Mills v. White Castle System, Inc.

• Decision Date: 19 April 1988
• Docket Number: Docket No. 95232
• Citation: 421 N.W.2d 631,167 Mich.App. 202
• Parties: Deborah M. MILLS and Carolyn Ellis, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. WHITE CASTLE SYSTEM, INC., a foreign corporation, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 631

421 N.W.2d 631

167 Mich.App. 202

Deborah M. MILLS and Carolyn Ellis, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. WHITE CASTLE SYSTEM, INC., a foreign corporation, Defendant-Appellee.

Docket No. 95232.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted Jan. 12, 1988.

Decided March 9, 1988.

Released for Publication April 19, 1988.

Gary Houghton, Warren, for plaintiffs-appellants.

Zamplas, Paskin, Nagi, Baxter, Johnson & Walker, P.C. by Jeannette A. Paskin, Detroit, for defendant-appellee.

Before J.H. GILLIS, P.J., and WEAVER and ALLEN, ^* JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiffs appeal as of right from the trial court's order granting defendant's motion for summary disposition. MCR 2.116(C)(8). We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Plaintiffs' complaint alleges that at 2 a.m. on August 17, 1985, plaintiffs and two companions parked their automobile in defendant's parking lot. Plaintiffs and their friends observed a group of seven or eight people standing outside of another vehicle. These people were drinking alcohol, using obscenities and "noticeably acting like disorderly persons." Plaintiffs and their companions ignored the group and entered the restaurant. Forty minutes later, plaintiffs and their friends left defendant's business and plaintiffs were attacked by the same group of unruly persons they had observed earlier. During the attack, one of plaintiffs' companions reentered defendant's establishment and asked the manager to call the police. The manager refused to call the police, refused to allow plaintiffs' friend to call the police and told plaintiffs' friend to go across the street and use a public telephone to summon the police. Defendant's restaurant was located at Eight Mile and Gratiot Roads. Plaintiffs further alleged that the delay in summoning the police allowed the unruly group to continue its attack and, in fact, to leave the area before the police arrived. Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that defendant was negligent in failing to maintain its premises in a safe and prudent manner because it allowed unruly patrons to congregate in its parking lot and, thereby, to attack plaintiffs and because it failed, refused or neglected to allow plaintiffs' friend to call the police so that they could aid plaintiffs.

Defendant moved for summary disposition, claiming that plaintiffs had failed to state a cause of action upon which relief could be granted. Defendant read plaintiffs' complaint as alleging that it owed plaintiffs a duty to protect them from attack by unknown third persons or to intercede on their behalf when the attack occurred. Defendant claimed that plaintiffs were, in reality, alleging that it owed them a duty to provide police protection. Defendant alleged that it owed no such duty. Defendant further alleged that even if its employees had called the police there was no guarantee that the police would have responded.

The trial court granted defendant's motion, holding that defendant did not owe plaintiffs a duty to protect them from assaults by third persons.

A motion for summary disposition for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, MCR 2.116(C)(8), is tested by the pleadings alone. Beaudin v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co., 157 Mich.App. 185, 187, 403 N.W.2d 76 (1986). Only the legal basis of the complaint is examined. Id. The factual allegations of the complaint are accepted as true, along with any inferences which may fairly be drawn therefrom. Id. Unless the claim is so clearly unenforceable as a matter of law that no factual development could possibly justify recovery, the motion should be denied. Id.

In Williams v. Cunningham Drug Stores, Inc., 429 Mich. 495, 418 N.W.2d 381 (1988), plaintiff Willie Williams was shopping in the defendant's store, which was located in a high-crime area in Detroit. While the defendant generally had a plainclothes security guard on duty, the guard was ill on that day and the defendant was robbed. The plaintiff was injured when he inadvertently ran out behind the robber in the ensuing panic and was shot. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant had breached its duty to exercise reasonable care for the safety of its patrons by failing to provide armed, visible security guards and by failing to intercede on the plaintiff's behalf after learning that a robbery was in progress.

Our Supreme Court noted:

"In determining standards of conduct in the area of negligence, the courts have made a distinction between misfeasance, or active misconduct causing personal injury, and nonfeasance, which is passive inaction or the failure to actively protect others from harm. The common law has been slow in recognizing liability for nonfeasance because the courts are reluctant to force persons to help one another and because such conduct does not create a new risk of harm to a potential plaintiff. Thus, as a general rule, there is no duty that obligates one person to aid or protect another.

"Social policy, however, has led the courts to recognize an exception to this general rule where a special relationship exists between a plaintiff and a defendant. Thus, a common carrier may be obligated to protect its passengers, an innkeeper his guests, and an employer his employees. The rationale behind imposing a duty to protect in these special relationships is based on control. In each situation one person entrusts himself to the control and protection of another, with a consequent loss of control to protect himself. The duty to protect is imposed upon the person in control because he is best able to provide a place of safety.

"Owners and occupiers of land are in a special relationship with their invitees and comprise the largest group upon whom an affirmative duty to protect is imposed. The possessor of land has a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect invitees from an unreasonable risk of harm caused by a dangerous condition of the land. Consequently, a landlord may be held liable for an unreasonable risk of harm caused by a dangerous condition in the areas of common use retained in his control such as lobbies, hallways, stairways and elevators. Likewise, a business invitor or merchant may be held liable for injuries resulting from negligent maintenance of the premises or defects in the physical structure of the building.

"The duty a possessor of land owes his invitees is not absolute, however. It does not extend to conditions from which an unreasonable risk cannot be anticipated or to dangers so obvious and apparent that an invitee may be expected to discover them himself. Furthermore, 'the occupier is not an insurer of the safety of invitees, and his duty is only to exercise reasonable care for their protection.' " Id., at...