Mills v. Van Kirk

Citation192 W.Va. 695,453 S.E.2d 678
Decision Date21 December 1994
Docket NumberNo. 22270,22270
CourtSupreme Court of West Virginia
PartiesRoscoe MILLS, Plaintiff Below, Appellee, v. Fred VAN KIRK, in his Official Capacity as Commissioner of West Virginia Division of Highways, Defendant Below, Appellee, Philip Keller and Donna J. Keller, Intervenors Below, Appellants.

2. When interpreting a statute, " '[t]he primary object in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature.' " Syllabus of Snider v. West Virginia Department of Commerce, 190 W.Va. 642, 441 S.E.2d 363 (1994), quoting Smith v. State Workmen's Comp. Com'r, 159 W.Va. 108, 219 S.E.2d 361 (1975). To determine the true intent of the legislature, courts are to examine the statute in its entirety and not select "any single part, provision, section, sentence, phrase or word." Syllabus Point 3, in part, Pristavec v. Westfield Ins. Co., 184 W.Va. 331, 400 S.E.2d 575 (1990).

3. Applying the plain language of the statute, abutting landowners must receive preferential treatment when purchasing state property pursuant to W.Va.Code, 17-2A-19 (1988). Under this statutory scheme, the Commissioner has the right to decide whether turnpike and railway property will be useful in the present or foreseeable future. Once this decision is made, the statute directs the Commissioner to first offer the property to the abutting landowners for fair market value.

4. A circuit court's interpretation of W.Va.Code, 17-2A-19, is entitled to no special deference and is subject to our plenary and independent review. However, absent clear legislative intent to the contrary, we do afford deference to a reasonable construction of the statute by the Commissioner because he has policymaking authority with regard to the statute.

Thomas R. Goodwin, Richard D. Owen, Goodwin & Goodwin, Charleston, for appellee Roscoe Mills.

Joyce F. Ofsa, Trina L. Leone, Spilman, Thomas & Battle, Charleston, for appellants.

Jeff Miller, Charleston, for appellee Fred Van Kirk, Com'r.

CLECKLEY, Justice:

The intervenors below and appellants, Philip Keller and Donna J. Keller, appeal an order granting summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff below and appellee, Roscoe Mills. This case concerns the proper interpretation of W.Va.Code, 17-2A-19 (1988), which provides for the disposition of certain turnpike and railroad properties. The intervenors and Fred Van Kirk, in his official capacity as Commissioner of the West Virginia Division of Highways (Commissioner), the defendant below and appellee, argue that W.Va.Code, 17-2A-19, requires abutting landowners be given a right of first refusal of the subject property at fair market value. The plaintiff argues, and the trial court found, that W.Va.Code, 17-2A-19, does not require a right of first refusal and that the Commissioner must obtain the "highest and best price" for such property.

Applying the plain language of the statute, we hold that abutting landowners must receive preferential treatment when purchasing state property pursuant to W.Va.Code, 17-2A-19. Under the statutory scheme, the Commissioner has the right to decide whether turnpike and railway property will be useful in the present or foreseeable future. Once this decision is made, the statute directs the Commissioner to first offer the property to the abutting landowners for fair market value. Fair market value is the price a willing party would pay for the property when there is no compulsion on any of the parties. Because we find the circuit court's interpretation of W.Va.Code, 17-2A-19, to be incorrect, the circuit court's order granting summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff is reversed.

I. FACTS

In 1992, the Commissioner determined that a portion of the former Gilmer, Ripley, and Ohio turnpike was not needed for the present or foreseeable future as a State road or hiking trail and could thus be sold pursuant to W.Va.Code, 17-2A-19. After obtaining an independent appraisal of the land, the Commissioner decided to subdivide the subject property and sell it through private sales to the abutting property owners for a total price of $55,350.

The intervenors are independent business people who own the abutting property to the north of the subject property. McDonald's Corporation is the owner of record of the property to the south. The intervenors accepted the Commissioner's offer to purchase the northern portion of the land for $20,900. McDonald's rejected the Commissioner's offer of $34,450 for the remaining portion of the property.

The plaintiff is not an abutting landowner. However, the plaintiff does own the McDonald's franchise on the abutting property to the south of the subject property. For sometime prior to the proposed sale, the Division of Highways leased the abandoned property both to the plaintiff and to the intervenors. The plaintiff claims that he would purchase the entire subject property for $150,000 if it were sold at a public auction.

To prevent the sale of the subject property to the intervenors, the plaintiff instituted an action for declaratory judgment pursuant to W.Va.Code, 55-13-1 (1941), and for injunctive relief against the defendant in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County on July 6, 1992. The Division of Highways then refused to proceed with the closing on its private sale of the northern portion of the abandoned turnpike to the intervenors.

In an effort to protect their interest in the property, on December 23, 1992, the intervenors filed a motion to intervene in the declaratory judgment action instituted by the plaintiff. By agreed order dated January 4, 1993, the intervenors' motion was granted. On the same date, the intervenors filed a memorandum of law in opposition to the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. By order dated February 4, 1993, the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment was denied because discovery had not been completed.

Limited discovery was conducted by the parties, after which both the plaintiff and the intervenors filed cross-motions for summary judgment with supporting legal memoranda. The primary issue before the circuit court hinged on its interpretation of W.Va.Code, 17-2A-19. This statute and its 1988 amendment are at issue in this case, and neither has been interpreted by this Court.

The circuit court agreed with the plaintiff's interpretation of the statute; and, by order dated October 22, 1993, granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff and enjoined the Commissioner from subdividing or otherwise disposing of the property other than in its entirety at a public auction. Among other findings, the circuit court determined that the statute in question did not grant a right of first refusal to abutting property owners and that the "highest and best price" provision applied in the sale of the disputed property.

II. REVIEW OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT

The summary judgment granted by the circuit court is now before this Court on appeal. As we recently stated in Syllabus Point 1 of Painter v. Peavy, 192 W.Va. 189, 451 S.E.2d 755 (1994):

"A circuit court's entry of summary judgment is reviewed de novo."

Rule 56(c) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure gives circuit courts the discretion to grant summary judgment when a moving party has shown that no genuine issue of material fact exists and the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. At the summary judgment phase, a circuit court's primary responsibility is " 'to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.' " Painter v. Peavy, 192 W.Va. at 192, 451 S.E.2d at 758, quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202, 212 (1986). Therefore, inferences from the underlying facts must be drawn in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Painter v. Peavy, supra; Masinter v. WEBCO Co., 164 W.Va. 241, 262 S.E.2d 433 (1980); Andrick v. Town of Buckhannon, 187 W.Va. 706, 421 S.E.2d 247 (1992). However, the party opposing a motion for summary judgment must offer sufficient evidence "for a reasonable jury to find in a nonmoving party's favor." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. at 2512, 91 L.Ed.2d at 214. If the nonmoving party fails to present satisfactory evidence showing the existence of a genuine issue of fact and inquiry concerning the facts is not desirable to clarify application of the law, then summary judgment is appropriate.

After evaluating this case in light of the foregoing principles, we find that the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff. As will be discussed below, the circuit court incorrectly interpreted the provisions of W.Va.Code, 17-2A-19.

III. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

In the proceedings below, all the parties agreed that the central issue was the interpretation of the requirements of W.Va.Code, 17-2A-19. 1 The pertinent section of the Code provides for the disposition of land deemed by the defendant as "not necessary or desirable for present or presently foreseeable future state road purposes[.]" 2

The arguments of the Commissioner and intervenors are largely consistent in that they both disagree with the plaintiff's interpretation of the statute. Under their interpretation, the statute requires that abutting landowners be given the right of first refusal for the subject property at fair market value. However, the plaintiff links himself to the phrase in the statute that requires the Commissioner to sell the property at the "highest and best price." This phrase, according to the plaintiff, applies to all provisions of the statute and requires the Commissioner to obtain the highest price not only at a public auction but at a private sale as well. Consequently, under this theory, the right of first refusal for abutting...

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    ...the general purpose of the legislation." (internal quotations and citations omitted)); Syl. pt. 2, in part, Mills v. Van Kirk, 192 W.Va. 695, 453 S.E.2d 678 (1994) ("To determine the true intent of the legislature, courts are to examine the statute in its entirety and not select `any single......
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