Mills v. Mills
| Decision Date | 11 July 1911 |
| Citation | 33 R.I. 115,80 A. 591 |
| Parties | DUNN WORSTED MILLS v. ALLENDALE WORSTED MILLS. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
Action by the Dunn Worsted Mills against the Allendale Worsted Mills. There was a decision for plaintiff, and defendant excepted. Plaintiff petitions to establish the truth of defendant's exceptions, under Gen. Laws 1909, c. 298, § 21. Petition granted.
John J. Heffernan and James H. Rickard, Jr., for plaintiff. Bassett & Raymond, for defendant.
This is an action of the case, brought to recover damages for the alleged breach on the part of the defendant of a certain contract between the plaintiff and the defendant. Jury trial having been waived, the case was tried in the superior court before the presiding justice. On a day subsequent to the date of trial the said justice filed a rescript, in which he discusses at some length the testimony given at the trial, and concludes with a "decision for the plaintiff for $6,000." To this decision the defendant duly filed its exception. The defendant's exception was as follows: "And now, after decision for the plaintiff in the above-entitled case, and within seven days after notice of such decision, the defendant comes into court and hereby excepts to said decision." It does not appear that the defendant took any other exception during the progress of said case in the superior court Within the time fixed by said justice the defendant filed its bill of exceptions in the superior court. In this bill the defendant recites the nature of the action, the fact of the trial, and that "decision was rendered for the plaintiff for $6,000, and after said decision of said case exceptions thereto were duly taken by the defendant, which exceptions set forth in detail are." Then follows in numbered paragraphs an assignment of ten reasons for the defendant's contention that the decision was erroneous. These reasons are chiefly objections to the reasoning of the justice, appearing in the rescript, which led him to render his decision. The bill of exceptions was allowed by said justice, and together with the transcript and the papers in the case has been certified to this court. The case is before us now upon the plaintiff's petition to establish the truth of the defendant's exceptions.
The plaintiff's contention is that the truth of said exceptions would be established by striking from said bill "the alleged exceptions numbered 'first' to 'tenth' inclusive," referring to the reasons urged against said decision in the numbered paragraphs of the bill. The plaintiff's counsel argued before us that, as these so-called exceptions were not in fact taken by the defendant, it cannot place them in its bill. The counsel further intimated that if this petition be granted, and the said paragraphs stricken out, leaving only the general exception to the decision, the plaintiff will then move to dismiss the bill, on the ground that the said exception is too general and indefinite. Since the hearing in this case the court has rendered its opinion in Blake, Trustee, v. Atlantic National Bank, 32 R. I. ——, 80 Atl. 181. In that case we denied a motion to dismiss a bill of exceptions as too general and indefinite, which contained a single exception to a decision in the same form as that taken to the decision in this case, and quoted above. This case presents the slightly different question as to whether, if a party in his bill elaborates his exceptions and enumerates the reasons on which they are based, these reasons should be stricken out in a proceeding to establish the truth of the exceptions. Perhaps this question has been sufficiently answered already in Blake, Trustee, v. Atlantic National Bank. We have thought it well, however, to treat the matter thus fully, that there may be no misunderstanding as to the form of taking exception and the form of bills of exceptions under the statute as it now stands.
First, as to the form of the exception: The office of the ordinary exception taken during the preliminary progress of the cause, while the pleadings and the...
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White v. White.
...of jurisdiction. On this view General Motors Truck Co. v. Shepard Co., 47 R.I. 153, 155, 130 A. 593, and Dunn Worsted Mills v. Allendale Worsted Mills, 33 R.I. 115, 80 A. 591, which respondent cites in support of her position that petitioner has an adequate remedy by bill of exceptions, are......
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Frappier v. Frappier, s. 8200, 8201.
...bills of exceptions is contained in the opinions in Blake v. Atlantic National Bank, 33 R.I. 109, 80 A. 181, and Dunn Worsted Mills v. Allendale Mills, 33 R.I. 115, 80 A. 591, decided a few years after the enactment of the court and practice act of 1905. And earlier, in Enos v. Rhode Island......
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Vaill v. McPhail
...418, 62 N. W. 543. What we have said in Blake v. Atlantic National Bank, 33 R. I. 109, 80 Atl. 181, and in Dunn Worsted Mills v. Allendale Worsted Mills, 33 R. I. 115, 80 Atl. 591, with regard to the form of statement of exception in a bill of exceptions, is applicable to the form of reason......
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Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. French
...for which there is no statutory warrant. See Blake v. Atlantic National Bank, 33 R.I. 109, 80 A. 181; Dunn Worsted Mills v. Allendale Worsted Mills, 33 R.I. 115, 80 A. 591, and Vaill v. McPhail, 34 R.I. 361, 375, 83 A. 1075. However, this court has consistently held that under an exception ......