, upon appeal, did not obtain jurisdiction. Its position is based upon the theory that the Act of the General Assembly of 1921, p. 587, conferring special jurisdiction upon certain city courts, including the City Court of East Chicago, is void and unconstitutional for the reasons: (a) That the act does not classify certain cities, but only identifies one city, and that, therefore, the classification is void under section 22 of article IV of the Constitution of Indiana; (b) that the act is unconstitutional since it deprives a party litigant of the constitutional right to a trial by a jury of twelve men; and (c) that the act is a local and special act regulating the practice in courts of justice, and is unconstitutional under Article IV, section 22, of the Constitution of Indiana.
The act provides that the city court of any city of the second-class, not having a circuit or superior court located therein, shall have jurisdiction of all civil cases for the enforcement of demands not exceeding $ 2000.00, where the parties or subject matter are in the township in which the city is located. There are certain exceptions to the jurisdiction, which we need not notice here. It is provided that:
"Such city court shall be governed so far as may be by the laws and rules governing the practice, pleading and processes in circuit courts, excepting as provided in this act and other laws governing city courts."
There is no provision in the act concerning jury trials, and, hence, we look to § 11041, Burns 1926, (§ 42607, Burns 1933, § 11612, Baldwin's 1934), which provides that:
"All issues of fact (in a civil action) pending in said city courts shall be triable by the judge, unless either party shall demand a jury trial, which jury shall consist of six qualified voters of the city, to be summoned by the bailiff by venire issued by the judge."
It is contended by appellant that the Act of 1921, conferring jurisdiction in civil cases up to $ 2,000.00 in the City Court of East Chicago, is unconstitutional and void because it is to be construed in connection with the other acts concerning city courts, among which is the one last quoted, providing for a jury of six; that under our constitution parties litigant are entitled to a trial of issues of fact in civil actions by a common-law jury of twelve; that the act denies trial by jury; and therefore is unconstitutional.
Section 20, Art. 1, of the Constitution of Indiana provides that: "In all civil cases, the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate." It is well settled by our decisions that the Constitution of Indiana must be interpreted in the light of the common law of England. Concerning our constitutional provision, this court said in the case of Allen v. Anderson (1877), 57 Ind. 388:
"This provision of the constitution was adopted in reference to the common-law right of trial by jury, as the language plainly imports, namely, that the right 'shall remain inviolate,' that is, continue as it was."
The courts of numerous states having a constitutional provision as to juries identical or similar to ours, and the United States Supreme Court, have universally held that such a constitutional provision preserves the right to a trial by a common-law jury. At common law the right to a trial by jury was only satisfied by a trial before a jury of twelve, presided over by a judge with power and authority to direct the conduct of the trial, and advise the jury concerning the law, and to arrest and set aside judgments. It is well settled that the constitutional requirement is only satisfied by a trial by such a jury, so presided over, and that the right may not be curtailed by legislative enactment reducing the number of jurors, or dispensing with judicial supervision of the trial. At common law a trial by a jury of twelve, or any other number, presided over by a justice of the peace, was not a trial by jury, since the justice of the peace was not considered as having judicial power, and had no right to grant a new trial, or arrest judgment upon the verdict, or set the verdict aside for any cause whatsoever. It has been universally held, however, that this constitutional right is not infringed by a statutory provision for trial of civil causes for moderate amounts by a justice of the peace, or in his presence by a jury of twelve, or of any less number, allowing to either party the right to appeal from the judgment to a court of record and to have a trial by jury in that court. The question is elaborately and exhaustively discussed in the opinion by Mr. Justice Gray in the case of Capital Traction Co. v. Hof (1899), 174 U.S. 1, 43 L.Ed. 873, 19 S.Ct. 580.
But we are considering here the jurisdiction of a city court, presided over by a city judge. It is argued that the city court has civil jurisdiction concurrent with that of justices of the peace, but it must be remembered that the statute also provides that it shall have original concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit court where the amount in controversy does not exceed $ 500.00 under the general statute, or $ 2,000.00 under the statute here under consideration, and that "such courts shall be governed so far as may be by the laws and rules governing the practice, pleadings and processes in the circuit court of the state, excepting as in this act otherwise provided." This court is provided with a clerk, and it is a court of record; it is provided that judgments rendered shall have the same force and effect as judgments rendered in circuit courts when certified transcripts thereof are filed with the clerk of the circuit court. § 11042, Burns 1926 (§ 4-2608, Burns 1933, § 11613, Baldwin's 1934), provides that new trials may be granted by the judge of a city court, and provision is made for change of venue from the judge, and the appointment of a practicing attorney as special judge. We must conclude that the tribunal is a court, presided over by a judicial officer, with the same powers as to the supervision of the conduct of trials, instruction of jury as to the law, granting new trials, and arresting judgment, that are vested in circuit courts and the judges thereof; and that, therefore, a trial by a jury of twelve men in a city court, presided over by the judge thereof, is a trial by jury conforming to the common-law requirements and satisfying the constitutional provision.
It follows, therefore, that the portion of the statute providing for a jury of six is unconstitutional and void. But without this clause the statute is workable, and must be considered as operative, and the clear intention of the legislature that the statute should be operative, notwithstanding any portion might...
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Millers Nat. Ins. Co. v. American State Bank of East Chicago
... ... Appeal from Lake Circuit Court; E. Miles Norton, Judge.Action by the American State Bank of East Chicago against the Millers National Insurance Company. From a judgment of the circuit court in favor of the plaintiff after a trial de novo on appeal from the city court, the defendant ... ...