Mills v. Dist. of Columbia

• Citation: 259 A.3d 750
• Decision Date: 30 September 2021
• Docket Number: No. 18-CT-784,18-CT-784
• Parties: Cecelia Ellen MILLS, Appellant, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Appellee.
• Court: Court of Appeals of Columbia District

259 A.3d 750

Cecelia Ellen MILLS, Appellant,

v.DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Appellee.

No. 18-CT-784

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued February 5, 2021

Decided September 30, 2021

Omar M. Bississo, Falls Church, VA, for appellant.

John D. Martorana, Assistant Attorney General, with whom Karl A. Racine, Attorney General for the District of Columbia, Loren L. AliKhan, Solicitor General, and Rosalyn C. Groce, Deputy Solicitor General, were on the brief, for appellee.

Before Glickman, Associate Judge, Thompson, Associate Judge,^* and Long, Senior Judge District of Columbia Superior Court.^**

Thompson, Associate Judge:

After a bench trial before a magistrate judge (the Honorable Rainey Brandt), appellant Cecelia Mills was found guilty of reckless driving (see D.C. Code § 50-2201.04(b) (2021 Supp.) ) and driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs (DUI) (see D.C. Code § 50-2206.11 (2020 Repl.)). Thereafter, Associate Judge Heidi Pasichow denied appellant's motion for review. In this appeal, appellant renews her argument that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions. She also contends that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to impose sanctions on the District of Columbia (the "government") for its failure to preserve body-worn camera (BWC) footage recorded when appellant was at Providence Hospital hours after her arrest. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.

I. Factual & Procedural Background

Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) Officers Jonathan Earhart and Alex Berg were the sole witnesses at appellant's trial. In his testimony pertinent to the reckless driving charge, Officer Earhart told the court that the officers encountered appellant's vehicle at about 9:44 p.m. on July 27, 2016, when, as part of their patrol, they were driving southbound on Holbrook Street, N.E. Officer Earhart described Holbrook Street, a street with no lane-dividing lines, as "a little narrow" in some spots.¹ On the night in question, it had vehicles parked on both sides, and traffic was "very light." Officer Earhart described the vehicle appellant was driving as a "very, very old Cadillac[,]" "a little bit larger vehicle." He testified that he observed appellant, driving at a "relatively higher rate of speed," make a wide turn onto Holbrook Street to go northbound – "basically like a veering motion to come around the parked vehicles that were on the side." The turn caused appellant's vehicle to veer into the police cruiser's lane of traffic; Officer Earhart "felt like [appellant's] vehicle was going to impact [the officers’] vehicle[,]" which caused the officers to "ha[ve] to stop and swerve to the right to avoid being struck by [appellant's] vehicle." Officer Earhart also noticed that appellant's vehicle had only one operable headlight. The officers turned around and then followed appellant as she made a series of right turns without signaling. After appellant's vehicle arrived at Holbrook Street again,² it made a left turn onto Holbrook and abruptly pulled "head-first" into a parallel-parking spot, coming so close to the car parked behind her that the officers felt compelled to check for damage (although no damage was found).³

Officer Berg gave similar testimony. He described Holbrook Street as a "narrow street" where "[t]here was room for two cars to pass, but it required both cars to be ... as far over as possible to the side of the road." Officer Berg did not "recall seeing any other vehicles on the road or driving" at the time. He also did not recall how far behind appellant's vehicle the police cruiser was at the times when appellant failed to give turn signals. Both officers described appellant's driving as "erratic."

Both officers also gave testimony about appellant's demeanor after she had parked. Their testimony was consistent: appellant exited her vehicle despite the officers’ requests that she remain inside; "h[ung] onto the vehicle" while walking to the rear of her car; was slow to respond to, and did not appear to understand the officers’ questions; made incoherent statements and gave non-responsive or non-sensical answers; when asked for her driver's license, "just kind of star[ed] off in the distance[,]" "blankly"; provided only five digits of her Social Security number and then stared "blankly ahead and didn't answer anything further after that"; rather than provide her license and registration, handed the officers mail and court documents; had "slurred" and difficult-to-understand speech; had red, glossy, and bloodshot eyes; repeatedly insisted that she needed to urinate; and had problems keeping her balance and needed assistance with walking so that she would not fall over. Defense counsel asked Officer Earhart whether appellant's mode of answering was just an uncooperative reaction to her recognizing the officer from a prior incident (that had resulted in a court order prohibiting appellant from driving). Officer Earhart discounted that idea, explaining, "I don't know if I would construe it as not cooperative. ... [S]he just wasn't ... answering half the time and her statements at times did not make any sense." Appellant did not request medical assistance or say that she had medical problems or needed a cane.

The officers testified that they made multiple calls to dispatch to request a Standardized Field Sobriety Test officer to conduct a sobriety test, but were told that none were available at the time. Based on their experience in interacting with impaired individuals (both estimated multiple such interactions per week), the officers believed that appellant was intoxicated or "under the influence of alcohol or drugs of some substance." The officers placed appellant under arrest and transported her to the police station. The government did not present evidence about what transpired at the station (and thus offered no evidence about any substance testing protocol or response) because the intake portion of the station house video footage was missing.⁴

Not quite three hours after her arrest, appellant (who the record indicates was 68 years old at the time and was complaining of breathing problems and asthma

symptoms) was taken to Providence Hospital for evaluation. There, MPD Officer Duane Moore, who was on detail at the hospital, activated his body-worn camera at 12:53 a.m. on July 28, 2016, during six minutes and seven seconds of appellant's hospital visit. Before trial, in response to the defense's request for this body camera footage, the prosecutor reported that the footage, which had been labeled "incident" and "no arrest[,]" had been deleted in November 2017 as it was not tagged to be saved. The trial court noted that Officer Moore had not "encountered [appellant] at the station house and found there was "really no reason to believe that [Officer Moore] was part of the investigative team ... investigating towards a prosecution." During a colloquy before the close of the government's case, the court denied defense counsel's request that the court infer that the missing video footage would have been favorable to appellant.

Appellant moved for a judgment of acquittal at the close of the government's case and, after the motion was denied, argued again in closing that the evidence was insufficient for conviction on either charge Finding that the officers’ testimony was credible, the trial court found that appellant's driving was "not cautious and prudent" under the circumstances, noting in particular the wide turn and veering into the officers’ lane of traffic, the lack of signaling with the police cruiser on the road, the inoperable headlight, and "the higher rate of speed than normal." The court also found that appellant's behaviors observed by the officers, who the court emphasized frequently encounter people under the influence, were not those of someone being uncooperative but rather of someone being under the influence. The court cited in particular appellant's difficulty balancing, failure to follow directions, and bloodshot and glassy eyes. The court therefore found appellant guilty of both charges.

The reviewing judge agreed that the evidence was sufficient to prove reckless driving and DUI and also concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to impose a discovery sanction. This appeal followed. Although our review is of the associate judge's order affirming the magistrate judge's rulings, "our powers of appellate review are [not] so limited that ... we may not look to the findings and conclusions of the fact finder on which that ruling is based." In re C.A.B. , 4 A.3d 890, 902 (D.C. 2010).

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

A. Standard of Review

Our review of a claim of insufficiency of the evidence is de novo, but we must "view[ ] the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, and affirm[ ] a conviction if any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Thomas v. United States , 249 A.3d 802, 804 (D.C. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Powell v. United States , 238 A.3d 954, 957 (D.C. 2020) ). Stated differently, "[o]ur standard of review of the sufficiency of the evidence is limited to determining whether as a matter of law, ... no reasonable fact finder acting reasonably[ ] could convict appellant on the evidence presented." Kennedy v. District of Columbia , 601 A.2d 2, 2 n. 2 (D.C. 1991) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Beatty v. United States, 544 A.2d 699, 701 (D.C. 1988). "In considering the sufficiency of the evidence, we make no distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence," recognizing that "circumstantial evidence is not intrinsically inferior to direct evidence. " Smith v. United States , 809 A.2d 1216, 1222 (D.C. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bernard v. United States, 575 A.2d 1191, 1193 (D.C. 1990). "The standard for overturning convictions for evidentiary...