Millett v. Puget Sound Iron & Steel Works

• Decision Date: 10 March 1905
• Citation: 79 P. 980,37 Wash. 438
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: MILLETT v. PUGET SOUND IRON & STEEL WORKS.

79 P. 980

37 Wash. 438

MILLETT v. PUGET SOUND IRON & STEEL WORKS.

Supreme Court of Washington

March 10, 1905

Appeal from Superior Court, Pierce County; W. O. Chapman, Judge.

Action by John Millett against the Puget Sound Iron & Steel Works. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Govnor Teats, for appellant.

Hudson & Holt, for respondent.

PER CURIAM.

The appellant was injured while in the employ of the respondent, and instituted this action to recover damages therefor, alleging in his complaint that the injury was caused by negligence for which the respondent was liable. The respondent owns and operates machine shops at the city of Tacoma, and, as a part of its business, manufactures logging engines. The appellant was employed as a helper in its shop; his duties being to assist the machinists with their work, and to perform such labor as did not require special skill and training. At the time of the occurrence of the injury for which the appellant sues the respondent had a number of logging engines nearly completed, and was putting on them the final touches preparatory to turning them out of the shops. The appellant, with another helper, Charles Hurd, was engaged in painting one of these engines, when another employé, John Scholl, came along, and notified them that he was about to test the engine on which they were painting, whereupon the appellant and Hurd quit work at the engine. About 40 or 45 minutes thereafter Hurd came to the appellant, told him that the tester had finished with the engine on which they were formerly working, and that he might go back and finish the painting. The appellant went to the engine, climbed upon it, and was proceeding with his work, when Scholl came back, and put the engine in motion, catching the appellant's foot in the machinery and crushing it off.

It is the contention of the appellant that both Scholl and Hurd were vice principals as to him, and that the negligence of either of them would be the negligence of the respondent. But we know of no principle of law on which this contention can be maintained. All three of them were working for a common employer, under a common foreman, in a common enterprise, and in connection with each other. If, under any circumstances, two or more persons working for a common mastor can be follow servants, we think they were so in this instance.

Affirmed.