Mills v. Board of County Com'rs, Burleigh County, 9880

Decision Date15 May 1981
Docket NumberNo. 9880,9880
Citation305 N.W.2d 832
PartiesBetty L. MILLS, Applicant and Appellant, v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, BURLEIGH COUNTY, North Dakota, Respondent andAppellee, and North Dakota State Tax Commissioner, a party pursuant to Section 57-23.2-02, North Dakota Century Code, Respondent. Civ.
CourtNorth Dakota Supreme Court

Mills & Moore, Bismarck, for applicant and appellant; argued by Sherry Mills Moore, Bismarck.

John M. Olson, State's Atty., and Gail Hagerty, Asst. State's Atty., Bismarck, for respondent and appellee Board of County Commissioners; argued by Gail Hagerty.

VANDE WALLE, Justice.

Betty L. Mills appeals from a judgment of the district court of Burleigh County reversing a decision of the Tax Appeals Board. We affirm the judgment of the district court.

In 1977, following assessment of her land and residence, Mills applied to the Burleigh County Board of Commissioners ("County Board") for abatement of taxes on the home as a farm improvement and also alleged an arbitrary assessment of the land. The County Board denied the application for abatement and Mills appealed to the North Dakota Tax Appeals Board. 1 The Tax Appeals Board determined that the home was exempt as a farm improvement, that the land was arbitrarily assessed, and ordered an abatement of the taxes. The County Board appealed the decision of the Tax Appeals Board to the district court of Burleigh County, 2 which reversed the Tax Appeals Board decision that the home was exempt as a farm improvement. Mills has appealed the district court's decision that the home is not exempt as a farm improvement. 3 She raises two issues on appeal:

1. Is the Tax Appeals Board's finding that the taxpayer is a farmer supported by the evidence?

2. Is the Tax Appeals Board's finding that the land is agricultural supported by the evidence?

Before considering the issues raised on appeal we briefly consider the function of the courts in an appeal from a decision of the Tax Appeals Board. This court has not specifically defined the scope of review in an appeal from a decision of the Tax Appeals Board. In Caldis v. Board of Cty. Comrs., Grand Forks Cty., 279 N.W.2d 665 (N.D.1979), the issue of whether or not the Tax Appeals Board's procedures are subject to the Administrative Agencies Practice Act, Chapter 28-32, N.D.C.C., was raised but not answered. 4

The district court as well as the parties to this appeal assume that the procedures governing the review of a decision of an administrative agency apply to appeals from the Tax Appeals Board and we will apply that standard for the purpose of our review. 5 We have said that on an appeal from the decision of an administrative agency we review the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order made by the agency rather than the findings of the district court. Bromley v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 304 N.W.2d 412 (N.D.1981). Pursuant to the pertinent provisions of Section 28-32-19, N.D.C.C., we must affirm the decision of the administrative agency unless we find:

"1. The decision or determination is not in accordance with the law.

"2. ...

"3. ...

"4. ...

"5. The findings of fact made by the agency are not supported by the preponderance of the evidence.

"6. The conclusions and decision of the agency are not supported by its findings of fact."

In Power Fuels, Inc. v. Elkin, 283 N.W.2d 214, 220 (N.D.1979), we stated:

"In construing the 'preponderance of the evidence' standard to permit us to apply the weight-of-the-evidence test to the factual findings of an administrative agency, we do not make independent findings of fact or substitute our judgment for that of the agency. We determine only whether a reasoning mind reasonably could have determined that the factual conclusions reached were proved by the weight of the evidence from the entire record."

We look now at the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the Tax Appeals Board pertinent to the issues before us:

"FINDINGS OF FACT

"II.

"That the subject of the appeal and the matter to be resolved is the difference of opinion between the appellant (Mills) and the respondent (County Board) concerning ... real property ... consisting of farmland in Burleigh County, North Dakota, ... and that the appellant and respondent also differ in opinion relative to the exempt status of the home located on said properties.

"IV.

"That the subject property has been in the past and is presently used for hayland and woodland, having previously been also utilized for other farming purposes including stock raising and rural dwelling place. The subject property was used as a farm unit together with contiguous property consisting of 43.7 acres ...

"V.

"That the appellant lives and resides upon the subject property, utilizing the same as an agricultural residence, and that her major income was from farming operations and that she spends the major portion of her time on the agricultural land.

"CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

"III.

"That the property which is the subject of this appeal is agricultural farmland consisting of grazing land, hayland and native woodlands, ...

"IV.

"That the dwelling place of the appellant is located upon the farmland which is the subject of this appeal; that a major portion of the appellant's income is from agricultural and farming operations; and that the same qualifies for a farm dwelling exemption as defined by Section 57-02-08(15) of the North Dakota Century Code, as amended."

Section 57-02-08(15), N.D.C.C., provides that the following property is exempt from taxation:

"15. All farm structures, and improvements located on agricultural lands. This subsection shall be construed to exempt farm buildings and improvements only, and shall not be construed to exempt from taxation industrial plants, or structures of any kind not used or intended for use as a part of a farm plant, or as a farm residence. Any structure or structures used in connection with a retail or wholesale business other than farming, even though situated on agricultural land, shall not be exempt under this subsection. It is the intent of the legislative assembly that this exemption as applied to a residence shall be strictly construed and interpreted to exempt only a residence which is situated on a farm and which is occupied or used by a person who is a farmer and that the exemption shall not be applied to property which is occupied or used by a person who is not a farmer; for this purpose the term 'farm' means a single tract or contiguous tracts of agricultural land containing a minimum of ten acres (4.05 hectares) and which normally provides a farmer, who is actually farming the land or engaged in the raising of livestock or other similar operations normally associated with farming and ranching, with not less than fifty percent of his annual net income; and the term 'farmer' means an individual who normally devotes the major portion of his time to the activities of producing products of the soil, poultry, livestock, or dairy farming in such products' unmanufactured state and who normally receives not less than fifty percent of his annual net income from any one or more of the foregoing activities; and the term also includes an individual who is retired because of illness or age and who at the time of retirement owned and occupied as a farmer as defined above the residence in which he lives and for which the exemption is claimed."

Mills argues that the Tax Appeals Board found the land to be agricultural farmland; that she lived and resided on the property using the home as an agricultural residence; that the major portion of her time was spent on the agricultural land; and that the major portion of her income was from farming. She therefore urges us to determine that the findings of the Tax Appeals Board support its conclusions that the owner meets the definitional requirements of a farmer. Mills and the County Board argued in detail the source of Mills' income. Mills contends that more than 50 percent of her income is from farming, that the home is conducive to farming, and that the majority of her income-producing time is spent farming. Several of these matters involve intriguing questions, such as:

(1) Is the land on which the home is situated agricultural land? 6

(2) Does the production of hay and the growing and selling of firewood constitute farming? 7

Regardless of how interesting these other issues may be, we deem it necessary to consider only one issue: Is Mills a farmer? Conceding for the purposes of this opinion, but without so deciding, that the land upon which the home is located is agricultural and that it is a farm, we determine that the conclusions of the Tax Appeals Board that Mills is a farmer are not supported by its findings of fact.

Before examining the specific findings which lead to our determination, we emphasize that Section 57-02-08(15), N.D.C.C., as it now exists, specifically provides that it is the intent of the Legislative Assembly that the exemption as applied to a residence is to be strictly construed and interpreted to exempt only a residence which is situated on a farm "and which is occupied or used by a person who is a farmer and that the exemption shall not be applied to property which is occupied or used by a person who is not a farmer." A "farmer" is defined by the provision as meaning an individual "who normally devotes the major portion of his time to the activities of producing products of the soil, poultry, livestock, or dairy farming ... and who normally receives not less than fifty percent of his annual net income from any one or more of the foregoing activities; ..."

The finding of the Tax Appeals Board pertinent to this issue is simply that Mills "lives and resides upon the subject property, utilizing the same as an agricultural residence, ... and that she spends the major portion of her time on the agricultural land." It is apparent that one who lives and resides on the land and spends the major...

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