Milne v. Berman

• Decision Date: 11 November 1974
• Docket Number: No. 73 Civ. 5397.,73 Civ. 5397.
• Citation: 384 F. Supp. 206
• Parties: Ronald MILNE, Individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiff, and Douglas Streeter et al., Intervenor-Plaintiffs, v. Leonard BERMAN, Individually and as Commissioner of the Westchester County Department of Social Services, and Abe Lavine, Individually and as Commissioner of the New York State Department of Social Services, Defendants, and George E. Boisvert, Individually and as Commissioner of the Ontario County Department of Social Services, Intervenor-Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

384 F. Supp. 206

Ronald MILNE, Individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiff and Douglas Streeter et al., Intervenor-Plaintiffs, v. Leonard BERMAN, Individually and as Commissioner of the Westchester County Department of Social Services, and Abe Lavine, Individually and as Commissioner of the New York State Department of Social Services, Defendants and George E. Boisvert, Individually and as Commissioner of the Ontario County Department of Social Services, Intervenor-Defendants.

No. 73 Civ. 5397.

United States District Court, S. D. New York.

November 11, 1974.

Gerald A. Norlander, Mount Vernon, N. Y. (The Legal Aid Society of Westchester County, Mount Vernon, N. Y., Martin A. Schwartz, White Plains, Catherine E. Cronin, New Rochelle, and Hilary Sohmer, Yorkers, N. Y., Legal Aid Society of Westchester County, of counsel), for plaintiffs.

Gerald A. McIntyre, Corning, N. Y. (Monroe County Legal Assistance Corp., Flood Disaster Relief Project), for intervenor-plaintiffs.

Amy Juviler, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Louis J. Lefkowitz, Atty. Gen. of N. Y., of counsel), for defendant Lavine.

Richard W. McAtamney, White Plains, N. Y. (Harry Lott, Westchester County Atty.), for defendant Berman.

Harrison S. Downs, Canandaigua, N. Y., for intervenor-defendant.

Before OAKES, Circuit Judge, and BONSAL and WYATT, District Judges.

OPINION

OAKES, Circuit Judge:

The named plaintiff and intervenor plaintiffs, welfare recipients, herein collectively "plaintiffs," seek on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and damages against the Commissioner of the New York State Department of Social Services and the Commissioner of the Westchester County Department of Social Services. Plaintiffs claim that a New York welfare statute, N.Y.Soc. Serv.Law § 131(10) (McKinney's Consol.Laws, § 55 Supp.1973), and a regulation of the New York State Department of Social Services promulgated pursuant thereto, 18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 385.7,¹ violate the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. The statute and regulation disqualify from receipt of assistance for 75 days persons who voluntarily terminate their employment or reduce their earning capacity for the purpose of qualifying for Home Relief or Aid to Families with Dependent Children. The claims of plaintiffs, as later more fully discussed, are specifically directed to a further provision of the statute and regulation which states that a person who applies for assistance within 75 days after voluntarily terminating his employment or reducing his earning capacity shall "be deemed" to have done so "for the purpose of qualifying for such assistance or a larger amount thereof, in the absence of evidence to the contrary supplied by such person."

Jurisdiction of this court is based upon 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 since plaintiffs' complaint alleges a substantial claim involving the denial by defendants, acting under color of state law, of rights guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. Declaratory relief is sought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201, injunctive relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2202 and compensatory and punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 534-543, 94 S.Ct. 1372, 1378-1382, 39 L.Ed.2d 577 (1974).

Because plaintiffs seek to enjoin the enforcement of a state statute, N.Y. Soc.Serv.Law § 131(10) (McKinney Supp.1973), on the ground that it is contrary to the Constitution of the United States, a three-judge court was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281, 2284.

I.

There are before the court motions from three separate movants: plaintiffs, intervenors and defendant Lavine. The first motions to be considered will be those by plaintiffs (1) for an order determining that the action may be maintained as a class action (Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(c)(1)), and (2) for "final summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs for the declaratory and injunctive relief prayed for in paragraphs (D), (E) and (F) of the Wherefore Clause of the Amended Complaint" (Fed.R.Civ.P. 56). We shall first consider the summary judgment motion and later treat the class action motion.

A. Summary judgment.

Section 131(10) of the New York Social Services Law provides as follows:

Any person who voluntarily terminated his employment or voluntarily reduced his earning capacity for the purpose of qualifying for home relief or aid to dependent children or a larger amount thereof shall be disqualified from receiving such assistance for seventy-five days from such termination or reduction, unless otherwise required by federal law or regulation. Any person who applies for home relief or aid to dependent children or requests an increase in his grant within seventy-five days after voluntarily terminating his employment or reducing his earning capacity shall, unless otherwise required by federal law or regulation, be deemed to have voluntarily terminated his employment or reduced his earning capacity for the purpose of qualifying for such assistance or a larger amount thereof, in the absence of evidence to the contrary supplied by such person.

(Emphasis added.)

Plaintiffs make three basic arguments:

1. The statutory presumption of a wrongful intent to obtain welfare benefits is irrational and thus violates the due process clause because there is a logically insufficient connection between provable facts (that an applicant voluntarily terminated his employment or reduced his earning capacity) and the presumed fact (that he did so for the purpose of qualifying for assistance or a larger amount thereof);

2. The challenged statute operates conclusively to presume essential facts in violation of the due process clause because plaintiffs are not afforded timely hearings — they have no opportunity to rebut the presumption of the statute and regulations at the time they apply for assistance and, by the time the State actually holds a hearing at which rebuttal evidence can be introduced and renders a final decision, the 75 days referred to in the statute have expired; and

3. The statute violates the equal protection clause because it arbitrarily burdens the plaintiffs' class with a presumption of ill motive — other applicants for public assistance being entitled to apply and have their eligibility assessed free of any negative presumption.

Since we agree with the plaintiffs on their first point, it is unnecessary for us at this stage to reach the second or the third.

On its face, the challenged statute provides that a person who applies for public assistance within 75 days after the voluntary termination of his employment is presumed to have terminated his employment "for the purpose of qualifying for . . . assistance . . ., in the absence of evidence to the contrary supplied by such person." The regulation in question in subparagraph (b) simply restates this.

The statute creates a rebuttable presumption that an applicant terminated his employment with a wrongful purpose that justifies a 75-day hiatus before public assistance begins. A legislative presumption cannot stand, however, "when it is entirely arbitrary, or creates an invidious discrimination, or operates to deprive a party of a reasonable opportunity to present the pertinent facts in his defense." Bandini Petroleum Co. v. Superior Court, 284 U.S. 8, 19, 52 S.Ct. 103, 107, 76 L.Ed. 136 (1931) (holding that there was a "manifest connection" between the proven fact, blowing, release or escape of natural gas, and the presumed fact, unreasonable waste). A statutory presumption is not arbitrary only if "it can at least be said with substantial assurance that the presumed fact is more likely than not to flow from the proved fact on which it is made to depend." Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 36, 89 S.Ct. 1532, 1548, 23 L.Ed.2d 57 (1969) (presumption of knowledge that marijuana was illegally imported), following Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 63 S.Ct. 1241, 87 L.Ed. 1519 (1943) (the possession of a firearm and ammunition presumptive evidence that the firearm or ammunition was transported or received in violation of the Federal Firearms Act). Accord, United States v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136, 86 S.Ct. 279, 15 L.Ed.2d 210 (1965) (possession, custody or control of still, presumed by statute from presence at site unless defendant explains presence violates due process clause). Thus, if there is a logical nexus between the proven fact and the presumed fact, the statutory presumption can be upheld. Bandini Petroleum Co. v. Superior Court, supra; Mobile, Jackson & Kansas City Railroad Co. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35, 43-44, 31 S.Ct. 136, 55 L.Ed. 78 (1910). But where such a connection is lacking, due process is violated. United States Department of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508, 93 S. Ct. 2832, 37 L.Ed.2d 767 (1973) (food stamps); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 93 S.Ct. 2230, 37 L.Ed.2d 63 (1973) (resident tuition); Owens v. Roberts, 377 F.Supp. 45 (M.D.Fla.1974) (three-judge court) (statute relating to transfer of assets as exclusion from welfare eligibility creates rebuttable but irrational presumption that such transfer was for the purpose of becoming eligible for welfare assistance); DeKalb Real Estate Board, Inc. v. Chairman and Board of Commissioners of Roads, 372 F.Supp. 748, 753-754 (N.D.Ga.1973) (posting of sign by real estate broker improperly creates prima facie case of intentional "block-busting").

We hold that the statutory rebuttable presumption is irrational and in violation of the due process clause because there is an insufficient connection between the known fact, that is, application for public assistance within 75 days of an applicant's termination of employment, and the fact presumed by the statute, that is, that the applicant terminated his employment for the purpose of qualifying for public assistance.

Plaintiffs here are all applicants for Home...