Mills v. Forest Pres. Dist. of Cook Cnty.

• Decision Date: 23 October 1931
• Docket Number: No. 20650.,20650.
• Citation: 178 N.E. 126,345 Ill. 503
• Parties: MILLS v. FOREST PRESERVE DIST. OF COOK COUNTY.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

345 Ill. 503

178 N.E. 126

MILLS

v.FOREST PRESERVE DIST. OF COOK COUNTY.

No. 20650.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Oct. 23, 1931.

Bill by Allen G. Mills against the Forest Preserve District of Cook County. From a decree dismissing the bill, complainant appeals.

Affirmed.Appeal from Circuit Court, Cook County; W. V. Brothers, judge.

Lorin C. Collins and Beverly W. Howe, both of Chicago, for appellant.

George A. Basta, Irvin Rooks, and Eli E. Fink, all of Chicago, for appellee.

DUNN, J.

Allen G. Mills conveyed eighty-five acres of land which he owned in Cook county to the forest preserve district of Cook county on April 5, 1924, for a consideration of $55,889.12, which was paid him. On June 6, 1928, he filed a bill in the circuit court of Cook county against the grantee, tendering back the purchase money which he had received, and praying for a reconveyance of the land to him. Upon a hearing the court dismissed the bill, and the complainant has appealed.

The appellee is a municipal corporation organized under the act of June 27, 1913, ‘to provide for the creation and management of forest preserve districts and repealing certain Acts therein named.’ Laws of 1913, p. 385. The only act repealed was a former act for the creation of forest preserve districts which was held unconstitutional at the December term, 1911, in People v. Rinaker, 252 Ill. 266, 96 N. E. 897. Another section (8a) was added to the act in 1917 (Laws of 1917, p. 529), and several of the sections were amended in 1923 (Laws of 1923, p. 409).

On February 7, 1921, the forest preserve district passed an ordinance purporting to create a forest preserve district of certain real estate in Cook county which included the complainant's land. The ordinance directed the real estate agent of the district to negotiate with the owners of the land for its purchase, and, in case an agreement could not be reached upon the compensation to be paid, the attorney of the district was directed to proceed to obtain title to the land under the eminent domain laws of the state. The land in question did not contain a natural forest or part thereof, or land connecting such forests, as required by section 6 of the Forest Preserve Act, but was swamp or marsh land subject to overflow, and during the spring and autumn was covered with water to a depth of one to three feet or more, and was part of a large area known as the Skokie marsh. The bill alleged that the defendant threatened to commence condemnation proceedings and try the suit when said land would be covered with water and could not be viewed by a jury except by boat; that the complainant and defendant were not on an equal basis, as the defendant had the power of eminent domain and the right to commence condemnation at such time as it might select and to cause the suit to be brought to trial at such time as it might select, and the complainant would have been subjected to great risk by refusing to accept the offer made by the defendant as the purchase price of the land; that, if the land had been viewed by a jury at the most unfavorable time and under most unfavorable conditions, a verdict fixing the value of the land at no more than 10 per cent. of its value might reasonably have been expected; that the ordinance was void, and the defendant had no power, under the law, to purchase or condemn the land, and acquired no title by the deed of the complainant; that the complainant was unwilling to sell his land to the defendant, but was compelled to do so at the price which the defendant was willing to pay or to subject himself to the risk of a jury trial under unfavorable conditions; that the defendant tried for a long time to prevent the complainant and other ownersof land in the same situation from draining it, for the purpose of acquiring it for less than its actual value; that these acts were unlawful, and deprived the complainant of his lawful right to hold or convey his land without interference or domination by the defendant; that the passage of the ordinance was sufficient, of itself, to eliminate all possible purchasers, and thereby the complainant was compelled to choose between the alternatives of accepting what the defendant was willing to pay or risking a condemnation proceeding, and that his deed was not voluntary, but was made under constraint, in view of the danger of loss that might be sustained by submitting to an appraisement of value by a jury in the condemnation suit. It was further alleged that on November 26, 1923, a taxpayer's suit was brought against the defendant in the superior court of Cook county, which was dismissed by the court for want of equity, but that upon appeal this court on October 22, 1927, reversed the decree and remanded the cause to the superior court, with directions to enter a decree enjoining the defendant from further acquiring the land described in the ordinances of February 7, 1921, and February 2, 1925, by the expenditure of any public money, except such parcels of that land as might be acquired in conformity with section 6 of the Forest Preserve Act as construed in the opinion of the court (Washburn v. Forest Preserve District, 327 Ill. 479, 158 N. E. 801); that a mandate was issued from this court and a final decree was entered by the superior court in accordance with its directions. The bill then alleges that the decision of the Supreme Court, the final decree of the superior court of Cook county, and the acts of the defendant created by operation of law a constructive trust, of which the land of the complainant is the subject, the defendant the trustee, and the complainant the beneficiary; that the defendant, as trustee, holds the naked legal title, to be conveyed to the complainant upon payment of the sum of $55,889.12, with legal interest from the time of its receipt; that the complainant, on or about February 5, 1928, made a written demand upon the defendant for the reconveyance of the land so conveyed to the defendant, and offered to return the sum of money paid him, with legal interest thereon. It is also alleged that the defendant by the passage of the ordinance of February 7, 1921, unlawfully converted the land of the complainant into a forest preserve, that the ordinance by its terms, provisions, and operation was an illegal taking of the land of the complainant, and that the agreement as to the compensation that the complainant was to receive for his land and the execution and delivery of the deed to the defendant were made by the complainant under duress, and that by reason of the lack of power of the defendant to acquire the land it has not the power to hold the same, and that the acts of the defendant in refusing to convey the land and receive back the consideration paid to the complainant are all in violation of sections 1 and 2 of article 2 of the Bill of Rights of the Constitution of the State of Illinois and section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

The defendant filed a plea which was set down for argument and was not allowed but was ordered to stand as an answer. It alleged that the complainant's deed was voluntarily made by him after he had made a written proposition to sell the land for $56,062.50; that he had originally offered to sell it to the defendant for $600 an acre, but afterward refused to convey it for that price, and demanded $675 an acre, which proposition was accepted by the defendant; that the price paid was the full market value of the land, he was paid $56,062.50, the whole proceeding was voluntary, and no coercion of any kind was used, nor were any threats made which caused him to make the conveyance.

The cause was heard in open court. The complainant was the only witness who testified. There was no cross-examination. His testimony, together with the ordinance of February 7, 1921, the mandate of the Supreme Court in the Washburn Case, the demand of the complainant for a reconveyance of the land, the complainant's proposal dated August 13, 1921, to sell the land to the defendant for $600 an acre subject to the taxes of 1921, bearing on its face the written statement, ‘This is a compromise offer made to avoid litigation,’ his proposal dated November 1, 1923, to sell the same land for $675 an acre, and the warrant of the district for $55,889.12 payable to the complainant and indorsed by him, constituted all the evidence in the case, the defendant offering no evidence.

The appellant is an attorney who has practiced law in Chicago since 1894. After the passage of the ordinance of February 7, 1921, he had many conversations relative to the sale of his land to the appellee with representatives of the district. Testimony was offered to show that threats were made to bring condemnation proceedings and have them tried when the land was under water, unless it were sold at an agreed price, and to show that the appellant had an offer for the purchase of his land at $1,000 an acre if he could get the land out of the forest preserve, but the evidence was not received. Though the appellee denied that it was material, it was stipulated that the appellee was opposed to draining the Skokie, and the appellant testified that before the ordinance was passed the appellee appeared in the East Fork Drainage District case in opposition to the drainage of the Skokie area. The appellant doubted the authority of the appellee to own or condemn his land.

The appellant's contentions are, that the enactment of the ordinance was itself a taking within the meaning of section 2 of the Bill of Rights of Illinois; that he sold the land under duress; that the acquisition of title to the land was beyond the power of the defendant; that the corporation has no right to hold what it has no right to acquire, and that the result of the transaction is a constructive trust, the district taking the naked legal title to the land as a trustee for the complainant, the vendor, and the complainant holding the purchase price in trust...