Mills v. City of Opelika

• Citation: 320 So.3d 554
• Decision Date: 01 May 2020
• Docket Number: 1180268
• Parties: Jordan MILLS and Bradley Braswell v. CITY OF OPELIKA and American Traffic Solutions, Inc.
• Court: Supreme Court of Alabama

320 So.3d 554

Jordan MILLS and Bradley Braswell

v.CITY OF OPELIKA and American Traffic Solutions, Inc.

1180268

Supreme Court of Alabama.

May 1, 2020

Rehearing Denied August 28, 2020

J. Doyle Fuller and Susan G. Copeland of Fuller & Copeland, Montgomery, for appellants.

Robert E. Poundstone IV and George R. Parker of Bradley Arant Boult Cummings LLP, Montgomery; and Marc James Ayers and J. Thomas Richie of Bradley Arant Boult Cummings LLP, Birmingham, for appellee City of Opelika.

Joseph Jay Minus, Jr., and Day Peake III of Phelps Dunbar LLP, Mobile; and Kim M. Boyle and Allen C. Miller of Phelps Dunbar LLP, New Orleans, Louisiana, for appellee American Traffic Solutions, Inc.

BOLIN, Justice.

Jordan Mills and Bradley Braswell (hereinafter referred to collectively as "the plaintiffs") appeal from the Lee Circuit Court's dismissal of their declaratory-judgment action challenging the Opelika Red Light Safety Act and the implementing City of Opelika ordinance providing for the automated photographic enforcement of red lights within the corporate limits of the City of Opelika ("the City") on constitutional and statutory grounds.

Facts and Procedural History

In 2011, the Alabama Legislature enacted Act No. 2011-524, Ala. Acts 2011, a local act known as the "Opelika Red Light Safety Act" ("the Act"), which authorized the automated photographic enforcement of traffic lights in the corporate limits of the City. The Act became effective on June 9, 2011. The legislature found in § 2(1) of the Act that "vehicles running red lights have been and are a dangerous problem in Opelika, Alabama." The legislature further found in § 2(2) of the Act that "automated traffic camera enforcement in a municipal area is a highly accurate method for detecting red light violations and is very effective in reducing the number of red light violations and decreasing the number of traffic accidents, deaths, and injuries." To that end, the legislature found that it "should adopt legislation implementing a program for automated photographic enforcement of traffic signal violations." § 2(4) of the Act. The legislature created in the Act a "non-criminal category of law called a civil violation created and existing for the sole purpose of carrying out the terms" of the Act. The legislature made the penalty for violating the civil violation "the payment of a civil fine." § 3(3) of the Act.

On August 16, 2011, the City adopted Ordinance No. 112-11 ("the ordinance"), which provided for the automated photographic enforcement of red lights within the corporate limits of the City and the imposition of a civil penalty for those motorists whose vehicles were photographed running a red light. Section 16-300 of the ordinance states that the Opelika City Council found that there was a "significant risk to the health and safety of the community from drivers of vehicles that run red lights within the city"; that the running of a red light is a "public nuisance"; and that "[a]ccident data establishes that vehicles running red lights ... are a dangerous problem in the [City]." Section 16-301(9) of the ordinance classifies a traffic-control violation as a "civil violation" and defines a traffic-control violation as "any violation of Code of Ala. 1975, § 32-5A-31, § 32-5A-32, § 32-5A-35, or of any combination thereof, wherein a vehicle proceeds into a signalized intersection at a time while the traffic-control signal for that vehicle's lane of travel is emitting a steady red signal." Section 16-302(b) imposes a $60 civil penalty for a first or second violation of the ordinance within a 12-month period. Section 16-302(c) imposes a $100 civil penalty for a third violation of the ordinance within a 12-month period.

The plaintiffs alleged that, in 2011, American Traffic Solutions, Inc. ("ATS"), approached the City regarding the installation of traffic-light-enforcement cameras within the corporate limits of the City. According the plaintiffs, ATS offered to install, maintain, and monitor traffic-light-enforcement cameras at multiple intersections throughout the corporate limits of the City. The plaintiffs further asserted that ATS represented to the City that, when a vehicle is caught on camera going through a red light, ATS would electronically forward the resulting picture to a City official for review. Upon approval from the City, the plaintiffs alleged, ATS would then mail to the owner of the vehicle that ran the red light a ticket requesting payment of a fine. Finally, the plaintiffs asserted, ATS would remit a portion of the fine recovered to the City and would retain the remainder for itself.

The plaintiffs alleged that the first automated traffic-light-enforcement cameras went into operation within the corporate limits of the City in February 2013 and that the first tickets were issued in May 2013. The plaintiffs each received a ticket after the automated traffic-light-enforcement cameras captured vehicles owned by them running red lights within the corporate limits of the City.¹ The plaintiffs state that they paid the civil fines resulting from the traffic-signal violations.

On October 4, 2017, the plaintiffs individually and on behalf of a putative class of individuals who had received notice of violation pursuant to the Act, sued the City and ATS (hereinafter referred to collectively as "the defendants"), seeking, among other things, a judgment declaring that the Act and the ordinance were unconstitutional and violative of Alabama law. Specifically, the plaintiffs sought a declaration that the Act violated §§ 89 and 105, Ala. Const. 1901; that the ordinance violated §§ 11-45-1 and 32-5-1, Ala. Code 1975; and that the City has improperly delegated its police power to ATS under the ordinance. Additionally, the plaintiffs sought an order enjoining the City from ticketing individuals through the use of automatic traffic-light-enforcement cameras and a refund of all fines collected based on the use of the automatic traffic-light-enforcement cameras.

On December 12, 2017, the defendants moved the trial court, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P., to dismiss the declaratory-judgment complaint against them, arguing, among other things, that no justiciable controversy existed between the parties. The defendants contended that the Act and the ordinance provide for both an adjudicative hearing before a hearing officer and a de novo appeal to the circuit court but that the plaintiffs paid the fines without challenging the Act and the ordinance in the manner prescribed by the Act and the ordinance. The defendants argued that the plaintiffs cannot now revive this matter in a collateral declaratory-judgment action because, they say, the issues between the parties have become nonjusticiable and moot.

On March 22, 2018, the plaintiffs filed an amended and restated complaint to add a count seeking a judgment declaring that the Act violates § 104(14) and (19) of the Alabama Constitution of 1901. (Off. Recomp.)

On April 12, 2018, the defendants moved the trial court to dismiss the amended and restated complaint, again arguing, among other things, that no justiciable controversy existed between the parties. On May 29, 2018, the plaintiffs filed a response in opposition to the defendants' motion to dismiss. On November 21, 2018, the trial court entered an order granting the defendants' motion to dismiss, finding, among other things, that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the matter because no justiciable controversy existed between the parties after the plaintiffs paid the civil fines without contesting the notice of violations. The plaintiffs appealed.

Standard of Review

This Court has stated the appropriate standard of review for an appeal from an order of dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) as follows:

" ‘On appeal, a dismissal is not entitled to a presumption of correctness.... The appropriate standard of review under Rule 12(b)(6) [, Ala. R. Civ. P.,] is whether, when the allegations of the complaint are viewed most strongly in the pleader's favor, it appears that the pleader could prove any set of circumstances that would entitle [the pleader] to relief. ... In making this determination, this Court does not consider whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but only whether [the plaintiff] may possibly prevail. ... We note that a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is proper only when it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim that would entitle the plaintiff to relief.’ "

Carr v. International Refining & Mfg. Co., 13 So. 3d 947, 952 (Ala. 2009) (quoting Nance v. Matthews, 622 So. 2d 297, 299 (Ala. 1993) ). Further,

" ‘[f]or a declaratory-judgment action to withstand a motion to dismiss there must be a bona fide justiciable controversy that should be settled. Anonymous v. Anonymous, 472 So. 2d 640, 641 (Ala. Civ. App. 1984) ; Smith v. Alabama Dry Dock & Shipbuilding Co., 293 Ala. 644, 309 So. 2d 424, 427 (1975). The test for the sufficiency of a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment is whether the pleader is entitled to a declaration of rights at all, not whether the pleader will prevail in the declaratory-judgment action. Anonymous, 472 So. 2d at 641.

" ‘The lack of a justiciable controversy may be raised by either a motion to dismiss or a motion for a summary judgment. Smith, 309 So. 2d at 427. See also Rule 12, Ala. R. Civ. P.; Rule 56, Ala. R. Civ. P. However, a motion to dismiss is rarely appropriate in a declaratory-judgment action. Wallace v. Burleson, 361 So. 2d 554, 555 (Ala. 1978). If there is a justiciable controversy at the commencement of the declaratory-judgment action, the motion to dismiss should be overruled and a declaration of rights made only after an answer has been submitted and evidence has been presented. Anonymous, 472 So. 2d at 641. However, if there is not a justiciable controversy, a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim should be granted. Curjel v. Ash, 263 Ala. 585, 83 So. 2d 293, 296 (

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