Mills v. Best Western Springdale, 2009 Ohio 2901 (Ohio App. 6/18/2009), No. 08AP-1022.
| Decision Date | 18 June 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. 08AP-1022. |
| Citation | 2009 Ohio 2901 |
| Parties | Katrena Jean Mills et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Best Western Springdale, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, C.P.C. No. 07CVH07-10108.
Law Offices of James P. Connors, and James P. Connors, for appellants.
Demers & Adams, LLC, and David J. Demers, for appellee.
DECISION
{¶1} Plaintiffs-appellants, Katrena Jean Mills and Samuel Mills (collectively, "appellants"), appeal from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas' entry of summary judgment in favor of defendant-appellee, Best Western Springdale ("Best Western"). For the following reasons, we affirm.
{¶2} On October 18, 2002, Katrena and her infant son, Samuel, traveled with a church group to the Best Western in Springdale, Ohio, for a retreat. Appellants, along with group members Janet Utt and Vickie Krupnik, stayed in room 608, while other group members stayed in rooms 607 and 609 for a single night.
{¶3} On July 31, 2007, appellants filed a complaint against Best Western, alleging claims for breach of contract, negligence, and violation of the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act ("CSPA"), R.C. 1345.01, et seq., arising from their contention that they contracted scabies during their hotel stay. Scabies is, "[i]n man, a dermatitis with intense itching, caused by the burrowing into the skin of the itch mite, Sarcoptes scabei." Stedman's Medical Dictionary, Unabridged Lawyers' Edition (1961); see also Webster's Third New Internatl. Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged (G&C Merriam Co. 1966) (). Although the parties use the term "scabies" interchangeably to refer to the itch mites themselves and to the resultant skin condition, we will refer to the itch mites as "mites" and use the term "scabies" to refer to the condition caused by the mites burrowing into the skin.
{¶4} In their complaint, appellants alleged that Best Western breached its express and/or implied contractual obligation to provide them with a suitable, clean, and habitable hotel room by placing them in a room infested with mites. Appellants also alleged that Best Western breached its duty to provide them with a room that complied with Ohio statutory and regulatory cleanliness requirements. Lastly, appellants alleged that Best Western's actions underlying the breach of contract and negligence claims together with its alleged failure to resolve appellants' complaints, constituted unfair, deceptive, and unconscionable practices, in violation of the CSPA.
{¶5} On May 8, 2008, Best Western moved for summary judgment, arguing that the record contained no evidence causally connecting appellants' scabies to their hotel stay, as required for appellants' negligence and breach of contract claims. Best Western also argued that the record contained no evidence of an unconscionable, unfair or deceptive act to establish a violation of the CSPA. Appellants opposed Best Western's motion for summary judgment and filed their own motion for partial summary judgment on June 30, 2008, arguing that they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on their negligence claims.
{¶6} The trial court granted Best Western's motion for summary judgment and denied appellants' motion for partial summary judgment. The trial court concluded that Best Western was entitled to summary judgment on appellants' breach of contract and negligence claims because the record contained no evidence to demonstrate the presence of mites in appellants' hotel room or to otherwise connect appellants' scabies with their hotel stay. The trial court further concluded that the evidence failed to establish a CSPA violation. The trial court issued its final judgment on October 20, 2008, and appellants filed a notice of appeal.
{¶7} Appellants assert the following assignments of error:
1. The trial court erred by granting summary judgment to appellee Best Western Springdale on all claims.
2. The trial court erred by denying partial summary judgment to the appellants Katrena and Samuel Mills. Because both assignments of error concern the trial court's rulings on the parties' motions for summary judgment, we will address them together.
{¶8} We review a summary judgment de novo. Koos v. Cent. Ohio Cellular, Inc. (1994), 94 Ohio App.3d 579, 588, citing Brown v. Scioto Cty. Bd. of Commrs. (1993), 87 Ohio App.3d 704, 711. When an appellate court reviews a trial court's disposition of a summary judgment motion, it applies the same standard as the trial court and conducts an independent review, without deference to the trial court's determination. Maust v. Bank One Columbus, N.A. (1992), 83 Ohio App.3d 103, 107; Brown at 711. We must affirm the trial court's judgment if any grounds the movant raised in the trial court support it. Coventry Twp. v. Ecker (1995), 101 Ohio App.3d 38, 41-42.
{¶9} Pursuant to Civ.R. 56(C), summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits, transcripts of evidence, and written stipulations of fact, if any, timely filed in the action, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Accordingly, summary judgment is appropriate only under the following circumstances: (1) no genuine issue of material fact remains to be litigated; (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) viewing the evidence most strongly in favor of the non-moving party, reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, that conclusion being adverse to the non-moving party. Harless v. Willis Day Warehousing Co. (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 64, 66 {¶10} "[T]he moving party bears the initial responsibility of informing the trial court of the basis for the motion, and identifying those portions of the record before the trial court which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of fact on a material element of the nonmoving party's claim." Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 292, 1996-Ohio-107. Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the non-movant must set forth specific facts demonstrating a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 293. Because summary judgment is a procedural device to terminate litigation, courts should award it cautiously after resolving all doubts in favor of the non-moving party. Murphy v. Reynoldsburg, 65 Ohio St.3d 356, 358-59, 1992-Ohio-95, quoting Norris v. Ohio Std. Oil Co. (1982), 70 Ohio St.2d 1, 2.
{¶11} An overriding theme in appellants' arguments is that the trial court disregarded the principle that a claim for negligence or breach of contract may be based on circumstantial evidence and that the trial court granted summary judgment based solely on the lack of direct evidence connecting the scabies to the hotel. Of course, appellants are correct that circumstantial evidence may prove a claim, and Best Western does not dispute that assertion. "Circumstantial evidence is not inherently less reliable or certain than direct evidence." Fogle v. Cessna Aircraft Co. (Jan. 16, 1992), 10th Dist. No. 90AP-977, citing State v. Jenks (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 272. Both circumstantial and direct evidence are sufficient to support a verdict, and, in some cases, circumstantial evidence may be more persuasive than direct evidence. Fogel, citing Michalic v. Cleveland Tankers, Inc. (1960), 364 U.S. 325, 330, 81 S.Ct. 6, 11.
{¶12} Although the trial court stated in its summary judgment decision that there is no "direct evidence" showing that appellants contracted scabies from their hotel room and that appellants' evidence is "speculative and entirely circumstantial," it is not clear that the trial court was suggesting that appellants could not prove their case with circumstantial evidence. Reading the trial court's decision in its entirety, it appears that the trial court found that appellants lacked any evidence, even of a circumstantial nature, from which a trier of fact could find in favor of appellants without engaging in improper speculation. Nevertheless, regardless of whether the trial court proceeded from an erroneous position with respect to the validity of circumstantial evidence, our de novo standard of review on appeal renders any such error moot. See Safe Auto Ins. Co. v. Hasford, 10th Dist. No. 08AP-249, 2008-Ohio-4897, ¶18. Therefore, we proceed with our own review of the evidence.
{¶13} Because they are premised on the same alleged conduct, the trial court addressed appellants' breach of contract and negligence claims together, and we do the same. To prevail on a claim for breach of contract, the claimant must demonstrate the existence of a contract, performance by the plaintiff, breach by the defendant, and damage or loss to the plaintiff. Jarupan v. Hanna, 173 Ohio App.3d 284, 2007-Ohio-5081, ¶18. It is axiomatic that damages must be the natural and proximate result of the defendant's breach. Ziss Bros. Constr. Co., Inc. v. TransOhio Sav. Bank (June 20, 1991), 8th Dist. No. 58787. Indeed, a contracting party is at liberty to breach his contract, being liable only for damages proximately resulting from the breach. Sorensen v. Wise Mgt. Servs., Inc., 8th Dist. No. 81627, 2003-Ohio-767, ¶39. See also DeMuesy v. Haimbaugh (Dec. 31, 1991), 10th Dist. No. 91AP-212 (). To establish actionable negligence, appellants must demonstrate (1) the existence of a duty from Best Western to appellants, (2) breach of that duty, and (3) damages proximately resulting from the breach. See Jeffers v. Olexo (1989), 43 Ohio St.3d 140, 142. Thus, to recover on either a breach of contract or negligence theory, appellants must establish that their injuries or damages proximately resulted from...
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