Milligan v. Rambosk
| Decision Date | 24 February 2022 |
| Docket Number | 2:20-cv-403-FtM-29MRM |
| Parties | MATTHEW MILLIGAN, Plaintiff, v. KEVIN RAMBOSK, in his official capacity as Sheriff of Collier County, Florida, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
This matter comes before the Court on review of defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #23) filed on October 26 2021. Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition (Doc. #32) on December 10, 2021, and defendant filed a Reply (Doc. #40) on January 3, 2022.
On June 4, 2020, Plaintiff Matthew Milligan (Plaintiff or Milligan) filed a three-count Complaint against Kevin Rambosk (Defendant, the Sheriff, or Sheriff Rambosk), in his official capacity as Sheriff of Collier County, Florida. (Doc. #1.) Plaintiff alleges that the Sheriff unlawfully discriminated against him (Count I) and failed to reasonably accommodate his disability (Count II) in violation of the American Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. Plaintiff further alleges that the Sheriff engaged in unlawful discriminatory employment practices against him (Count III) in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (FCRA). (Id., pp. 10-16.) The Sheriff now seeks summary judgment as to all the claims. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is denied.
Motions for summary judgment should only be granted when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, show “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). “An issue of fact is ‘genuine' if the record taken as a whole could lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party.” Baby Buddies, Inc. v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., 611 F.3d 1308, 1314 (11th Cir. 2010). A fact is “material” if it may affect the outcome of the suit under governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). “A court must decide ‘whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.'” Hickson Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co., Inc., 357 F.3d 1256, 1260 (11th Cir. 2004)(quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251).
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court views all evidence and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Tana v. Dantanna's, 611 F.3d 767, 772 (11th Cir. 2010). However, "[i]f reasonable minds might differ on the inferences arising from undisputed facts, then the court should deny summary judgment." St. Charles Foods, Inc. v. America's Favorite Chicken Co., 198 F.3d 815, 819 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting Warrior Tombigbee Transp. Co. v. M/V Nan Fung, 695 F.2d 1294, 1296-97 (11th Cir. 1983)). "If a reasonable fact finder evaluating the evidence could draw more than one inference from the facts, and if that inference introduces a genuine issue of material fact, then the court should not grant summary judgment." Allen v. Bd. of Pub. Educ. for Bibb Cty., 495 F.3d 1306, 1315 (11th Cir. 2007).
The material relevant facts, viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff when there is a dispute (and some disputed facts) are as follows:[1] Plaintiff was born with a neurological condition - Ataxic Cerebral Palsy (ACP) - the least common form of Cerebral Palsy, which has varying degrees of impairment and symptoms among individuals. Plaintiff asserts that his ACP substantially limits his brain function, his speech, and his writing. (Doc. #32, p. 4, ¶ 1.)
At age fifteen, Plaintiff was diagnosed with Paroxysmal Kinesigenic Dyskinesia (PKD), a disorder characterized by periodic involuntary muscle contractions to the right side of his body, causing that side to lock up. Plaintiff asserts that these muscle spasms typically last five seconds. (Doc. #32, p. 4, ¶ 3.) Both parties agree that the PKD does not substantially impede Plaintiff's ability to perform any life function. (Doc. #23, pp. 3-4, ¶ 3; Doc. #32, p. 4, ¶ 3.) Both parties also agree that the spasms can be triggered by a number of factors, including caffeine, stress, and pressure to Plaintiff's feet, such as when he drives or walks. (Doc. #23, p. 4, ¶ 4; Doc. #32, p. 4, ¶ 4.) Plaintiff asserts that the spasms were completely controlled by medication beginning March 8, 2019. (Doc. #32, p. 4, ¶ 4.)
In late 2017, Plaintiff applied for a position as a deputy with the Collier County Sheriff's Office (CCSO), and did not request an accommodation during the application process. (Doc. #23, p. 4, ¶ 6; Doc. #32, p. 5, ¶ 6.) During the routine polygraph examination which was part of the application process Plaintiff experienced several spasms which caused him to be unable to complete the examination. (Doc. #23, p. 4, ¶¶ 7-8.) Plaintiff voluntarily withdrew his application in December 2017. (Id. at ¶ 9.)
On October 26, 2018, Plaintiff again applied to the CCSO for a position as a certified law enforcement officer (road patrol deputy). (Doc. #32, p. 8, ¶ 1.) In his CCSO application, Plaintiff disclosed his ACP and PKD, but did not request any accommodation. (Doc. #23, p. 5, ¶ 11.) During the polygraph examination Plaintiff again experienced a muscle contraction, which caused the examination to be inconclusive. (Id. at ¶ 12.) Nevertheless, in December 2018 Plaintiff received and accepted a Conditional Offer of Appointment from the CCSO. (Doc. #32, p. 8, ¶ 2.) Plaintiff began working as a road patrol deputy on February 5, 2019. (Doc. #23, p. 5, ¶ 13.)
After accepting the employment, Plaintiff was required to complete four phases of field training while paired with a field training officer who taught and evaluated Plaintiff's performance. (Doc. #23, p. 6, ¶ 15; Doc. #32, p. 5, ¶ 15.) Plaintiff did not request any accommodations prior to his field training. (Doc. #23, p. 6, ¶ 16; Doc. #32, p. 5, ¶ 16.) Plaintiff successfully completed phase one of his field training, and began the second phase with Corporal Michael Sweely. (Doc. #32, p. 9, ¶¶ 13-14.) On March 30, 2019, while driving a patrol vehicle and accompanied by Corporal Sweely, Plaintiff experienced an involuntary muscle spasm on his right side due to his PKD. (Doc. #23, p. 6, ¶ 17; Doc. #32, p. 9, ¶ 15.) The details of this event are disputed: the Sheriff asserts that Corporal Sweely took control of the steering wheel, while Plaintiff maintains Corporal Sweely grabbed his arm but did not take control of the steering wheel. (Doc. #23, p. 6, ¶ 18; Doc. #32, p. 5, ¶ 18.) In any event, Plaintiff agrees that Corporal Sweely was concerned and scared by the event. (Doc. #32, p. 5, ¶ 18.) Corporal Sweely instructed Plaintiff to pull into a parking lot for a short period of time. (Doc. #32, p. 6, ¶ 19.) Afterwards, Corporal Sweely permitted Plaintiff to drive for a short time before Corporal Sweely drove for the remainder of the day. (Doc. #23, p. 7, ¶ 20.)
Corporal Sweely documented the incident and reported it to Captain Mark Baker (Captain Baker) and Human Resources Director Darlyn Estes (Director Estes). (Id. at ¶ 21.) Plaintiff's supervisors ordered him to undergo examination by emergency medical systems (EMS), which medically cleared Plaintiff. (Id. at ¶ 20; Doc. #32, p. 6, ¶ 20.) Plaintiff was not permitted to drive himself home and was directed to take sick leave on March 31, 2019. (Doc. #32, p. 6, ¶ 22.)
On April 1, 2019, Plaintiff met with Captain Baker and Director Estes. (Id. at ¶ 22.) Plaintiff presented his version of the March 30, 2019 incident, and provided them with a medical evaluation that his treating neurologist Dr. John Osterman had performed in connection with another law enforcement position for which Plaintiff had applied in 2018. (Id.) Captain Baker and Director Estes advised Plaintiff that he would need to be evaluated by a neurologist to determine his fitness for duty, and in the interim Plaintiff was temporarily assigned to crime prevention with the same pay and benefits. (Doc. #23, p. 7, ¶ 23.)
On April 5, 2019, the CCSO requested that neurologist Dr. Brian Wolff evaluate Plaintiff's fitness for duty. (Id. at ¶ 24.) Dr. Wolff was provided with Corporal Sweely's observations of the March 2019 incident, other medical documentation from Plaintiff, Plaintiff's medical questionnaire from the CCSO, and two videos of Plaintiff experiencing spasms. (Id.) The parties dispute whether Dr. Wolff was also given a job description for a CCSO road patrol deputy. (Doc. #32, p. 6, ¶ 24.) On April 30, 2019, Dr. Wolff performed an in-person fitness for duty examination of Plaintiff. (Doc. #23, p. 8, ¶ 25.) Afterwards, Dr. Wolff opined Plaintiff was not fit for duty as a police officer because of the impacts of his impairments. (Doc. #1-10, p. 3.)
On May 7, 2019, Dr. Osterman prescribed Carbatrol to control the muscle spasms. (Doc. #23-13.)
At a May 9, 2019 meeting with Sheriff Rambosk and Director Estes, Plaintiff was reassigned from road patrol deputy and given a list of various civilian positions to choose from for a new job with CCSO. (Doc. #23, pp. 8-9, ¶ 26.) In the meantime, Plaintiff remained in crime prevention. (Id.) Although reassigned, Plaintiff remained classified as a deputy sheriff. (Id.)
Plaintiff sent a follow-up email to Sheriff Rambosk and Director Estes on May 15, 2019, stating in part that he believed he could perform the essential functions of a road patrol deputy without reasonable accommodations, but would like to consider any reasonable accommodations in order to continue working as a road patrol deputy. (Doc. #23, p. 9, ¶ 27.) There was no response to this email by the Sheriff. (Doc. #32, p. 7, ¶ 27.)
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